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PREFACE
The Korean question is a long historical puzzle which has remained unsolved over four decades. Although, it has been regarded as
a closed question by many, the Korean people are still suffering this
national tragedy imposed by outside powers. The situation is analogous to having family members out of touch, sight, and sound on the
opposite bank of a river. Almost all of the Korean people have some
family members or friends on the other side. Furthermore, the Korean division is still the source of bitter troubles and tensions since it
greatly hampers the development of the Korean nation. It thus remains a plaguing problem to the Korean people.
Voluminous books and articles on the Korean question have been
published. Many of them concentrate on describing the expressed policies of South and North Korea. Many objective observes fail, however, to offer positive suggestions for unification, or a legal analysis for
unification planning.
This book was not written by an objective observer, but by a Korean who is also suffering the national tragedy and who is determined
to devote his whole life to the task of unification. Thus, this book studies feasible ways for Korean unification through the legal analysis of
the various relations and facts connected to the Korean question. The
book consists of three chapters. Chapter One analyzes under the principles of international law the status of the parties to the Korean Armistice Agreement, and South Korea's status in the Agreement.
Chapter Two deals with the de facto dissolution of the United Nations
Command in Korea and the peace-keeping mechanisms in Korea
without the Command. Chapter Three offers workable solutions and
concrete means for Korean unification.
I am greatly indebted to Korea University and the Korean Ministry of Education for supporting my stay in the United States for one
year, and to the Law School of the University of Maryland for receiving me as a visiting scholar. I am very grateful to Professor Hungdah
Chiu for his kind arrangement for my stay in the United States and his
assistance in this publication. I am also grateful to Professors Pak ZaiSup and Park Choon-Ho, Former Agriculture Minister Chang DukChin, Mr. Park Kye-Dong, Mr. Kim Hyung-Soo, Mr. Lee Sang-Hap
and Mr. Roh Kun-Woo for their assistance to me during my stay in
the United States. I would also like to extend my gratitude to several
persons who edited and corrected this book, particularly Mr. Mitchell
(vii)
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A. Silk. Finally, I am particularly appreciative of my wife, Kim NaeHyun, for her great patience in allowing her husband to spend all his
·
time in the office.
Lyou, Byung-Hwa

PEACE AND UNIFICATION IN KOREA AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW

Lyou, Byung-Hwa
CHAPTER ONE. THE KOREAN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
The international legal problems stemming from the Korean Armistice Agreement are principally related to the definition of the legal
parties to the agreement. The complex composition of the legal parties
confuses the legal situation of the agreement. As is well known, South
Korea opposed in vain, after much sacrifice, the conclusion of the Korean Armistice Agreement, which did not solve the problem of the
division of Korea. As a result, the question whether South Korea is a
legal party to the Korean Armistice Agreement or not has been subject to much dispute. 1 The answer would be a decisive factor in legal
interpretation and a future solution of the Korean problem.
This study concentrates on analyzing the legal reality of this
problem, based on the concrete situation and historical facts of the
Korean problem, and tries to offer a reasonable solution to this delicate problem.
Section A.

1.

Conclusion Of The Korean Armistice Agreement

Negotiations between the United Nations Command and the
Communist Side

Just after the North Korean invasion of South Korea on June 25,
1950, the United Nations demanded that North Korea halt its attack
and withdraw its troops to the north of the 38th Parallel. 2 Given its
strategically favorable position, it would have been out of the question
for North Korea to agree. Negotiations became possible only after the
United Nations Forces' victorious amphibious operation of Inchon on
September 15, 1950 and the North Korean retreat to the north of the
38th Parallel. The question whether the United Nations Forces might
cross the 38th Parallel or simply conclude an armistice agreement
I. Lyou Byung-Hwa, Le Commandement des Nations Unies en Coree et Ses Problemes
Juridiques, Seoul: 1980, pp. 74-93.
2. UN Security Council Resolution 82, 25 June 1950, UN Document S/1501, in Republic of Korea (ROK) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Resolutions of the United Nations Principal Organs Relating to Korea (1947-1976), Seoul, 1976, pp. 132-133.

(1)
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arose among the states composing the United Nations Forces. From a
political and military viewpoint, crossing the 38th Parallel and destroying North Korean forces was the most certain way of guaranteeing peace on the Korean peninsula; but, on the other hand, that would
risk triggering Communist Chinese 3 intervention in the War. 4 After
some discussion and hesitation, the United Nations Command under
the leadership of United States finally decided to cross the 38th Parallel and destroy North Korean forces. At the same time, the Command
tried to persuade Communist China not to intervene, explaining that
the United Nations Command would not encroach on Chinese interests. Although Communist China repeated warnings that it would not
tolerate the United Nations Command crossing the 38th Parallel, 5 on
October 7, 1950, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a
Resolution which confirmed the United Nations Command's decision
to cross the 38th Parallel. 6 Then on October 26, 1950, Communist
China intervened "unofficially" en masse in the Korean war, changing
the war radically.
Confronted with this new development, the Commander-in-Chief
of the United Nations Command requested authorization to extend
the combat area outside the Korean peninsula to prevent the continuing participation of Communist Chinese forces. He also asked for reinforcement of the UN Forces in order to defeat the massive Chinese
forces. The Allied Nations feared the expansion of war, and limited
the military operation to the Korean Peninsula. 7 Furthermore, they
hesitated in condemning the intervention of Communist China and
tried to induce the Chinese to negotiate an armistice.
In October 1950, the UN General Assembly held a meeting to
discuss the possibility of an armistice. In the First Committee of the
General Assembly, thirteen Arab-Asian nations proposed to establish
the Group of Three, composed of India, Iran, and Canada. The
3. In the early 1950s, only a small number of countries recognized the People's Republic of China. It was generally referred to as Communist China. Thus, in Chapter I
"Communist China" is used, while in Chapters II and III the "People's Republic of China"
is used.
4. U.S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (1950), (hereinafter referred to as FRUS) VII (Korea), Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office (GPO),
1976, pp. 813-816.
5. Leland M. Goodrich, Korea: A Study of U.S. Policy in the United Nations, New
York: Council of Foreign Relations, 1956, reprint 1972, pp. 136-139.
6. U.N.G.A. Res. 376(V) (Oct. 7, 1950), no. 16.
7. Courtney Whitney, "The War McArthur Was Not Allowed to Win," Life, Sept. 5,
1955, p. 68; U.S. Dept. of State, FRUS (1951), vol. VII, Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1983,
pp. 41-60.
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Group of Three discussed an armistice with the United Nations Command, while the United States proposed basic conditions for an armistice: a complete cessation of hostilities in the Korean peninsula; the
establishment of a demilitarized zone about 20 miles in width; the disposition of armed forces to assure the cease-fire; the supervision of the
cease-fire by the United Nations Commission; a cessation of the enforcement of armed forces; an exchange of prisoners of war; aneta
confirmation of the cease-fire arrangement by the UN General
Assembly. 8
The other Allied Nations worried about Communist China and
urged the United States not to expand the war outside Korea, and to
seek all available means to achieve the armistice. One of the Group of
Three, the Canadian, Pearson, supported by the British Commonwealth, proposed the so-called Five Principles, which even included
elements of appeasement: an immediate cease-fire; the pursuit of further steps toward peace; the gradual withdrawal of all foreign troops,
combined with the appropriate arrangements for the establishment of
a Korean Government in accordance with the principles of the United
Nations; an appropriate interim arrangement would be made for the
administration of Korea and the maintenance of peace; after the ceasefire, the establishment of appropriate committee for the settlement of
the Far Eastern problem, including the problem of Taiwan and the
representation of China in the United Nations.
However, Communist China, being in a favorable strategic position, continued to reject all the propositions of armistice, demanding
unacceptable conditions, such as the withdrawal of all foreign troops
from Korea, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Taiwan, and thereplacement of Nationalist China by the People's Republic in the United
Nations. 9
Finally, the United States Secretary of State Acheson declared the
futility of trying to negotiate with Communist China, and proposed a
resolution of the UN General Assembly condemning Communist
China as an aggressor. The worries and pressure of other Allied Nations were not quelled. 10 Through long and tiresome efforts, the
United States persuaded the other Allied Nations and the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 498(V) on February 1,
1951, which condemned Communist China as an aggressor, and au8. Goodrich, supra note 5, p. 159.
9. UN Bulletin (Jan. 15, 1951), vol. 10; U.N. Doc. A/C 1/653, FRUS, supra note 7,
pp. 91-92.
10. U.S. Dept. of State, Bulletin, Vol. 24 (January 29, 1951), p. 164; FRUS, supra note
7, pp. 92-93.
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thorized the necessary additional measures of the Collective Measure
Committee to repel Chinese forces. The Resolution also expressed the
Allied Nations desire for a cease-fire in Korea. 11
Still, however, the attitude of the Allied Nations did not change
after the adoption of Resolution 498(V). They continued to urge the
United States to seek a cease-fire. Nevertheless, the Commander-inChief of the United Nations Command, General MacArthur, insisted
on strong measures against Communist China and after he expressed
his view directly in the United States Congress through Congressman
J.W. Martin on April 5, 1951, President Truman replaced him with
General Ridgway on April 11, 1951.'2 With this unfortunate event,
the direction of the policy of the United Nations Command changed,
leaning toward arriving at the negotiation of an armistice with the
Communist counterpart as soon as possible, rather than attempting to
solve the Korean question concretely. In other words, the policy of
the United Nations Command was to get out of the Korean War without damaging its honor. It thus lacked a positive objective, most notably the reunification of Korea.
From January of 1951, the war situation began to change in favor
of the United Nations Command. In March, the United Nations
Command again faced the problem of recrossing the 38th Parallel.
However, the Allied Nations were extremely reluctant to do so. They
intended neither to reinforce the United Nations Forces enough to defeat Communist Chinese forces, nor to wage a major attack against the
enemy. The United States Government instructed the Commander-inChief of the United Nations Command not to cross the 38th Parallel
without prior consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United
States. As a matter of fact, it is clear now that they wanted to get out
of Korea without damaging their honor. 13
However, the Communists never seemed to pay attention to the
armistice proposal of the Allied Nations. The Allied Nations thus
very reluctantly adopted Resolution 500 of the UN General Assembly
on May 18, 1951, as an additional measure, recommending an embargo on Communist China and North Korea. 14 On the other hand,
the powerless South Korean Government utilized every effort to persuade the United States to continue their military operation until the
Korean problem was solved.
11.
12.
13.
14.

U.N.G.A. Res. 498(V), A/PV 327, (February 1, 1951).
FRUS, supra note 7, pp. 298-301.
Ibid., pp. 189-194, 320-330, 353-362.

U.N.G.A. Res. 500(V) (18 May 1951).
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Facing the continued deterioration of the war situation, the Communists began to express hope for an armistice. On June 23, 1951, the
Soviet Representative to the United Nations, Yakov Malik, expressed
such hope in a radio broadcast on "The Price of Peace" sponsored by
the United Nations radio:
The Soviet people further believe that the most acute problem of the present day- the problem of the armed conflict
in Korea - could also be settled. This would require the
readiness of the Parties to enter on the path of a peaceful
settlement of the Korean question. The Soviet people believe
that as a first step discussion should be started between the
belligerents for a cease-fire and an armistice providing for the
mutual withdrawal of forces from the 38th Parallel. Can
such a step be taken? I think it can, provided there is a sincere desire to put an end to the bloody fighting in Korea. 15
As soon as this broadcast was delivered, the U.S. Department of
State issued a welcoming statement. The statement said that the Allied Nations were ready, as they had always been, to play their part in
bringing an end to hostilities and in preventing their resumption, if the
Communists were willing to end the aggression in Korea. Two days
later, President Truman also made a similar statement. 16
Communist China's official newspaper, the People's Daily, on
June 25, 1951, endorsed the armistice proposal of MalikY On June
27, the Soviet Union's Deputy Foreign Minister Gromyko also confirmed this idea to the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow, Mr. Kirk, but
also indicated that the arrangement would have a purely military disposition without involving any political or territorial matters. 18
Finally, at the United States Government's instruction, the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command, General Ridgway,
broadcast a concrete proposal for the negotiation of an armistice
through the United Nations Forces Radio on June 30, 1951. According to the proposal, if the Communist side desired a meeting to discuss
an armistice providing for the cessation of hostilities, with adequate
guarantees for the maintenance of such an armistice, the United Nations Command would be prepared to name its representative. This
proposal also suggested a Danish hospital ship, Jutlandia in Wonsan
15. FRUS, supra note 7, p. 547.
.
16. U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin (July 9, 1951), p. 45; Harry S. Truman: Public Papers
of the President of the United States, Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1951, pp. 362-363.
17. Goodrich, supra note 5, p. 183.
18. FRUS, supra note 7, p. 561.

6

CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES

Harbor, as a place of meeting. 19
The Communist side responded quickly to the proposal of the
United Nations Command, and confirmed their willingness to negotiate an armistice. The Communist side proposed that such a meeting
should be held in Kaesong on the 38th Parallel. They also suggested
that they would be prepared to meet the delegates of the United Nations Command between 10 and 15 July, 1951,2°
After the exchange of several messages between the commanders
of both sides, 21 they decided that the preliminary meeting would be
held in Kaesong22 on July 8.2 3 They also agreed that each delegation
would be composed of three liaison officers and two interpreters
respectively. 24
The first meeting of liaison officers of both sides took place in
Kaesong on July 8. They agreed to open- and did in fact hold- the
first conference in Kaesong on July 10, 195I.25 The Communist delegation, under the North Korean General Nam II, was composed of
North Korean and Communist Chinese Generals. The United Nations delegation, whose head was Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, was
composed of American Generals and one South Korean General, Paik
Sun-Yup. The other nations contributing forces to the United Nations
Command did not participate in this negotiation.
Conflicts arose at the onset. There were difficulties even in adopting the agenda of the conference. 26 The Communist side insisted that
certain political questions such as withdrawal of foreign troops from
Korea should be included in the agenda, while the United Nations
Command tried to limit the agenda to military questions. The Communist side also insisted that the establishment of the 38th Parallel as
the military demarcation line between both sides should be pre-determined and included in the agenda. 27 In addition, the Communist side
hampered the participation of the newsmen of the UN side at the conference. However, after some patient negotiations, both sides agreed
to adopt the following agenda: 28
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. 25 (July 9, 1951), p. 43.
FRUS, supra note 7, p. 609.
U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin (July 9, 1951), p. 43.
Ibid., p. 44.
FRUS, supra note 7, p. 623.
Ibid., p. 624.
Ibid., p. 652.
Ibid., pp. 652-653.
Ibid., p. 653.
U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin (August 6, 1951), pp. 231-232.
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adoption of the agenda
fixing a military demarcation line between both sides so
as to establish a demilitarized zone as a basic condition
for a cessation of hostilities in Korea
111.
concrete arrangements for the realization of a cease-fire
and an armistice in Korea, including the composition,
authority and functions of a supervising organization
for carrying out the terms of a cease-fire and armistice
1v. arrangements relating to prisoners of war
v. recommendations to the governments of the countries
concerned on both sides.
Among the major differences between the two sides on the negotiation of the armistice, the first major obstacle was the location of the
demarcation line. 29 The Communists insisted that the demarcation
line should be based on the 38th Parallel because the war broke out at
the 38th Parallel, and this was an historical fact that both sides had to
respect. On the other hand, the United Nations Command proposed
that the actual military battle line should be the demarcation line, on
the grounds that it would reflect a military reality and it would be a
more defensible line. Furthermore, the 38th Parallel would be only an
imaginary line from a military viewpoint, because it did not reflect any
physical conditions of the territory, and the Communists already had
violated it.
Painful negotiations lasted for more than three months. The
heated oral disputes were interrupted two times in August, and resulted in a long recess until October.
From the onset, the South Korean Government made it clear that
it was ardently opposed to the demarcation line around the 38th Parallel. While the United States attempted to assure them of its inevitability, all stratas of Korean society still expressed an emotional shock
over the idea of stabilizing the demarcation line, despite the fact that
the war situation favored the United Nations Command. The United
States Government explained that a major advance to the north of the
38th Parallel would risk a third world war which would bring disaster
even to Korea. The Korean Government, however, insisted that an
armistice without solving the Korean division would result in surrendering Korea and the defeat of the United Nations side. The end result was a stalemate. 30
The difficulty of the conference was in part due to its location 1.

u.

29. FRUS, supra note 7, pp. 694, 710, 738, 763, 774.
30. Ibid., pp. 737, 740-745.
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Kaesong - because the Kaesong area belonged to the Communist
zone. Therefore, both sides agreed to a move from Kaesong to
Panmunjom, which was an adjacent areaY
This long, fruitless discussion tired both sides, and the United
Nations Command proposed a new concrete proposal, which embodied the following points:
- The present line of contact as jointly determined by
the sub-delegations will constitute a provisional military demarcation line, and two lines, 2 km from the demarcation
lines, will constitute the southern and northern boundaries of
a provisional demilitarized zone.
- The above provisional military demarcation line and
the above provisional demilitarized zone based upon the
present line of contact shall become effective with any armistice agreement signed within 30 days after this agreement is
accepted by the two delegations in plenary session.
- If an armistice agreement is not signed by the end of
the 30 day period, the then existing line of contact will be
determined jointly by the sub-delegations, and will constitute
a new provisional military demarcation line which will be
the median line of a new provisional demilitarized zone, to
be effective under such conditions as will be at the time generally agreed to by the delegations of both sides. 32
The reaction of the Communist delegation to this proposal was
comparatively favorable. Thus, after some minor modifications, both
sides agreed to these principles, and concentrated on determining the
actual line of contact, which was agreed on November 26, 1951. 33
The second major difference in the armistice negotiations concerned the power and function of the supervisory organ which would
carry out the terms of the armistice agreement. The Communists were
opposed to a strong supervisory organ. They viewed a supervisory organ empowered to inspect and have access to North Korean territory
as an interference in internal affairs. The United Nations Command
insisted, however, that the effective function and free access of the supervisory organ were necessary to ensure the fragile peace of this region after the conclusion of the armistice agreement. The two sides
finally compromised, agreeing to install inspection teams at five ports
on each side, and establish several mobile inspection units to investi31. Ibid., pp. 848-854.
32. Ibid., p. 1147.
33. Ibid., p. 1186.
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gate alleged violations of the armistice agreement. " 34
The third difference between the two sides involved the western
coastal islands under the control of the United Nations Command.
These five coastal islands were located substantially north of the general line of contact between the two sides. The Communists demanded that United Nations Forces withdraw from the coastal islands
in accordance with the demarcation line on the mainland, while the
United Nations Command sought to retain the islands unless suitable
adjustments were made elsewhere. The Communists refused to accept
the position of the United Nations Command and so the United Nations Command continued to occupy the islands. 35
The fourth and most divisive difference concerned prisoners of
war. First of all, the Communist count of prisoners of war differed
greatly from the number claimed earlier. The total number listed by
the Communists was only 11,559 prisoners, composed of 7,142 South
Korean soldiers and 4,417 United Nations soldiers, while the total
number claimed earlier exceeded 65,000. On the other hand, the
number of the POWs listed by the United Nations Command totalled
132,000, with another 37,000 having been recently reclassified as civilian internees. The 132,000 POWs held by the United Nations Command were composed of 95,531 North Koreans, 20,700 Chinese and
16,243 South Koreans. The 16,243 South Koreans had been domiciled in South Korea before June 25, 1950, and a large number of them
had been forced to fight against South Korean forces after June 25 by
North Korean forces. 36 It appeared that there were many United Nations POWs alive but not included on the Communist list because the
POW camps identified by the Communists comprised only a portion
of the POW camps located in North Korea and omitted all POW
camps located in Communist China. 37 Moreover, the South Korean
Government pressured the United States Government to secure the
release of more than 20,000 South Korean civilians kidnapped by the
Communist occupation in 1950. 38
The most difficult problem was how to exchange the prisoners of
war. The Communists insisted on the unconditional exchange of all
POWs they held, for all POWs held by the United Nations Command.
The United Nations Command, however, proposed the exchange of
34. Ibid., pp. 1187-1193.
35. Ibid., pp. 1216-1221.
36. Walter G. Hermes, United States Army in the Korean War: Truce Tent and Fighting Front, Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1966, p. 141.
37. FRUS, supra note 7, p. 1399.
38. Ibid., p. 1252.
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prisoners of war on an individual basis, according to the wishes of
individual prisoners. In other words, the Communists insisted on an
involuntary repatriation in which all prisoners of war would be returned to the side for which they were fighting at the time of capture.
On the other hand, the United Nations Command refused the forced
repatriation of prisoners against their own will. 39
Several months passed without any progress. The reason why
this problem was difficult to resolve was that many prisoners of war
who had suffered so much under the Communist regime forcibly resisted their return to North Korea, even at the risk of seeing their
families separated. The first global screening showed that among the
132,000 Communist prisoners of war and 37,000 civil internees held
by the United Nations Command, as many as half of them resisted
return to the Communist side. The Communists, knowing this fact,
would not agree to the voluntary repatriation of prisoners of war. On
the one hand, they would be in desperate need of human resources
after the drastic reduction of population during the war. Yet, on the
other hand, there would be a disastrous effect on public opinion due to
the fact that as many as half of the Communist prisoners of war refused to return. Thus the Communists worried about the possible result of normal negotiations. They instigated several violent riots in the
United Nations Command POW camps, with prisoners resisting and
obstructing the screening operation. As a result, several prisoners and
guards were killed and wounded. 40 The Communists also criticized
the United Nations Command, claiming major violations of the international law of war, including the bombing of civilians, and the use of
bacteriological weapons. 41
Considering these facts, the United Nations Command did its
best to reduce the number of prisoners of war resisting return to the
Communist side. First, the United Nations Command informed the
POWs of Communist broadcasts seeking to persuade the prisoners to
return to the Communist side. Second, the questions in screening interviews were designed to encourage the maximum number of prisoners to return to the Communist side. Only the prisoners who
expressed the strongest resistance, such as committing suicide or fighting to die in cases of forced repatriation, were excluded on the list for
39. Ibid., p. 1417.
40. FRUS (1952-1954), vol. XV (Korea), pt. 1, Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1984, p. 153.
41. Rosalin Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping 1946-1967, vol. II, London: Oxford
University Press, 1970, pp. 188-191.
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repatriation. 42 As a result of such interviews, 753 prisoners of war
reversed their initial decisions and decided to return to the Communist
side. But still the number of 753 prisoners was not enough to mitigate
the strong opposition of the Communist side. 43 Thus, the negotiations
continued in a deadlock.
In an effort to end the war quickly, the United Nations Command
proposed an overall settlement of remaining issues. The contents of
the so-called "package proposal" were: (1) the United Nations Command would accept the Communist position on air-field reconstruction; (2) the Communist side would accept the United Nations
Command's position excluding the Soviet Union from the Military
Armistice commission; (3) the Communist side would accept voluntary repatriation of prisoners of war. However, the voluntary repatriation of prisoners of war was such an important concession to the
Communist side that they categorically rejected the United Nations
Command's proposal. 44
Over the next several months the negotiations remained in a
deadlock. Since the stalemate showed no sign of improvement, the
problem was brought to the United Nations General Assembly in October.45 The United States proposed a draft resolution endorsing the
position of the United Nations Command and called on the Communist side to accept the voluntary repatriation of prisoners of war.
Meanwhile, the Soviet Union proposed a draft resolution supporting
involuntary repatriation of all prisoners of war. In an effort to find a
compromise between the two extreme positions, India submitted an
intermediate draft resolution which, while confirming that the Geneva
Convention of 1949 did not permit the use of force in the repatriation
of prisoners of war, proposed that all prisoners of war be turned over
to a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission which would handle
the problem of prisoners of war in accordance with an agreement concluded thereafter between the two sides. After making some modifications to assure the effective function of the Repatriation Commission,
and including guarantees for prisoners of war refusing repatriation not
to be detained indefinitely, the United States supported this resolution.
It was adopted on December 3, 1952, by a vote of 54 to 5 with 1
abstention. This Resolution 610(VII) was, however, rejected by the
42. "44th Report of the United Nations Command in Korea," UN Doc. S/2700 (July
14, 1952); FRUS, supra note 40, p. 162.
43. FRUS, supra note 40, p. 183.
44. Ibid., pp. 82-97, 179-10; Goodrich, supra note 5, p. 192.
45. FR US, supra note 40, p. 588.
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Communist side. 46
The United States presidential election on November 4, 1952 also
delayed the conclusion of an armistice agreement. Republican candidate Dwight Eisenhower pledged that, if elected, he would go at once
to Korea to try to end the war. President-Elect Eisenhower visited
Korea in early December, and concluded that an honorable armistice
should be secured. 47 The Communist side may have wanted to delay
the conclusion, hoping that a change in United States leadership
would alter the odds, but that hope would be in vain. The new administration sought a new approach to break out of the deadlock. John
Foster Dulles, who was designated as Secretary of State in the new
administration, reported to Eisenhower that the dominant factor in
the Korean War was the Soviet Union, and that the Soviet Union
would encourage the present armistice stalemate, as long as it could
obtain certain advantages without the expansion of war or military
defeat. The advantages of the stalemate of war were: (1) tying down a
large number of United States forces in the Far East and thereby
weakening the American position in other actual or potential areas of
conflict; (2) the absorbtion of a large amount of military equipment in
Korea, slowing down the rearmament of Western Europe and other
areas; (3) the generation of friction between the United States and the
other NATO members. On the other hand, Dulles understood that
the prisoner of war issue was important to the Communists beyond
Korea and for the future. That is, voluntary repatriation might encourage defections elsewhere, whereas enforced repatriation would deter future desertions. 48
In this situation, the new United States administration believed
that the only way to break out of the deadlock was to threaten to
expand the war to the outside of Korea. In his State of the Union
Message of February 2, 1953, President Eisenhower stated that he was
reversing the June 1950 decision ordering the Seventh Fleet to prevent
an attack on Taiwan while ensuring that Taiwan would not be used as
a base of operation against the mainland. He issued instructions that
the Seventh Fleet no longer be employed to shield Communist China
because Communist China had invaded Korea and refused the United
Nations proposals. 49
46. U.N. Doc. A/PV 399 (December 3, 1952); FRUS, supra note 40, p. 702; Higgins,
supra note 41, p. 281.
47. FRUS, supra note 40, p. 578; Higgins, supra note 41, p. 281.
48. FR US, supra note 40, pp. 692-693.
49. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Public Papers of the President of the United States, Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1953, pp. 16-17.
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At the 131st meeting of the National Security Council on February 11, 1953, President Eisenhower suggested that the United States
should consider placing tactical atomic weapons in Korea in order to
end the war expeditiously. 50 Previously, the National Security Council on several occasions discussed the possibility of using atomic weapons in Korea. 51
After Stalin died on March 5, 1953, the new leadership of the
Soviet Union was beset with the succession problem. 52 Therefore, the
Communists became more anxious to conclude an armistice agreement. They responded to the United Nations Command's proposal on
February 19, 1953 concerning the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war in accordance with appropriate articles of the Geneva
Convention and the Resolution of the Executive Committee of the
League of Red Cross Societies (December 13, 1952). The Communist
liaison officers informed the United Nations Command on March 28,
1953 that they were ready to exchange sick and wounded prisoners of
war in accordance with the humanitarian provisions of the Geneva
Convention and to resume armistice negotiations at Panmunjom. Furthermore, Chinese Premier Chou En-lai broadcasted a statement and
also sent a corresponding cablegram to the United Nations General
Assembly proposing that negotiations should begin immediately on
the exchange of sick and wounded, and that this would hopefully lead
to an overall settlement of the prisoner of war question. He added that
all prisoners of war insisting upon repatriation should be exchanged
immediately following the cease-fire and that the remaining prisoners
of war be handed over to a neutral state to ensure a just solution to the
question of their repatriation. 53 This position conformed, as a whole,
to the United Nations Command's position. As a result, an agreement
for the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war was signed on
April 11. It set April 20, 1953 as the date for the beginning of the
exchange. According to the agreement, the Communist side would
deliver a total of 600 United Nations Command personnel at the rate
of 100 per day, while the United Nations Command would deliver
5,800 North Korean and Chinese personnel in numbers of 500 per
day.s4
At 11:00 a.m., April 25, 1953 (Seoul time), full negotiations resumed, and the discussions centered on the neutral nations assuming
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

FR US, supra note 40, p. 770.
Ibid., pp. 845-850.
Ibid., p. 898.
U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin (April 13, 1953), pp. 526-572.
FRUS, supra note 40, pp. 902, 919.
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custody of the non-repatriate POWs, the place of custody, the duration of custody, and the ways and organs responsible for the ultimate
decision on the fate of non-patriate POWs. 55 After patient negotiating, on June 8, 1953, United Nations' Representative William K. Harrison and Communist Representative Nam 11 finally signed an
agreement on the "Terms of Reference for the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission," concluding the final agreement on the last and
most difficult subject of the armistice talks. 56

2.

Negotiations between the United States and South Korea

Before signing the armistice agreement, the United Nations faced
one remaining obstacle: assurance of the agreement and cooperation
of the South Korean Government. This was, in a sense, the most complicated and difficult problem. The South Korean Government was
opposed from the first to an armistice without a solution to the Korean
division. The internal political crisis of South Korea during the
months following May 1952 further complicated the situation. President Rhee's thirst for power resulted in the massive arrest of members
of the National Assembly under martial law to stifle all opposition.
He enacted a constitutional amendment consolidating his power, and
created considerable consternation in the United States Government,
which even considered his removal. 57 Thereafter, the South Korean
Government continued to oppose an armistice without any solution to
the problem of Korea's division. As the armistice negotiations
progressed and prospects for conclusion became more certain, the opposition of the anxious South Korean Government grew stronger. On
November 3, 1952, South Korean Foreign Minister Pyun Yung-Tai
delivered a powerful speech before the First Committee of the United
Nations General Assembly. He blamed the Soviet Union for supporting the Korean invasion, and opposed any armistice which left his
country divided. In addition, the South Korean delegation to the
United Nations General Assembly circulated a 46 page pamphlet demanding arms for two million men for the purpose of unifying Korea.
Foreign Minister Pyun condemned the armistice negotiations as a
Communist hoax and plot. 58
On April 8, 1953, the Korean Ambassador to the United States,
Yang You-Chan, met the United States Secretary of State, John F.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Goodrich, supra note 5, p. 195; FR US, supra note 40, p. 920.
FR US, supra note 40, p. 1151.
Ibid., pp. 242-376, 402-404.
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Dulles, and communicated the South Korean Government's position
relating to the armistice. He proposed the following preconditions for
the conclusion of an armistice: (1)all of Korea must be reunited; (2)
all Chinese forces must vacate Korean territory; (3)North Korean
forces must be disarmed; (4) any third party must be prevented from
providing arms to the Communists in Korea; and (5) the sovereignty
of the Republic of Korea must be guaranteed and its voice in international discussion on the future of Korea must be guaranteed. 59
In his letter to President Eisenhower on April 9, 1953, President
Rhee expressed his strong opposition to the armistice. He said that he
knew of President Eisenhower's determination to end the Korean War
with honor as soon as possible, and he also knew of the strong opposition of foreign powers and some circles of the American administration against the policy of President Eisenhower. Under such
circumstances, he said, the Korean people would again suffer disappointment. President Rhee expressed strong emotional protest: "At
all events, either as a result of the Indian resolution or of the Communists' recent offer of peace negotiations, if they [some UN members]
arrange a peace agreement allowing the Chinese to remain in Korea,
we have to ask all the friendly nations whose armed forces are now
fighting in Korea and who do not desire to join us in our determination to defeat aggressive communism and drive up to the Yalu River,
to withdraw from Korea . . . we will not move one step beyond our
age-old national boundary line without your request . . ." 60
Furthermore, the South Korean Government supported mass rallies against the armistice in several principal cities in Korea. The
United States Government worried about possible unilateral action,
such as the withdrawal of South Korean forces from the United Nations Command or military use of South Korean forces. 61 In his answer to President Rhee, President Eisenhower also expressed his firm
determination on April 23: " . . . the action taken by the United Nations in Korea was to assist your valiant country in repelling the
armed attack directed against it, initially by the North Korean regime
and subsequently by the Chinese Communists. This has successfully
been accomplished . . . The United States and the United Nations
have consistently supported the unification of Korea under conditions
which would assure its freedom and independence. Neither the
United States nor the United Nations has ever committed itself tore59. FR US, supra note 40, p. 897.
60. Ibid., pp. 902-903.
61. Ibid., p. 906.
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sort to war to achieve this objective . . ." 62
On April 24, 1953, South Korean Ambassador Yang You-Chan
handed an Aide-Memoire from his Government to the United States
Department of State, informing the President that President Rhee was
preparing to withdraw South Korean forces from the United Nations
Command when and if the United Nations would conclude any agreement with the Communist aggressors, allowing Chinese Communists
to remain south of the Yalu River after a cease-fire agreement. The
Aid-Memoire also said that South Korean forces, in this eventuality,
would have to fight it out alone, either to win or lose, if necessary, but
in either event, with honor as free men. 63
After receiving this Aide-Memoire, the United States Government was very embarrassed. The United Nations Command prepared
a contingency plan, if necessary, to replace President Rhee. Concurrently, however, the United Nations Command tried to clarify the
conditions and timing under which South Korean forces might be
withdrawn from the United Nations Command. In his classified telegram to the Chief of Staff of the United States Army on April 26,
1953, United Nations Commander Clark explained in detail his contingency plan. According to this plan, the United Nations Command
would carry out drastic actions if one of the following three conditions
would be fulfilled: (1) if the South Korean troops were not responsive
to the United Nations Command directives; (2) if the South Korean
Government and military units, through official announcement, public
statements and other means, indicated a refusal to carry out the
United Nations Command directives and manifested a determination
to proceed along an independent course of action; (3) if the South Korean Government, military units or people were overtly hostile to the
United Nations Command troops. The drastic actions covered several
steps, from the control and limitation of supplies available to the
South Korean forces, to the establishment of an interim government in
the event of the breakdown of South Korean Government administration. The latter case contemplated, as an initial step of placing President Rhee in custody. 64
Subsequently, Commander Clark met with President Rhee and
was informed that President Rhee considered withdrawing South Korean forces from the United Nations Command as a last resort, and
that he would take such an action only after thorough discussion with
62. Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953-1956,
New York: Doubleday & Co., 1963, pp. 185186.
63. FRUS, supra note 40, p. 935.
64. Ibid., pp. 940-943.
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the United Nations Command. 65
Due, perhaps, to this position of the South Korean Government,
the United Nations Command had not discussed in advance the contents of armistice negotiations. Considering that South Korea was the
host country for this event, the United Nations Command's attitude
was not justified. From time to time, the Korean Member of the
United Nations Command delegation to the armistice talks learned
the contents of the negotiations in advance and informed their Government of them. After being informed, the South Korean government obstructed the armistice talks. For this reason, the United
Nations Command tried to keep the Korean Government informed of
current developments in the armistice negotiations and to discuss principal problems with the South Korean Government. 66
President Rhee preferred the simultaneous withdrawal of both
the Chinese Communists and the United Nations forces from Korea to
the prospect of Chinese forces remaining indefinitely. But he adhered
to the following conditions: (1) a Korean-American mutual defense
treaty; (2) a buffer zone on the other side of the Korean boundary; (3)
the continued naval blockade around the Korean coast and air defense
until peace in East Asia would be firmly established; and (4) United
States' aid to strengthen South Korean forces, and so on. 67
Faced with the determination of the United States Government,
the South Korean Government became more realistic and changed its
position. South Korea continued to insist on the release of Korean
non-repatriate prisoners of war and demanded the withdrawal of Chinese Communists with a guarantee against their reintervention. South
Korea also asked the United States to strengthen South Korean forces,
and to conclude a mutual defense treaty and increase economic aid.
At the same time President Rhee asked the Commander-in-Chief of
the United Nations Command to increase South Korean participation
in the armistice talks.
As to the withdrawal of the Chinese Communists, the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command tried to make President Rhee understand that this subject should be addressed at a
political conference and not in the military armistice. In order to increase South Korean participation in the armistice talks, he promised
to increase the number of administrative assistants for the South Korean delegation. The United States authorized the Commander-in65. Ibid., pp. 947-950.
66. Ibid., pp. 955-956.
67. Ibid., pp. 1007-1010.
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Chief of the United Nations Command to activate additional South
Korean divisions from the sixteen already activated to a total of
twenty. They also agreed to some increase of personnel in the South
Korean Marine Corps, Navy and Air Force. 68 However, the United
States Government was reluctant to commit itself to a mutual defense
treaty. Instead, the United States considered a comprehensive agreement on military assistance and other related matters. 69 In addition,
the United States emphasized the so-called "Greater Sanction Statement," which was to be issued by the United States and the other
Allied Nations immediately upon conclusion of the armistice agreement. According to the Statement, in the event of an armed attack
against South Korea, the sixteen nations should again be united to
resist it, and, furthermore, they would not confine the hostilities
within Korea. 70 As to Korean non-repatriate prisoners of war, the
United States tended to agree with the South Korean position, but the
other Allied Nations insisted that the United Nations Command's position should be as close as possible to the Indian initiated Resolution
of the United Nations General Assembly, December 3, 1952. 71
The United States Government made it clear to President Rhee
that it would take all necessary measures to ensure the security of the
United Nations forces in the event that South Korea took unilateral
military action and withdrew its forces from the United Nations Command.72 In this way, the United States tried to ensure that South Korea would refrain from opposition and agitation against the armistice
negotiations. The United States also persuaded the South Korean
Government to use its influence to restrain all strata of South Korean
society from agitating against the armistice negotiations. They also
tried to ensure that South Korea would cooperate fully in implementing the armistice agreement, and that South Korean forces would remain under the operational control of the Commander-in-Chief of the
United Nations Command until the governments of the United States
and South Korea mutually agreed it was no longer necessary. The
United States Government also hoped that President Rhee would
make a public declaration that the South Korean Government would
fully cooperate with the United States and the United Nations. 73
However, South Korea was determined to maintain its position
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
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on the withdrawal of the Chinese Communists and the release of the
non-repatriate Korean prisoners of war. 74 President Rhee refused to
give the assurances that the United States Government had requested.
In his letter to President Eisenhower on May 30, 1953, President Rhee
once again confirmed his initial position. He was extremely worried
about the possible continued presence of the Chinese forces in Korea
after the armistice. He stated:
. . . [W]e are fearfully aware . . . . that to accept any armistice arrangement which would allow the Chinese Communists to remain in Korea would mean to the Korean nation,
in terms of eventualities, an acceptance of a death sentence
without protest. It is a hard thing for a nation to do. Furthermore, even if I personally agree to such an arrangement,
it will not help the matter very much, as subsequent developments, I fear, will show. 75
In the same letter, President Rhee put forth a South Korean proposal
for the armistice. The main points of the proposal were the following:
(1) a simultaneous withdrawal of both the Communist and United Nations forces from Korea; (2) a mutual defense treaty between the
United States and South Korea; (3) the strengthening of South Korean
forces; and (4) the United States air and naval forces' continuing support for South Korea. President Rhee's letter came to a significant
conclusion:
Our first choice, if we are allowed to make it, is still to have
our allies by our side to actively help us fight out our common issue. But, if that is no longer possible, we would rather
wish to have the right of self-determination to decide the issue ourselves conclusively one way or the other. Anyway, it
is beyond question that we cannot any longer survive a stalemate of division.
The United States continued to try to persuade South Korea, offering a mutual defense treaty and economic aid. The United States
also prepared a contingency plan to replace President Rhee if necessary. This was the so-called "Plan Everready." This extreme step
never, however, came to fruition. 76
As the armistice negotiations approached their conclusion, concrete actions defined the South Korean attitude. As President Rhee
74. Ibid., p. 1098.
75. Ibid., pp. 1124-1126.
76. Ibid., pp. 965, 1114-1119, 1122-1124, 1132, 1134, 1144, 1148, 1151.
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mentioned in his letter to President Eisenhower, the South Korean
Government insisted on proposing its own armistice terms. Further,
the South Korean Government recalled its delegate to the armistice
negotiations, the plenary sessions of which it had been boycotting
since May 15, 1953, on June 7, 1953. 77 Finally, President Rhee
warned the United States that South Korea would fight on, even if it
meant suicide. 78
In spite of the stubborn opposition of South Korea to the armistice terms, the United Nations Command and the Communist side
signed an agreement on the terms of prisoners of war solution on June
8, 1953. 79 The United Nations Command was fully alert to possible
problems that would have been created by South Korea. 80
Then, at dawn on June 18, 1953, a surprising event occurred.
More than 25,000 anti-communist Korean prisoners of war escaped
from the prisoner of war camps located in South Korea. Undoubtedly, they escaped with the help of South Korean guards, who had
received instructions from their government for the release of prisoners of war. This incident resulted in a temporary suspension of work
on the final details of the armisticeY The United States Government
and the United Nations Command immediately protested the action
taken by the South Korean Government. President Eisenhower
warned President Rhee that unless he accepted the authority of the
United Nations Command, another arrangement would be necessary.82 At the same time the United Nations Command informed the
Communist side of this incident, blaming the South Korean Government. The Command explained that in spite of its best efforts to recapture as many escapees as possible, there was little hope of success
because they had already been sheltered by Korean civilians. 83
Among the 35,000 non-repatriate anti-communist prisoners of war,
only 8,600 remained after this mass escape. 84
After the incident, President Rhee made his position clear in a
public statement on June 18, 1953. According to this Statement, the
77. Ibid., p. 1148.
78. Ibid., p. 1150.
79. U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin (June 22, 1953), pp. 866-868.
80. FR US, supra note 40, pt. 2, pp. 1152-1154.
81. Higgins, supra note 41, p. 289; FRUS, supra note 80, pp. 1196-1197; Mark W.
Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954, pp. 279-282;
Hermes, supra note 36, pp. 451-452.
82. U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin (June 29, 1953), p. 907; Eisenhower, supra note 62, pp.
185-186.
83. U.S. Dept. of State, supra note 82, pp. 905-908; Higgins, supra note 38, p. 289.
84. FRUS, supra note 80, p. 1233.
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anti-communist Korean prisoners of war should have been released
long before, in accordance with the Geneva Convention and human
rights principles. Since international complications hampered the release of the prisoners despite the sympathy of most of the Untied Nations authorities, President Rhee said he had ordered the release of the
anti-communist Korean prisoners. 85
In his letter dated June 18 to General Clark, President Rhee repeated his position and added that the South Korean Army would not
draw back 2 kilometers from the front line in accordance with the
armistice agreement. He also implied that South Korean forces might
be withdrawn from the United Nations Command. 86
Facing such stubborn opposition from South Korea, and outraged by the South Korean attitude, the United States Government
considered withdrawing all its troops from Korea. At the National
Security Council Meeting on June 18, 1953, President Eisenhower
suggested that if President Rhee continued in his course, he would
inform him that the United States would withdraw its troops. 87 On
the other hand, the United States Government hoped and was prepared to encourage, if necessary, that South Korean forces would take
action to replace the South Korean Government. 88 Before doing so,
the United States Government tried every effort to persuade President
Rhee to alter his position, proposing a mutual defense treaty, U.S.
$300 million in economic aid and cooperation in achieving reunification through a political conference following the conclusion of an armistice. The United States Government prepared a reconstruction
plan for the destroyed South Korean economy which would support
South Korean post-war security. This was the Tasca Report. This
Report was submitted to President Eisenhower on June 15, 1953. It
proposed more than $1 billion in aid to South Korea during the three
years following the armistice. 89
In order to persuade the South Korean Government to accept the
armistice terms of the United Nations Command, the United States
sent Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Walter S.
Robertson to South Korea. He was accompanied by the Chief of Staff,
General Collins, and several other high ranking officials. 90 He deliv85.
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88.
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90.
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ered the Aide-Memoire to President Rhee on June 27, 1953, explaining the United States position:
1. The South Korean Government will direct its
armed forces to carry out the orders of the United Nations
Command in maintaining the security of the remaining Korean non-repatriate prisoners of war who are now in the custody of the United Nations Command. The South Korean
Government will cooperate with the United Nations Command in moving those prisoners of war to the NNRC (Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission) in accordance with
agreed terms of reference.
2. The United States Government cannot impose any
time limit upon any other governments which may participate in the political conference following the armistice, but if
at the end of 90 days after the opening of the political conference it becomes clear that the conference is not making progress and is being exploited by the Communists to infiltrate
and propagandize or otherwise embarrass South Korea, the
United States Government would be prepared to act in concert with South Korea, retiring jointly with South Korea
from the political conference.
3. After signing the armistice agreement, the United
States Government would be willing to have a high-level
conference with President Rhee to confer on all aspects of
common objectives at the political conference to follow
within 90 days after the effective date of the armistice.
4. The United States Government is prepared to provide economic and military assistance to South Korea.
5. The United States Government is prepared immediately to begin negotiations with South Korea looking towards conclusion of a mutual defense treaty.
6. The above assurances from the Government of the
United States are dependent upon agreement of the South
Korean Government:
a. to accept the authority of the United Nations Command to conduct and conclude the hostilities;
b. to support the armistice entered into between the
Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command
and the commanders of the Communist forces;
c. South Korean forces will remain under the operational control of the Commander-in-Chief of the United
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Nations Command until Governments of the United
States and South Korea mutually agree that such arrangements are no longer necessary. 91
President Rhee was not, however, ready to give up easily his determination to have a unified Korea under his terms, even if he was
less insistent. He agreed not to obstruct the armistice, provided the
United States pledged to support South Korea, if fighting resumed due
to a failure of the political conference, until Korean unification would
be achieved. 92 However, with the patient persuasion of Special Envoy
Robertson, President Rhee conceded most of his positions. Thus, the
United States proposed a draft-treaty of mutual defense in accordance
with the request of the South Korean Government. 93 They agreed to
move all the anti-communist prisoners of war from their location to
the demilitarized zone, where they would then be turned over to the
Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in order to eliminate the
need of bringing Indian armed forces into South Korea since South
Korea had opposed the presence of Indian soldiers on South Korean
territory. 94 Finally, President Rhee formally agreed not to obstruct
the armistice. 95
President Rhee and Special Envoy Robertson issued a joint public
statement on June 11, 1953:
During the past two weeks we have had many frank and cordial exchanges of views which have emphasized the deep
friendship existing between the Republic of Korea and the
United States and have gone far toward achieving mutual
understanding of the troubled questions which have arisen in
connection with arrangements for an armistice, the exchange
of prisoners, and the forthcoming political conference.
These discussions have cemented our determination to continue and extend in the post-armistice period the close collaboration for our common objectives, . . . .96
This joint statement clearly expressed the South Korean Government's agreement to the conclusion of the armistice, a very important
fact in terms of international law. This internal agreement between
91. Ibid., pp. 1279-1280.
92. Ibid., pp. 1292-1295.
93. "U.S. Draft of Mutual Defense Treaty," FR US, supra note 80, pp. 1339-1340; "Republic of Korea Draft," supra note 80, pp. 1359-1361.
94. FRUS, supra note 80, pp. 1351-1354.
95. Ibid., p. 1362.
96. U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin (July 20, 1953), pp. 72-73.
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the members of one group of belligerents (the coalition army) justifies
the representative authority of the commander of the coalition army
for the conclusion of an armistice. As a result, if the commander signs
an armistice agreement, all the members of the coalition army become
parties to the armistice agreement. This will be further explained in
Section 3. President Rhee also expressed his agreement not to obstruct the armistice in his letter to President Eisenhower on June 11,
1953: " . . . . As you know, I have decided not to obstruct, in any
manner, the implementation of the terms (of the armistice), in deference to your requests . . ." 97
This agreement satisfied both the United Nations Command and
the Communists. The latter had required the assurance that the South
Korean Government would abide by all the provisions of the armistice
for the entire period when the armistice would be effective. 98 The
United Nations Command assured the Communist side that the
United Nations Command, including South Korean forces, would
carry out the terms of armistice. The United Nations Command emphasized that such assurances had been received from the South Korean Government. 99
At 10:12 a.m., Seoul Time, on June 27, 1953, Generals Harrison
and Nam II signed, ad referendum, the armistice documents at
Panmunjom. The commanders of both sides formally signed the armistice agreement at their respective headquarters. At the United Nations Command's headquarters in Munsan-Ri, the Commander-inChief of the United Nations Command, General Clark, in the presence
of a representative of South Korea, signed the armistice agreement on
the same day, under the flags of the United Nations, the United States,
and South Korea. The fighting stopped on the same day, 100 and the
Korean Armistice Agreement entered into force. 101
Section B.

1.

The Political Conference In Accordance With Article 4
Of The Korean Armistice Agreement

Negotiations at Panmunjom

After the conclusion of the Korean Armistice Agreement, the
two sides attempted to convene a political conference for the solution
97. FRUS, supra note 80, pp. 1368-1369.
98. Ibid., pp. 1365, 1368, 1380.
99. Ibid., p. 1382.
100. Hermes, supra note 36, pp. 489-491.
101. "Korean Armistice Agreement," U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin (August 3, 1953), pp.
132-140; see also Appendix I.
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of the Korean division, pursuant to Article 4 of the Armistice Agreement. Article 4, paragraph 60 provides:
Within three months after the Armistice Agreement is
signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a
higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the
peaceful settlement of the Korean question . . .
First, the seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly reconvened to discuss a political conference concerning the Korean question. Several proposals were submitted for this. The
member states contributing armed forces in Korea proposed a joint
draft-resolution providing that they should participate, with the Republic of Korea, in the political conference. The Soviet Union submitted a draft-resolution recommending that several Arab-Asian
countries and Soviet bloc countries should be included in the political
conference. Australia and New Zealand proposed a joint draft-resolution recommending that the Soviet Union should participate in the
political conference if the other side desired it. Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United Kingdom also submitted a joint draftresolution recommending that India should participate in the political
conference. 102 However, the United States maintained that the Korean Political Conference should represent the two belligerent sides as
delineated by Paragraph 60 of the Korean Armistice Agreement, and
that it should not be a round-table conference involving participation
of neutral nations. The South Korean Government strongly opposed
India's participation in this conference. 103
The United Nations General Assembly finally adopted a resolution on August 28, 1953, that was in line with the joint proposal of the
member states contributing armed forces to the United Nations Command, in addition to the Soviet Union's participation. According to
this Resolution, the member states contributing armed forces under
the Unified Command in Korea would participate in the conference,
together with the Republic of Korea (South Korea). The participating
governments were to act independently at the conference with full
freedom of action. The United States Government, after consultation
with the other participating countries, was to arrange with the Communist side for the political conference to be held not later than October 28, 1953 at a place and on a date satisfactory to both sides.
102. FRUS, supra note 80, p. 1498; Goodrich, supra note 5, p. 203.
103. FRUS, supra note 80, pp. 1492, 1497·1501.
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Finally, the Secretary General of the United Nations was, if agreeable
to both sides, to provide the political conference with such services
and facilities as deemed necessary. The Soviet Union could participate
in the conference provided the other side desired it. 104
The Secretary General of the United Nations informed the Communist side of the United Nations Resolution on August 28, but the
Communist side insisted on a round-table conference with the participation of so-called neutral nations. The Communist side even considered the Soviet Union as a neutral nation. 105
The United States Government appointed Arthur H. Dean as
Deputy to the Secretary of State in preparation for the political conference on September 15, 1953. He arrived in Seoul on October 24, 1953
for preliminary negotiations with the Communist side concerning the
preparation of the political conference. At the same time, he was to
persuade President Rhee not to proceed with unilateral actions in contravention of the Korean Armistice Agreement. 106 President Rhee, in
fact, distrusted the idea of political conference with the Communists.
He believed the only one way to achieve a free independent and unified
Korea was by force. 107
The United Nations Command's Representative Dean began the
negotiations with North Korean Ki Sok-Pok and Chinese Huang Hua
on October 26 at Panmunjom. 108 However, the Communist side proposed what was perceived as an unacceptable table agenda, insisting
on the round-table conference with the participation of so-called neutral nations. Meanwhile the United Nations Command made several
proposals aimed at by passing the problem of agenda in order to get on
with more substantive discussions. 109 Considering the long-term difficulties in the armistice negotiations under the heavy pressure of continued casualties, it was beyond question that the Communist side
would not easily concede their position in the political conference.
The preliminary talks at Panmunjom dragged on until middle of December without any solution to the basic differences between the two
sides over the conference participants. The Communist side demanded that the Soviet Union be designated as a neutral nation.
South Korea firmly opposed India's participation in the conference.
104. U.N.G.A. Res. 711 (VII) (28 August 1953); U.N. Resolutions, supra note 1, pp.
175-178; U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin (September 14, 1953), pp. 361-366.
105. Goodrich, supra note 5, p. 204.
106. FRUS, supra note 80, pp. 1519, 1558-1561.
107. Ibid., p. 1560.
108. Ibid., p. 1578.
109. Ibid., p. 1578.
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Thus the basic differences on the role of neutral nations hampered the
opening of the conference. Under such conditions, the United Nations
Command proposed on December 8, 1953 a package proposal maintaining a bilateral conference (with participation of the Soviet Union
as a voting member on the Communist side) and involving limited participation of neutral nations. But the Communist side rejected this.
Thus, the negotiations were completely severed without solution on
December 12, 1953. The final meeting devolved to an exchange of
rude charges. 110
After this, only the liaison meetings continued for one month
without any positive result. And even these meetings became deadlocked after the release of the 22,000 anti-communist prisoners of war
following the expiration of the detention term of the Neutral Nations
Repatriation Commission (NNRC). The Communists, having lost
face, intensified their insults and groundless charges against the United
Nations Command. This resulted in the ultimate deadlock of the
meeting. 111

2.

The Geneva Political Conference

At this juncture, the third quadripartite meeting of foreign ministers (France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United
States) convened in Berlin from January 15 to February 18, 1954. On
January 27, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov stated that the failure of
the discussions at Panmunjom was due to the fact that the decision to
hold the conference was made in spite of objections put forth by the
Soviet Union and without participation of Communist China and
North Korea. This implied that the Communist side had decided to
avoid further discussion at Panmunjom. 112
On February 18, 1954, the Four Foreign Ministers Meeting in
Berlin proposed the Geneva Conference on the Korean question to
work toward the establishment, by peaceful means, of a united and
independent Korea, reducing international tension, and restoring
peace in other parts of Asia. Representatives of the United States,
France, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), and other contributing countries who desired to attend were to meet in Geneva on April
26 for the purpose of reaching a peaceful settlement of the Korean
110. Ibid., p. 1656; U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin (December 21, 1953), pp. 877-878.
Ill. FR US, supra note 80, pp. 1725-1733.
112. Ibid. p. 1741.
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question. 113
There was no provision for neutral nations' participation in this
conference. Therefore, this proposal was more preferable to the
United States and South Korea than that proposed by the United Nations on August 28, 1953. Discussion on the restoration of peace in
Indochina was also included on the agenda.
South Korea's attitude toward the Geneva Conference was pessimistic from the first. At a press conference, President Rhee stated that
South Korea would give the United States and the United Nations a
chance at attaining a peaceful solution of the Korean question, but
that the Communists would never yield anything in negotiations. He
also emphasized that force would be the only instrument that the
Communists would understand. 114
The United States Government, in consultation with South Korea
and other Allied Nations, prepared the basic position paper for the
Geneva Conference. This position paper analyzed the expected positions of the participant countries and presented the U.S. position.
This paper also offered three specific plans for Korean unification. 115
According to the position paper, the general purpose of the
United States at the Geneva Conference was to seek an agreement to a
plan for the reunification of Korea which would establish a non-Communist, independent and representative government constituted by independently supervised elections, and which would provide for the
orderly, phased withdrawal of foreign troops. For this purpose, the
United States established general principles concerning the negotiations at the conference:
1. Maintain a position of strength and stability in free Korea which will lessen South Korean fear of abandonment, and avoid actions which may weaken South
Korean public morale;
2. Affirm that South Korea is the only sovereign, lawful
government in Korea, and that it must not be equated
with the North Korean regime;
3. Seek the unification within the constitutional framework
of the South Korean State, and in keeping with the spirit
and purposes of past United Nations resolutions;
113. U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin (March 1, 1954), pp. 317-318.
114. FRUS (1952-54), vol. XVI (The Geneva Conference), Washington, D.C.: GPO,
1981, pp. 24-25.
115. Ibid., pp. 131-139.
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Maintain a united front at the Conference among the Allies, the United States and South Korea;
Maintain some tactical flexibility, while developing a full
and common understanding of the basic principles regarding unification and withdrawal of foreign troops.
Acknowledge that the United States should assume leadership on the Allied side in close partnership, if possible,
with South Korea, in view of the heavy sacrifices and
commitments made by both the United States and South
Korea to repel Communist aggression in Korea;
Determine whether the Communists will (a) insist on
controlling parts of or all of Korea, or (b) renounce any
special position in Korea and agree to set up a unified
Korea for free Koreans. If the former is the case, recognize that no formula can succeed, and unmask Communist aggressive intentions.

According to the position paper, the expected positions of South
Korea were to: (1) oppose any unification plan violating South Korean sovereignty and any proposals for a neutralized Korea or a coalition government placing the North Korean regime on an equal basis
with the Republic of Korea; (2) propose the withdrawal of all Chinese
forces from Korea, the extension of South Korean sovereignty over
North Korea, and elections held by South Korea in North Korea to
fill the seats in the South Korean National Assembly available for representatives from the North; and (3) argue against simultaneous elections in South and North Korea, but possibly acquiesce in such
elections provided that South Korean sovereignty was preserved.
Meanwhile the position paper expected that other Allied Nations
would want a fresh start in Korea to form a new government and
consequently oppose the incorporation of North Korea into South Korea without some new constitutional act.
The position paper also analyzed the expected positions of the
Communist side, which were to: (1) do their utmost to broaden discussion on deceptive lines, such as a general Far East security pact; (2)
oppose any plans that would weaken their control in North Korea;
and (3) propose (a) a withdrawal of all armed foreign troops in Korea
so that the "Korean themselves" may bring about their own unification, (b) elaborate measures for the establishment of a provisional government over all Korea designed to give the Communists
predominance in Korea, (c) national elections to take place at some
indefinite time after the establishment of this provisional government
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and to be carried out "by the Koreans themselves" without any international supervision.
In the light of the situation, the United States proposed to: (1)
adopt a South Korean constitutional structure and preserve South Korean sovereignty; and (2) keep with the main points of past United
Nations resolutions concerning Korean unification - that is, elections
should be held on the basis of adult suffrage and by secret ballot and
the number of representatives should be proportionate to population.
Such elections should be observed by an international commission
with freedom to administrate throughout Korea.
Within the framework of its basic stance, the United States prepared three possible plans for the Korean unification. Plan A was the
simple incorporation of North Korea into the existing constitutional
framework of South Korea. For this purpose, Plan A included free
elections to be held only in North Korea to complete processes carried
out under the United Nations supervision in 1948 in the area south of
the 38th Parallel. According to this plan, North Korea was to supervise elections under the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK), in a manner similar to
the supervision of the United Nations Temporary Commission of 1948
in South Korea, with regard to conforming North Korean electoral
conditions to the principles of the General Assembly resolutions of
1947 and 1950-53 concerning the Korean unification. The United
States commented that Plan A would meet the requirement for preserving the South Korean constitutional system. Therefore, South
Korea would endorse it, while the Communists would reject it. Other
Allied Nations would only reluctantly support this Plan because it
called for elections in North Korea only.
Plan B was a modification of Plan A. Under Plan B, free elections would be held throughout Korea under the South Korean Constitution. UNCURK was responsible for supervising the elections.
The National Assembly-elect would consider an amendment of the
South Korean Constitution to provide a form of constitutional government satisfactory to all Korean people. The United States commented
that Plan B was more likely to obtain the approval of both South
Korea and other Allied Nations. Plan B also reflected the spirit and
the provision of the General Assembly resolutions concerning the Korean unification, but the Communists were expected to oppose it.
Plan C was to hold all Korean elections for the constituent assembly and to form new national government. For this purpose, a new
commission to supervise elections should be formed and this commission should establish the conditions for free elections throughout Ko-
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rea. In addition, international assurances on the territorial integrity
and political independence of a reunified Korea were to be given. The
United States commented that Plan C would obtain a favorable reaction of other Allied nations, while South Korea would strongly oppose
it. The Communists probably would not accept this Plan unless they
considered it necessary as a precedent for Indo-China.
The United States planned that at first Plan A would be proposed
through South Korea, and that after a deadlock they would introduce
Plan B with full Allied backing. According to the position paper, the
United States would keep Plan C in reserve possibly for consideration
if the Communists showed signs of desiring seriously to negotiate the
peaceful settlement of the Korean question that would provide for the
independent and unification of a free Korea.
After some difficult negotiations between the United States and
South Korea, the Geneva Conference was held on April 26, 1954 according to the schedule agreed upon by the Berlin Communique.
Since President Rhee was pessimistic about the Conference with the
Communists, he was very reluctant to participate in the Conference.
The Conference reached an impasse from the first due to the differences between the two sides. South Korean Foreign Minister Pyun
Yung-Tai made an opening statement on April 27, 1954. He emphasized that opening North Korea to free elections under the supervision
of the United Nations would be the only way to complete the United
Nations task in a manner compatible with the United Nations resolutions.116 His statement was, on the whole, in accordance with the
above mentioned Plan A.
North Korean Foreign Minister Nam 11 made a counter proposal
on the same day. After attacking the United Nations collective action,
the United States and South Korea, he proposed: (1) the withdrawal
of all foreign troops within six months, and (2) all Korean elections
prepared by an all-Korea Commission, the members of which were to
be selected by each of the National Assemblies of South and North
Korea, respectively. According to this proposal, this all-Korea Commission would facilitate contact between South and North Korea. 117
On April 28, the United States Secretary of State Dulles supported the South Korean position, explaining that in accordance with
the United Nations General Assembly Resolution of October 7, 1950,
free elections should be held under the supervision in North Korea
116. U.S. Dept. of State, The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference Apri/16-June
15, 1954, Washington: GPO, 1954, pp. 34-39.
117. Ibid., pp. 39-40.
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where this kind of elections had not yet been held. 118
The Communist China's Foreign Minister Chou En-lai repeated
the North Korean proposal, attacking the United Nations, the United
States and South Korea. 119 The Soviet Union's statement on April 29
followed the same line as the North Korean statement, focusing on the
withdrawal of foreign troops. 120 In sum, the Communist side stressed
the withdrawal of foreign forces, and rejected the authority of the
United Nations on the grounds that the United Nations was a belligerent party in the Korean war, and that Communist China and North
Korea were excluded from the United Nations. 121
Since the Communist side rejected Plan A, the United States prepared a new proposal along the lines of Plan B. The South Korean
Government strongly opposed Plan B, however, threatening the withdrawal of its delegation from the Conference. 122 After protracted negotiations among the Allied Nations, South Korea accepted free
elections throughout all of South and North Korea but also continued
to insist on the withdrawal of Chinese forces before these elections. In
spite of some complaints from some Allied Nations, particularly the
Commonwealth countries, South Korean Foreign Minister Pyun
Yung-Tai issued a fourteen-point proposal, somewhat along the line
Plan B, on May 22, 1954. 123
ll8. Ibid., pp. 45-53.
ll9. FRUS, supra note 114, p. 159; British White Paper: Documents Relating to the
Discussion of Korea and Indo-China at the Geneva Conference (April 26-June 15, 1954),
No. 9186, London, 1954, pp. 14-20.
120. FRUS, supra note 114, p. 159.
121. Ibid., pp. 176-177.
122. Ibid., pp. 205-207, 213-217, 226-228, 319-321.
123. The contents are summarized as follows:
1. With view to establishing united, independent and democratic Korea,
free elections shall be carried out under the United Nations supervision in accordance with the previous United Nations resolutions concerning Korean unification;
2. Free elections shall be held in North Korea and in South Korea in accordance with the constitutional processes of South Korea;
3. Elections shall be held within six months from adoption of this proposal;
4. Local authorities shall aid United Nations personnel connected with
election supervision in facilitating free elections;
5. The rights of candidates shall be recognized and protected;
6. Elections shall be based on the principle of universal adult suffrage and
conducted by secret ballot;
7. Representation in a unified Korean legislature shall be directly proportionate to the population patterns of the entire Korean peninsula;
8. A census shall be taken under U.N. supervision to determine proportionate representation;
9. The legislature shall convene in Seoul immediately following elections;
10. The following questions shall be addressed by the new legislature:
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In sum, the main contents of the South Korean proposal was the
annexation of North Korea by South Korea, on the one hand, and fear
and distrust of the North Korean regime on the other hand. The distrust was understandable and partially justified by the past behavior of
North Korea. From a practical viewpoint, however, if there was any
chance of success for negotiations leading to the peaceful unification of
Korea, the South Korean leaders might have been more flexible and
confident, even though there was little chance of success in negotiations with the Communists at that time. Further, blame for the failure
of these negotiations should not be borne by the South Korean leaders
since an analysis of the negotiations before and after the Korean War
has pointed to the Communists as the frustrating side. However, considering the fact that the losing chance might have irrevocably damaged the Korean people as a whole, it might be better if the Korean
leaders had not exhausted all their efforts in search of some positive
result.
The Communist side rejected the South Korean proposal and
continued to insist on their position concerning the withdrawal of foreign troops, and the denial of authority of the United Nations and its
supervision for free elections 124 As a result, the Geneva Conference
remained deadlocked. Thus, the Allied Nations were convinced that a
solution was not forthcoming and thus resolved to terminate the conference. 125 It seemed that the Communist side also did not foresee an
agreeable solution stemming from the conference. The Soviet Union's
delegate, Molotov, privately expressed such an opinion to the United
States Delegate Smith, stating that political settlement in Korea would
come about possibly as a result of some years of living together, and
that a period of living together and some form of commercial or other
contact over an extended period might reduce the bitterness and permit some political solution. 126
(a)the election of a new president for a unified Korea, (b) the amendment of the
existing South Korean constitution, and (c) disarmament;
11. The existing constitution of South Korea shall remain effective until it
is amended by the new legislature;
12. Chinese troops shall completely withdraw from North Korea one
month prior to the election date;
13. Withdrawal of the United Nations forces from South Korea may begin
before elections but must not be completed until Korea is unified;
14. The integrity and independence of a unified, independent and democratic Korea shall be guaranteed by the United Nations.
See ibid., at pp. 278-79, 313.
124. Ibid., pp. 348-349.
125. Ibid., pp. 314-315.
126. Ibid., pp. 315-316.
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However, the Communist side continued to put forth unacceptable proposals, probably for the purpose of internal propaganda. They
pretended to outline a rational way for the conference to reach an
agreement. For example, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov outlined
some principles on which he said an agreement could be reached. He
submitted a draft-resolution along the lines of these principles on June
5, 1954. 127
The United States' delegate, Smith, criticized the North Korean
proposal supporting an all-Korean Commission to prepare for elections in Korea. He pointed out that North Korea would have equal
representation on such a commission, despite the great disparity in the
size of populations between South and North Korea (estimated to be
22-24 million in South Korea and nine million in North Korea).
North Korea, then, would have a built-in veto on any proposal for a
genuine free election. He emphasized that genuine free elections in
Korea could be held only under the supervision of the United Nations.
He also criticized Chou En-lai's proposal for a Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to supervise elections in Korea. Smith cited the
example of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission agreement
over the Korean Armistice Agreement. Smith said that this Commission had been a dismal failure due to Communist trickery and intransigence, denying Chou's claim that the Commission played a successful
role in the Korean Armistice supervision. 128
On the other hand, North Korean Foreign Minister Nam 11 said
the Geneva Conference should reach some agreement leading to peace
in Korea. He charged South Korea with continuing to threaten resumption of hostilities. Then, he proposed a six-point proposal on
June 15. The major objective of this proposal was of propagandistic
value and a lobby for the withdrawal of the United Nations forces
from South Korea. 129
127. The contents are summarized as follows:
1) Free elections shall be held by secret ballot throughout Korea within six
months of the conclusion of the present agreement. Representation in the new
legislature will be proportionate to population of Korea as a whole;
2) An all-Korean body shall be established to facilitate free elections;
3) All foreign forces shall withdraw from Korea before the elections;
4) An appropriate international commission shall be established to supervise the elections;
5) The United Nations shall assume responsibility for ensuring the settlement of the Korean unification question;
See The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference, supra note 116, at pp. 143-49.
128. Ibid., pp. 149-153; UN Press Release No. 3309 (November 23, 1959); ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Documents on Korea- US Relations 1943-1971, Seoul 1971, p. 173.
129. The main points of his proposal were:
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The Soviet Union and the United States were at odds over this
statement. Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov supported the North Korean proposals and urged the participants to adopt the following declaration: "The States participating in the Geneva Conference have
agreed that, pending the final settlement of the Korean problem . . .
no action shall be taken which might constitute a threat to the maintenance of peace in Korea. . . . " 130 Delegate Smith, however, made a
statement rejecting Molotov's proposal, with a reminder that an existing armistice agreement would be a formal definitive arrangement
with more force than Molotov's declaration. 131
The Geneva Political Conference ended in failure with the Sixteen
Nations Declaration of June 15, 1954. Thailand's Delegate Prince
Wan read the Declaration on behalf of sixteen nations. The Declaration outlined two fundamental principles: (1) the United Nations,
under its Charter, is fully and rightfully empowered to take collective
action to repel aggression, to restore peace and security, and to extend
its good offices to seeking a peaceful settlement in Korea; and (2) in
order to establish a unified, independent and democratic Korea, genuinely free elections should be held under the United Nations supervision, for representatives in the National Assembly, in which
representation shall be in direct proportion to the indigenous population in Korea. 132 This Declaration concluded that the Allied Nations
had earnestly and patiently searched for a solution of Korean unification in accordance with these fundamental principles, but the Communists rejected the authority and competence of the United Nations in
Korea and refused to accept impartial and effective supervision of free
elections.
On November 11, 1954, the Allied Nations submitted their report
on the Geneva Conference on the Korean question to the ninth session
1. To recommend the withdrawal from Korea of all foreign troops;
2. To reduce within one year the strength of the troops of North and South
Korea, establishing a limit for each side at 100,000 troops;
3. To form a North-South commission to negotiate the cessation of hostilities;
4. To recognize military treaties involving any part of Korea and another
state as incompatible with peaceful reunification;
5. To form an all-Korea Committee to establish and develop economic cultural relations between South and North Korea;
6. To recognize the necessity of the United Nations to insure the peaceful
development and unification of Korea. See FRUS, supra note 114, pp. 376-377.
130. Ibid., pp. 377-378.
131. Ibid., p. 379.
132. The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference, supra note 113, pp. 381, 385-387;
U.S. Department of State Bulletin (June 28, 1954), pp. 973-974; Documents on Korea-US
Relations, supra note 125, pp. 149-150.
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of the United Nations General Assembly. This report reiterated the
points made in the Sixteen Nation Declaration, but also added that the
Geneva Conference should be regarded as the political conference referred to in Article 4 of the Korean Armistice Agreement and in the
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 711 (VII) of August 28,
1953. Finally, the report made it clear that the failure of the Geneva
Conference did not prejudice the armistice in Korea. 133 The armistice
remained in effect in accordance with Article 62 of the Armistice
Agreement, which provides that:
The articles and paragraphs of this Armistice Agreement shall remain in effect until expressly superseded either
by mutually acceptable amendments and additions or by
provision in appropriate agreement for peaceful settlement at
a political level between both sides.
The United Nations General Assembly approved the report on
the Geneva Conference concerning the Korean question by adopting
Resolution 811 (IX) on December 11, 1954. 134
Section C.

Legal Problems Of The Korean Armistice Agreement

1.

Special Character of an Armistice Agreement in General

a.

Definition

Under the traditional international law of war, an armistice
agreement is usually defined as a bilateral agreement concluded between belligerents, which results in a provisional suspension of the
conduct of an armed conflict. The term "armistice" originates from
the Latin arma (arms) and interstitum (interval) and thus means literally the provisional suspension of armed hostilities. 135 The concrete
rules of the law of war generally conform to this definition. For example, Article 36 of the Regulations annexed to the Hague Convention
(IV) with respect to the Laws and the Customs of War on Land in
1907, provides that "an armistice suspends military operations by mutual agreement between the belligerent parties, and that if its duration
is not defined, the belligerent parties may resume operations at any
time, provided always that the enemy is warned within the time agreed
133. U.N. Document A/2786 (December II, 1954).
134. Ibid., FRUS, supra note 114, pp. 393-394; Resolutions Relating to Korea, supra note
2, pp. 201-202.
135. M. Sibert, "L'Armistice," Revue General du Droit International Public, 3eme Serle,
tome VII, Paris: 1933, p. 657; S. Levie, "Nature and Scope of the Armistice Agreement,"
American Journal of International Law, vol. 50, No. 4 (October 1956), p. 881.
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upon, in accordance with the terms of the armistice." Article 135 of
the 1863 Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United
States in the Field prepared by Francis Lieber contains a similar
concept.
Such an armistice may apply generally or locally. According to
Article 37 of the Regulations annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention
IV, "a general armistice suspends the military operations of the belligerent parties everywhere, while a local armistice suspends the operations only between certain factions of the belligerent armies and within
a fixed radius." 136
To determine the legal nature of the Korean Armistice Agreement, one must first clarify the concept of armistice, and distinguish it
from similar concepts. First, an armistice is different from a suspension of arms. A suspension of arms is a military agreement the objective of which is concrete and unrelated to military operations or
political purpose, and is only binding for a short duration. For example, two belligerent parties may agree to a suspension of arms in order
to bury the dead. 137
An armistice is also distinguishable from a traditional peace preliminary (preliminaires de paix). A peace preliminary is a military
agreement which prepares the basis of future peace between two belligerent parties without suspending the armed conflict. It is a mutual
promise to conclude a peace treaty. 138
According to traditional terminology, an armistice agreement
also differs from a treaty of peace. A treaty of peace resolves the
causes of war themselves, while an armistice agreement merely suspends armed hostilities between the belligerent parties. An armistice
agreement thus may or may not eventually result in the conclusion of
a peace treaty. 139
Confusion may also arise in the difference between an armistice
agreement and a capitulation. Superficially speaking, a capitulation is
very similar to an armistice. Yet where there is a capitulation, the
winning party merely imposes its terms on the losing party, so there is
no true agreement between the two sides. 140 Interestingly, recent
136. A. Roberts and R. Gue1ff, Documents on the Laws of War, London: Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 55.
137. Dictionaire de Ia Terminologie du Droit International, Paris: Sirey, 1960, p. 59;
Sibert, supra note 135, p. 657.
138. Dictionaire de Ia Terminologie, supra note 137, p. 468.
139. R. Monaco, "Les Conventions entre Belligerents," Recueil des Cours de l'Academie
de Droit International de LaHaye, tome II, 1949, p. 323; Sibert, supra note 135, p. 664.
140. Monaco, supra note 139, pp. 314-317.
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treaty practices illustrate mixture of the two concepts, capitulation
and armistice. For example, after World War I, Marshal Foch identified capitulation as an armistice. 141
In conclusion, the traditional concept of armistice is just a military agreement suspending armed hostilities without ending the war,
while the war itself would be settled only by a peace treaty. This concept and function has, however, developed and consequently changed,
particularly after World War II. An armistice is no longer merely a
suspension of war. Now, belligerent parties give up their will of armed
activities through an armistice. Thus, an armistice results in a de facto
end of a war. This intention of ending a war is expressed, for example,
in the concept of a demilitarized zone. A demilitarized zone is established in order to prevent recurring war between the opposing sides.
In order to assure this result, a supervisory organ would be established. The Korean Armistice Agreement is a model case of such an
arrangement. 142
There is another element that illustrates this change in the concept of armistice. Belligerents rarely conclude peace treaty after the
conclusion of an armistice agreement. While some cases presuppose
the conclusion of a peace treaty after the armistice, the parties rarely
conclude such treaties in reality. Perhaps the only one clear exception
after World War II is the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt concluded in 1979. 143 Thus, it can be said there is a general tendency not
to conclude a peace treaty after an armistice, and an armistice results
in a de facto end of the war, through a long duration without a recurrence of war. Under such circumstances, the initial causes of the war
usually remain without remedy. This effect of an armistice agreement
may be the result of mutual intentions to maintain the status quo due
to the inability of either side to change the situation. Thus, the armistice signifies the freeze of the status quo, which, after a long time,
becomes a legal reality.
b.

Special Character

An armistice agreement is a kind of treaty. It thus has the legal
character of an international convention, and should fulfill most of the
legal conditions as a treaty. An armistice agreement as a military
agreement between two belligerent parties does, however, possess a
141. Sibert, supra note 135, p. 664.
142. Ibid., p. 665; Levie, supra note 135, p. 906; Lyou Byung-Hwa, Le Commandement
des Nations Unies en Coree et Ses Prob/emes Juridiques, Seoul: 1980, p. 50.
143. U.S. Dept. of State, Treaties in Force (1984), Washington, D.C.: GPO, p. 48.
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unique character. This special character stems from the special circumstances under which the armistice agreement was concluded and
applied.
First of all, an armistice agreement is a bilateral treaty between
belligerents. There are some cases in which several belligerents may
be involved, perhaps making the armistice resemble a multi-lateral
treaty. However, even if more than two nations are engaged in a war,
the armistice agreement is always a bilateral treaty. No matter how
many nations may be involved, those nations are divided into two opposing parties, so that the two opposing parties form one consensual
bilateral engagement. Therefore, an armistice agreement is a bilateral
agreement between two belligerents or two groups of belligerents. 144
One may point out certain particularities with regard to the conclusion of an armistice agreement. For example, the principal organ
of negotiations for conclusion of an armistice agreement is usually the
military commander. Sometimes, the foreign minister or diplomats,
who are the ordinary negotiating organs for an international treaty,
engage in the negotiations of an armistice agreement. However, due to
the special circumstances of an armistice agreement, the participation
of military commander is necessary. Since a military commander is
responsible for the direction of military operation, he might be also
responsible for the conclusion of an armistice agreement which terminate such military operations. 145 This does not mean that the authority for the conclusion of an armistice agreement rests with the military
commander. It is a recognized rule of law that the head of state must
delegate his treaty-making power to negotiate and conclude a military
armistice agreement to his military commander in accordance with the
provisions of municipal law. The conclusion of an armistice agreement by a military commander without the authorization of the head
of state or beyond the authorization delegated to him may give rise to
complicated problems concerning the legal effects of such an armistice
agreement. The legal problem of an unlawfully concluded armistice
agreement is not sui generis to armistice agreement practice, but rather
is a common problem associated with all kinds of treaties. The solution is provided in detail by the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (1969), particularly in Articles 46 and 47 which provide:
Article 46, 1. A state may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation
of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to
144. Monaco, supra note 139, pp. 284-285, 327.
145. Levie, supra note 135, p. 883; Monaco, supra note 139, pp. 326-327.
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conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of
fundamental importance.
2. A violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its
internal law of fundamental importance.
Article 47. If the authority of a representative to express
the consent of a state to be bound by a particular treaty has
been made subject to a specific restriction, his omission to
observe that restriction may not be invoked as invalidating
the consent expressed by him unless the restriction was notified to the other negotiating status prior to his expressing
such consent.
Another major difference between an ordinary treaty and an armistice agreement is that an armistice must be implemented as soon as
possible after its conclusion due to the precarious and dangerous character of military hostilities. For the belligerents to continue military
hostilities while waiting for the ratification of the armistice agreement
would result in heavy casualties, and therefore alter substantially the
war situation on which the conclusion of the armistice agreement was
based. Therefore, an armistice agreement must be an agreement in
simplified form by its nature. For the conclusion of an armistice
agreement, ratification or acceptance or approval is not required. In
other words, the signature of an armistice agreement means the authentication of its agreement text and at the same time the expression
of the consent to be bound by the agreement. There is no need for a
separate step to express the consent to be bound by the treaty which is
otherwise required in formal treaty. 146 As a matter of fact, the implementation procedure for an armistice agreement is simple. Usually
within several hours after the signing of the armistice agreement or at
the same time as the signing, according to the agreed terms, the armistice agreement should enter into force, and resulting in the cessation
of armed hostilities. 147
There is no fixed rule concerning the duration of an armistice
agreement. Duration depends upon the individual armistice agreements. For example, the Armistice of Shimonoseki in 1895 provided a
duration of twenty-one days, and the Armistice of Malmoe between
Prussia and Denmark on August 26, 1848, provided for an armistice
of seven months with automatic extension unless one month's advance
146. The Vienna Convention, on The Law of Treaties, 1969, Article 12.
147. Monaco, supra note 139, pp. 298-299.
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notice was given by either party. 148 However, armistice agreements
concluded since World War II, have for the most part provided for
either an indefinite duration, or contain no provision at all on this
point. For example, according to the General Armistice Agreement
between Israel and Lebanon, the agreement shall remain in effect until
a peaceful settlement between the two parties is achieved. 149 The Korean Armistice Agreement remains in effect until superceded by an
appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political level between the two parties. 150

2.
a.

The Korean Armistice Agreement
The Framework of the Korean Armistice Agreement

The Korean Armistice Agreement consists of a Preamble, five articles (63 paragraphs), and two annexes. The formal title of the Agreement is "Agreement between the Commander-in-Chief, United
Nations Command, on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of
the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the other hand, concerning a Military Armistice
in Korea."
The preamble deals with the cessation of hostilities. In the Preamble the Commanders of both sides express the clear intention to end
the war completely: " . . . . (the Commander of both sides) . . . in
the interest of stopping the Korean Conflict . . . . and with the objective of establishing an armistice which will insure a complete cessation
of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final peaceful settlement is achieved, do individually, collectively, and mutually
agree to accept and to be bound and governed by the conditions and
terms of armistice set forth in the following articles and paragraphs

"
Article 1 provides for the Military Demarcation Line and the Demilitarized Zone. This demarcation line was determined on the basis
of the actual contact line ofboth armed forces. The demilitarized zone
was established on the basis of the demarcation line, with each side
withdrawing its forces two kilometers north and south of the demarcation line respectively. Both sides are prohibited from executing any
hostile acts within, from or against the demilitarized zone. Further,
no person, military or civil, may be permitted to enter the demilitarized zone except persons concerned with civil administration andre148. Levie, supra note 135, p. 892.
149. Ibid., p. 892.
150. See Appendix I of The Korean Armistice Agreement, Para. 62.

42

CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES

lief and persons specifically authorized by the Military Armistice
Commission. 151
Article 2 concerns the concrete arrangements for implementing
the armistice. Both sides are bound to withdraw their military forces
from the demilitarized zone and cease the introduction into Korea of
reinforcement military forces and supplementary weapons. In order
to supervise the implementation of armistice agreement terms, a Military Armistice Commission was established. This Commission, headquartered at Penmunjom, was composed of ten senior officers, five of
whom were to be appointed by the United Nations Command and the
other five by the Communist side. This Commission was to be aided
by the Joint Observer Teams. Furthermore, in order to assure fair
supervision by the Military Armistice Commission over the implementation of the armistice provisions, a Neutral Nations Supervisory
Commission was established. This Commission was composed of four
senior officers of Neutral Nations, two of whom (Swiss and Swedish)
were to be appointed by the United Nations Command and the other
two (Polish and Czech) by the Communist side.
Article 3 and its two Annexes concern arrangements bearing on
prisoners of war and functions of the Neutral Nations Repatriation
Commission.
Article 4 concerns the political conference for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question following the armistice agreement. This
conference was to be held after the conclusion of the armistice
agreement. 152
Article 5 is the final clause providing for the agreement's entry
into force, the amendment of, and other problems of the agreement
itself.
b.

Particularities of the Korean Armistice Agreement

The Korean Armistice Agreement has several particular characteristics not found in other armistices. This is attributable to the fact
that the Korean War began as a civil war and evolved into a more
grand regional war.
First, the legal parties to this armistice are unique in international
practice. Take as evidence, for example, the title of the armistice:
"Agreement between the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean
People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volun151. Ibid., Para. 6, 9.
152. Ibid., Para. 60; see Chapter One, section A on this Conference.
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teers, on the other hand, concerning a Military Armistice in Korea."
The signatory of one side is the Commander-in-Chief of the United
Nations Command and the signatory of the other side is the Commander of the North Korean Army and the Commander of the Chinese Communist forces. Considering the fact that an armistice
agreement is a bilateral treaty by nature, the Korean Armistice Agreement must be also a bilateral agreement between two groups of belligerents. The United Nations Command and South Korea compose
one group of belligerents; North Korea and Communist China, the
other. However, South Korea is hidden behind the United Nations
Command, while a separate agreement between South Korea and the
United Nations Command had to be reached through separate negotiations between South Korea and the United States. Besides, since one
signatory is the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command, the United Nations is involved as a party to the Korean Armistice Agreement. This is one of the important elements that the
Communist side opposed, the United Nations supervision in all-Korean elections for Korean unification, at the Geneva Conference in
1954. At this Conference the Communist side rejected the United Nations as the supervisory agency on the grounds that the United Nations was a belligerent in the Korean War. Instead, they insisted that
a Neutral Nations Commission should be created for the supervision
of the elections and that this Commission should be composed of representatives from neutral nations. 153
Second, the Korean Armistice Agreement put a de facto end to
the Korean War without a concrete solution to remedy the causes of
this war. That is, the Korean Armistice Agreement, as have many
armistices since World War II, did not strike at the root of the war-namely, the division of Korea. Although the demarcation line was
somewhat different from the 38th Parallel, all the pre-war problems
still remained and worsened, despite the heavy casualties and damages. The South Korean Government firmly opposed any armistice
that failed to solve the Korean division. However, they eventually
agreed to it, with a guarantee of South Korean security from the
United States Government, i.e., the Mutual Defense Treaty and economic and military assistance. 154
Article 4 of the Korean Armistice Agreement recommends a high
level political conference for the Korean unification and as a matter of
fact this kind of conference was held in Geneva from April 26 to June
153. FRUS, supra note 114, pp. 300, 350-353.
154. FRUS, supra note 80, pp. 1265-1445.
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15, 1954. However, the conference failed to reach an agreement. As
long as the basic circumstances surrounding the Korean question remained unchanged, a drastic solution was not to be expected. 155
In spite of the failure of the Geneva Conference, both sides made
clear their intentions of ending the Korean War. North Korean Foreign Minister Nam 11 offered a six-point proposal ensuring peaceful
conditions in Korea. 156 The Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov submitted a draft-declaration requesting that peace threatening action be restrained pending the final settlement of the Korean question. 157 The
United States Delegate Smith reiterated that the existing Korean Armistice Agreement had the legal effect of ending the war. 158 Furthermore, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 811, December
11, 1954, confirmed this opinion, emphasizing Paragraph 62 of the
Korean Armistice, in "providing that the Armistice Agreement shall
remain in effect until expressly superceded by mutually acceptable
amendment or the appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement between both sides." 159
In sum, the failure of the Geneva Conference meant a divided
Korea. Thus, while the Korean War itself was over, the Korean problem remained unsolved.
As explained before, in traditional terminology, an armistice
agreement is a military agreement between belligerent parties simply
for the suspension of armed hostilities pending the conclusion of a
peace treaty. However, armistice agreements have evolved to a point
where they have the tendency to terminate the war itself without solving the cause of the war. The Korean Armistice Agreement exemplifies this modern character of armistice agreements. Both sides agreed
to a complete cessation of hostilities. They also established a demilitarized zone along the demarcation line, and the Military Armistice
Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. 160
The Armistice also gave rise to favorable conditions enabling all
parties in the war - except for North and South Korea - to resume
diplomatic relations. That is, all nations, except South and North Korea, which participated in the Korean War, normalized diplomatic relations in the post-war era. Even the United States later normalized
diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (Communist
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

See section 2 of this volume.
FRUS, supra note ll4, pp. 376-377.
The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference, supra note 116, pp. 176-182.
Ibid., p. 182.
Resolutions Relating to Korea, supra note 2, p. 201.
See Korean Armistice Agreement, Article l.
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China) on January 1, 1979. 161 Additionally, the same People's Republic of China which had been condemned as an aggressor in Korea became a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. 162
Some of the Allied Nations such as Australia, New Zealand, and Ethiopia normalized their diplomatic relations with North Korea. These
material developments support the proposition that, for most members
of the belligerents, the Korean War was formally over. Only relations
between South and North Korea remained vague. Thus, again, while
the Korean War came to an end, the cause of the war - the Korean
division - remained unsolved. 163
Even North-South Korean relations took on a new form. South
and North Korea issued a Joint Communique on July 4, 1972 in an
effort to improve relations. It stated that " . . . . the two sides, in an
effort to remove the misunderstanding and mistrust and mitigate increased tension . . . . as a result of long separation, and further to
expedite unification of the fatherland, have reached full agreement on
the following point . . . . unification shall be achieved through peaceful means, and not through the use of force against each other . . . .
as a homogeneous people, a great national unity shall first be sought,
transcending differences in ideas, ideologies . . . " 164
In sum, the nature of the Korean Armistice, the state of post-war
diplomatic relations, and the new nature of North-South Korean relations all reveal the inefficacy of the Korean Armistice in tackling the
central issue in dispute - namely, Korean unification.

3.

Legal Parties to the Korean Armistice Agreement

a.

Superficial Parties to the Korean Armistice Agreement
i.

The Signature and the Conclusion of an Armistice
Agreement

Article 1 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines
a party to a treaty as a State which has consented to be bound by the
treaty and for which the treaty is in force. The Vienna Convention
applies only to a treaty concluded between states; however, it does not
deny other international legal subjects such as international organiza161. U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin 79 No. 2022 (Jan. 1979).
162. U.N.G.A. Res. 498(V) (February 1, 1951).
163. Lyou Byung-Hwa, supra note 1, pp. 63-64.
164. National Unification Board of the ROK, A White Paper on South-North Dialogue
in Korea, Seoul, 1980, p. 85-86; The Institute for East Asian Studies, Foreign Policy for
Peace and Unification, Seoul, 1975, pp. 158-159.
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tions to become parties to international treaties. 165 In fact, the International Law Commission, which prepared the Vienna Convention, is
drafting another convention on the law of treaties governing treaties to
which international organizations are parties. There has been a surge
of activity by international organizations participating in the conclusion of treaties. Under such circumstances, the International Court of
Justice clarified the legal personality of international organizations in
its advisory opinion on the Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations. The Court stated that international organizations are subjects of international law capable of possessing
international rights and duties, including the conclusion of international treaties and bringing international claims. 166 Thus, all subjects
of international law are international legal persons, capable of participating in international treaties even though the nature and scope of the
rights and capacity of each subject are different. This depends, however, upon the needs of the community and the development of the
international society.
Parties to an armistice agreement are belligerents, who are by necessity subjects of international law. They include states, international
organizations and other international legal subjects. Since an armistice agreement is a bilateral agreement in nature, the parties to an
armistice agreement are two belligerents or two groups of belligerents.
With regard to the Korean Armistice Agreement, the two opposing
belligerents are the United Nations side and the Communist side. But
several persons and organs of the United Nations also appear on each
side. On the United Nations side, there are two signatures and several
names of state and organization and organs (i.e., the signatures of
Mark W. Clark and William K. Harrison, the United Nations Command, the United Nations and the United States).
In order to determine party or parties (on the United Nations
side) to the Korean Armistice Agreement, one must clarify the nature
and the relation of the two signatures, and determine the composition
and relation of members of the United Nations' side.
According to the formalities on treaty conclusion, under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of May 22, 1969, the conclusion of a treaty has several steps: negotiation, adoption and
authentication of the text (i.e., determining the treaty text as final, definite and authentic by the competent organ), 167 expression of consent
165. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, Article 3.
166. International Court of Justice (ICJ) Report (1949), pp. 178-179.
167. The Vienna Convention, supra note 165, Article 10.
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to be bound by a treaty, and entry into force. An armistice agreement
as a treaty should follow all these procedures. However, owing to
practical considerations, we need not explain all such procedures.
In concluding a formal treaty, authentication is done by signature, and expression of consent is achieved by ratification, acceptance,
or approval. 168 Yet, since an armistice agreement is an agreement in
simplified form, the signature of an armistice agreement carries the
force of both the authentication of the text and the expression of the
consent to be bound by the agreement. Thus, with regard to the Korean Armistice Agreement, mere signature will bind a party to the
agreement.
ii.

The United Nations Side

As far as the Korean Armistice Agreement is concerned, there
are two signatures on the United Nations side- those of Mark W.
Clark, Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command and
William K. Harrison, Jr., Senior Delegate of the United Nations Command. Questions arise as to: (1) the relation between the two signatures; and (2) which signature is the required signature under Article
12, Paragraph 1 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties that is, the expression of the consent to be bound by the agreement.
First, it is clear that Mark W. Clark possessed competent military authority to conclude the Korean Armistice Agreement on behalf of the
United Nations since he was the Commander-in-Chief of the United
Nations Command. He was competent to conclude the armistice
agreement under international law and in accordance with the instructions of the United Nations. In fact, the United Nations authorized
such action under Security Council Resolution 84 in 1950. 169 Concretely, the Resolution authorized the United States Government to
organize a unified command and to operate this unified command
under the responsibility of the United States Government. The United
States was required to provide the United Nations with reports on the
course of action taken under the unified command. 170 The United
States Government authorized General Clark to conclude the armistice agreement. Furthermore, United Nations General Assembly
Resolution 610 (VII) enumerated detailed instructions to the United
Nations Command concerning negotiations for the armistice agree168. Ibid., Article 14.
169. U.N.S.C. Res. 84 (July 7, 1950), U.N. Doc. S/1588.
170. U.N. Security Council Resolution 84, UN Doc. S/1588 (7 July 1950), Resolutions
Relating to Korea, supra note 2, pp. 135-136.
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ment. 171 Finally, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 711
(VII), 28 August 1953, approved the terms of the Korean Armistice
Agreement negotiated by the United Nations Command under the direction of the United States Government. 172 In accordance with the
authorization and instructions of the United Nations and the United
States Government, General Clark concluded the armistice
agreement.
In light of this, one is led to inquire as to the effect of the signature of William Harrison, the Senior Delegate of the United Nations
Command for the negotiations on the armistice agreement. As explained before, 173 at 10:12 a.m. (Seoul time) on July 27, 1953, Representatives Harrison and Nam 11 signed the text of the Korean
Armistice Agreement at Panmunjom, and at 13:00 on the same day,
General Clark signed the text at Munsan-Ri, along with his military
advisers and a South Korean Representative. General Clark delegated
his subordinate, Senior Delegate Harrison, to sign the text. The armistice agreement without the signature of General Clark would not
have been binding since he was the competent military organ to conclude the armistice agreement.
According to Article 12, Paragraph 2 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, the consent to be bound by a treaty in an
agreement in simplified form can be expressed not only by a signature,
but also by a initial or a signature ad referendum, if it is confirmed by
the competent authority afterward. The legal effect of such a signature becomes effective from the time of the signature ad referendum,
and not from the time of signature of the competent organ who confirms it. Of course, unless the competent organ confirms it, there is no
legal effect. Harrison's signature is the signature ad referendum, and
General Clark's is the formal signature, the agreement became binding
from the time of the signature ad referendum of Senior Delegate Harrison, provided that General Clark confirmed it, which he did.
After having determined when the Armistice came into effect, the
more difficult question of the proper party to the Agreement arises.
The discussion below will demonstrate that the United Nations alone,
as a legal entity, is the proper party to the Armistice. As explained
above, only legal subjects of international law with international legal
personality may be a legal party to an international agreement. 174 For
171.
172.
note 2,
173.
174.

U.N.G.A. Res. 610(VII), UN Doc. A/2228 (December 3, 1952).
U.N.G.A. Res. 711 (VII) (August 28, 1953); Resolutions Relating to Korea, supra
pp. 175-177.
See the last part of Section I of this volume.
UN Security Council Res. 84, UN Doc. S/1588 (July 7, 1950).
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this reason, one may dismiss the Security Council, General Assembly,
the United Nations Command and General Clark as legal parties to
the Armistice. First, General Clark was the commander-in-chief of
the U.N. Command. He merely represented the United Nations and
did not possess the attributes amounting to international legal personality. Second, the U.N. Command was the military command created
by the Security Council. 175 The Security Council operated the Command except when deadlocked by Soviet vetoes, 176 at which time the
General Assembly assumed supervisory power. The United Nations
Command was therefore a mere subsidiary organ of the United Nations (Article 29 of the UN Charter) and could not have been a proper
party to the Armistice. Last, since the Security Council and the General Assembly are merely principal organs of an international organization - the United Nations - and should conduct international
legal act in the name of the United Nations, not themselves. Thus, no
matter how important they may be on the international plane, they
cannot be subjects of international law. The relation between an organization and its organs would be analogous to the relation between a
state and its domestic agencies. 177 Therefore, only the United Nations
possesses sufficient legal personality to be the superficial party to the
Korean Armistice Agreement. 178
iii.

The Communist Side

There are three signatures for the Communist side on the Korean
Armistice Agreement. They are the signatures of Kim 11-Sung,
Supreme Commander of the North Korean Army, Peng Teh-huai, the
Commander of "Chinese People's Volunteers" and Nam 11, Senior
Delegate for armistice negotiations. The signature of Nam 11 is
equivalent to the signature of the Senior Delegate Harrison of the
United Nations Command. In accordance with the principles outlined
above, it is thus signature ad referendum for the Communist side.
Nam 11's signature must, however, have been confirmed by the signature of the competent authority on the Communist side, in order to be
binding.
A confusing issue arises with regard to the binding effect of the
signatures of Kim 11 Sung and Peng Teh-huai. Were this agreement a
175. U.N.G.A. Res. 376(V) (October 7, 1950); U.N.G.A. Res. "Uniting for Peace Resolution," 377(V) (November 3, 1950); U.N.G.A. Res. 498(V) (February 1, 1951).
176. ICJ Report. supra note 166, p. 178.
177. Badie Kasme, La Capacite de /'Organisation des Nations Unies de Conc/ure de
Traites, Paris: L.G.D.J., 1960, p. 175.
178. Lyou Byung-Hwa, supra, note 1, pp. 68-69.

50

CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES

multilateral treaty, the issue would be elementary. The question stems
from the fact that the Korean Armistice Agreement is an armistice
agreement and therefore a bilateral agreement by nature but is signed
by two authorities for one party. Since there is no indication of which
signature represents the competent authority, it is necessary to expand
on the juridical status of the parties involved.
The first issue pertains to the Commander of Chinese People's
Volunteers. Namely, was Peng Teh-huai commanding some Chinese
who volunteered individually to fight against the United Nations
Command or the regular army of Communist China. There is sufficient evidence to prove that real Chinese forces and not volunteers,
were involved. A communique issued on November 6, 1950 by the
Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Commander, General
MacArthur, regarding the Chinese intervention in Korea, well explained the situation:
The Korean War was brought to a practical end with the
closing of the trap on enemy elements north of Pyongyang
and seizure of the east coastal area, resulting in raising the
number of enemy prisoners of war in our hands to well over
135,000, which, with other losses amounting to over 200,000,
brought casualties to 335,000, representing a fair estimate of
North Korean total military strength. . . . In the face of
this victory of UN Army, the Communists committed one of
the most offensive acts of international lawlessness . . . by
moving without any notice of belligerency. . . . alien Communists forces across the Yalu River into North Korea and
massing a great concentration of possible reinforcing divisions with adequate supply behind the privileged sanctuary
of the adjacent Manchuria border . . . 179
Another communique issued on November 28, 1950 by General MacArthur further clarifies: "Enemy reactions developed in the course of
our assault operations of the past four days disclose that a major segment of the Chinese continental armed forces in army, corps and divisional organization of an aggregate strength of over 200,000 men is
now arrayed against the United Nations forces in North Korea
,,go

According to the report from the United Nations Command to
179. U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin (November 13, 1950), p. 763.
180. "Military Situation in the Far East," Hearings before the Committee on Armed
Services and the Committee on the Foreign Relations, Part 5, 82nd Congress 1st Session
(August 17, 1951), p. 3495.
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the Security Council during the period November 24 to December 1,
1950, the Chinese Communist forces took over direct responsibility for
the entire front in North Korea, except for short line of contact north
of Chongjin on the east coast. The Chinese transferred most of the
North Korean forces to Manchuria for retraining and re-equipping.
"At present, the only significant military power now confronting UN
forces in Korea is Communist China." Identified and confirmed Chinese Communist units were as follows: 38th Army (112, 113, 114th
divisions), 39th Army (115, 116, 117th divisions), 40th Army (118,
119, 120th divisions), 42nd Army (124, 125, 126th divisions), 50th
Army (148, 149, 150th divisions), 60th Army (196, 197, 198th divisions), 20th Army (59, 60, 89th divisions). 181
Before massive intervention by the Communist Chinese forces,
the Government of Communist China issued several statements saying
that it would not tolerate the advancement of the United Nations
forces toward the Yalu River, and accusing the United States of alleged air attacks on Communist China. 182 It therefore stands to reason that the so-called "Chinese People's Volunteers" were the regular
armed forces of Communist China. As a result, Peng Teh-huai stood
as the military commander of Communist China's regular forces.
The second issue relates to the legal status of the North Korean
regime. Before the Korean War, only a few Communist nations recognized the North Korean regime. Most nations and the United Nations
recognized only the South Korean government, which was established
under the auspices of the United Nations. Meanwhile the United Nations viewed the North Korean regime as illegal, because the Soviet
Union rejected the entrance and activities of the United Nations Temporary Commission in Korea, and formed the North Korean regime
on its own terms. 183 The UN Temporary Commission in Korea was
established under United Nations General Assembly Resolution 112
on November 14, 1947 for the purpose of holding general elections to
form an all-Korean government. United Nations General Assembly
Resolution 195 (III) of December 12, 1948 declared that the South
Korean Government was the only lawful government in Korea, based
on free elections under UN supervision and representing the great rna181. "The lOth Report of the United Nations Command in Korea," U.N. Doc. S/1953
(December 28, 1950).
182. U.N. Doc. S/1583 (July 6, 1950); U.N. Doc. S/1722 (August 28, 1950); Higgins,
supra note 41, p. 257.
183. U.N.G.A. Res. 112(11) (November 14, 1947); Resolutions Relating to Korea, supra
note 2, p. 39; U.N.G.A. Res. (February 26, 1948); Resolutions Relating to Korea, supra note
2, p. 57.
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jority of Korean people. 184
During the Korean War, both sides declared that they would
abide by all humanitarian rules of the Geneva Conventions in 1949. 185
South Korea signed all four Geneva Conventions of 1949, on July 4,
1950. 186 North Korea replied, on July 15, 1950, to the request of the
International Committee of the Red Cross to apply the humanitarian
rules during wartime, saying that it was strictly abiding by the principles of the Geneva Conventions. 187 The United Nations Command
instructed its forces to observe all the rules of the Geneva Conventions.188 In sum, all participants in the Korean War, including the
North Korean regime, applied the international law of war. This
means legally that the participants in the Korean War recognized the
North Korean regime as a belligerent. 189 Furthermore, the fact that
the United Nations Command concluded the Korean Armistice
Agreement with the North Korean regime proved that it recognized
the North Korean regime as a belligerent. Therefore, the Communist
side was a group of belligerents composed of North Korea and Communist China.
Having established the juridical status of North Korea and Communist China, the discussion now turns to each of their authority to
conclude the Korean Armistice Agreement. Since an armistice agreement is a bilateral treaty by nature, 190 normally one competent authority, representing all the belligerents on each side, signs the
agreement. The Korean Armistice Agreement bears, however, two
signatures on the Communist side. Therefore, it is necessary to discern their representative authority.
The Korean War began with the North Korean crossing of the
38th Parallel, and initially was a civil war between North and South
Korea. Later, the United Nations forces intervened on behalf of South
Korea. Some months later, Communist China entered the Korean
War, attacking the United Nations and South Korean forces. The
principal belligerents were South Korea and North Korea. The
United Nations supported South Korea, while Communist China as184. U.N.G.A. Res. 195(III) (December 12, 1948); Resolutions Relating to Korea, supra
note 2, pp. 58-59.
185. U.N. Doc. S/1834 (October 5, 1950).
186. Higgins, supra note 41, p. 191.
187. Ibid., p. 191.
188. "The 5th Report of the United Nations Command in Korea," U.N. Doc. S/1834
(October 5, 1950), p. 75.
189. Permanent Court oflntemational Justice (PCIJ) Report, Series A, No.7, (May 25,
1926), pp. 27-28.
190. Monaco, supra note 139, p. 284.
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sisted North Korea. The cause of the war was the Korean division.
Thus, the war was directly related to South and North Korea, even
though the United Nations and Communist China intervened. 191
In conclusion, North Korea and Communist China were not on
the same plane in terms of importance in connection with the Korean
Armistice Agreement. Moreover, an armistice in modern times results
in the de facto end of war. It is a legal means to guarantee peace in the
area concerned. In light of this analysis, North Korea assumed the
principal role for the Communist side, while Communist China took a
secondary role. The implementation of the armistice agreement further supports the leading role of North Korea. Thus, even if one commander of the Communist coalition army had signed the armistice
agreement, both North Korea and Communist China would become
parties. In fact, both of two commanders signed the armistice agreement, and this gave rise to confusion in terms of legal practices.
b.

South Korea and the Korean Armistice Agreement

As discussed above, the South Korean government stubbornly
opposed the conclusion of an armistice agreement which did not remedy the Korean division. Further, it often took issue with the position
of the Allied Nations. However, the agreement between South Korea
and the United States made possible the conclusion and maintenance
of the Korean Armistice Agreement. From a legal point of view, the
latter fact is more important. If South Korea had not agreed to the
conclusion of the Korean Armistice Agreement, the Armistice would
not have been concluded or maintained. Unfortunately, South Korean
opposition to the conclusion of an armistice agreement which did not
result in Korean unification has been overemphasized. As a result,
many contend that South Korea is not a party to the Korean Armistice Agreement. However, from a legal point of view, any armistice
without participation of South Korea would not have been possible in
South Korea unless the sovereignty of the Republic of Korea was challenged. Many do not even recognize this simple legal truth, including
some South Korean governmental officials. Thus, it is necessary to
present a legal analysis of this problem.
191. Lyou Byung-Hwa, supra note l, p. 74.
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1.

The Necessity of South Korea to be a Legal Party to
the Korean Armistice Agreement
(a) South Korea is a Principal Belligerent

Upon careful analysis of the history of the Korean War, one can
easily determine that the Korean War was divided into two periods that of pre- and post- U.N. intervention. First, the Korean War began
with the surprise attack by North Korean forces, which crossed the
38th Parallel at dawn on Sunday, June 25, 1950. 192 The North Korean forces advanced as far as in Seoul within three days and continued their drive southward. This unexpected event embarrassed the
United States Government, which hurried to convene the United Nations Security Council and organize the United Nations Command
under its direction. The United Nations forces arrived in Korea in the
beginning of July, 1950. North Korea forces already held a large part
of South Korean territory. During this period, only North and South
Korean forces were engaged in the civil war. This first period of the
Korean War is important in analyzing the complicated composition of
the belligerent parties and clarifying the principal position of South
Korea.
After the intervention of the United Nations, the composition of
belligerents on the United Nations side became very complex. Under
the United Nations Command, the armed forces of sixteen nations
were unified. South Korean forces joined the United Nations Command. The Security Council of the United Nations, after condemning
the North Korea invasion as a breach of peace and calling upon North
Korea to withdraw its forces by Resolution 82 of June 25, 1950, 193
recommended that members of the United Nations furnish such assistances to South Korea as might be necessary to repel the armed attack,
by Resolution 83 of June 27, 1950. 194 Following the recommendations
of the Security Council, most nations offered military or humanitarian
assistance to South Korea. In order to organize effective assistance,
the Security Council, with the initiative of the United States, established a unified command by adopting Resolution 84 on July 7, 1950.
The Security Council:
" . . . -recommended that all Members providing military forces and other assistance pursuant to the aforesaid
Security Council resolutions make such forces and other
192. U.S. Dept. of State, FRUS, 1950, vol. VII (Korea), Washington: GPO, 1976, pp.
125-127.
193. U.N. Doc. S/1501 (June 25, 1950).
194. U.N. Doc. S/1511 (June 27, 1950).
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assistance available to a unified command under the United
States;
- requested the United States to designate the commander of such forces;
- authorized the unified command at its discretion to
use the United Nations flag in the course of operations
against North Korean forces concurrently with the flags of
the various nations participating; and
- requested the United States to provide the Security
Council with reports as appropriate on the course of action
taken under the unified command. 195
In total, 42 member nations of the United Nations and five nonmembers made offers of assistance to South Korea. 196 Among the offers of military assistance from the member nations, only national contingents of more than one battalion were accepted. The armed forces
of sixteen nations (the United States, the United Kingdom, France,
Canada, Australia, Turkey, Union of South Africa, New Zealand,
Belgium, the Netherlands, Greece, Ethiopia, Colombia, Thailand, the
Philippines and Luxemburg) were accepted. Many other nations provided humanitarian assistance such as medical supplies and food. Nationalist China's offer of three infantry divisions was not accepted,
fearing the possible intervention of Communist China.
Among the armed forces of the United Nations Command, South
Korean and American forces comprised more than 90 percent, while
the total forces of the other fifteen nations comprised less than 10 percent of the 750,000 UN forces. 197 At the end of 1951, South Korean
proportion among UN forces was more than 40 percent, 198 and continued to increase thereafter. In a word, even after the intervention of
the United Nations, South Korea remained the principal belligerent in
terms of actual fighting forces. 199
(b)

South Korea As the Host Country

South Korea was the host country in terms of its role, interests,
and causes of the war. 200 The Korean War broke out between South
195. U.N. Doc. S/1588 (July 7, 1950); Resolutions Relating to Korea, supra note 2, pp.
135-136.
196. FRUS, supra note 40, p. 761.
197. Goodrich, supra note 5, p. 117.
198. Ibid., p. 117; FR US, supra note 80, p. 1384.
199. Lyou Byung-Hwa, supra note 1, p. 79.
200. Ibid., p. 80.
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and North Korea, and stemmed from the Korean division. The war
was conducted only on Korean territory. Although several countries
were involved in this war, only a portion of their armed forces were
engaged in the war, while all of the Korean armed forces were engaged. Moreover, the situation following the conclusion of the armistice agreement may suggest something. Every belligerent except
South and North Korea established normal diplomatic relations with
one another. This might mean that the Korean problem, including the
implementation of the armistice agreement, would eventually become
more and more the problem of the Korean people themselves, if not
their exclusive problem. The South-North Joint Communique of July
4, 1972 supported this position: "Unification shall be achieved
through independent Korean efforts without being subject to external
imposition of interference." 201
In the light of the situation, an armistice agreement without
South Korean participation would be meaningless. Any attempt at
legal explanations based on the faulty interpretations of the Korean
Armistice Agreement, which deny the South Korean participation in
this Agreement, is unrealistic.
(c)

South Korean Legitimacy

At the end of World War II, the United States and the Soviet
Union agreed to disarm Japanese forces in Korea. The Soviet Union
would deal with Japanese forces north of the 38th Parallel, while the
United States would maintain those south of the 38th Parallel. This
partition of Korean peninsula was the result of an impromptu decision
made under pressure in an urgent situation. Due to the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 8, Japanese forces
collapsed unexpectedly soon. Stalin quickly entered in the war against
Japan in Manchuria on August 8, and the Soviets rushed southward.
Embarrassed by this unexpected situation, the United States proposed
the 38th Parallel as the demarcation line between two occupational
powers. This idea of partition was recommended by the State-WarNavy Coordinating Committee, after being prepared by two young
military officers. 202
The Soviets accepted this proposal, and on September 2, 1945,
General MacArthur, as Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in the
201. White Paper, supra note 164, pp. 85-86.
202. J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons of Korea, Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1969, pp. 25-26; Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War,
/9451947, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981, pp. 120-121.
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Pacific, issued General Order No. 1 governing the conditions of Japanese surrender. This order included the partition of Korea. This was
to be the source of all Korean tragedies to come.
The two separate regimes of Korea were formed under the two
occupational powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. After
the failure of negotiations of the Joint Soviet-American Commission
for an independent and unified Korea, the United States brought this
problem to the United Nations. The United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 112(11) on November 14, 1947, which established the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea for the
purpose of holding free elections and forming an all Korean government under its supervision. 203 However, the Soviet Union refused the
activities of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea in
North Korea, while the Commission carried out its task in South Korea with the cooperation of the United States forces. The Commission
asked the Interim Committee of the General Assembly whether it
should carry out the General Assembly's program in South Korea
only, since it was unable to carry out its function in North Korea due
to Soviet opposition. The Interim Committee of the General Assembly advised the Commission to implement the program in South Korea alone under the existing circumstances. 204
A general election was held on May 10, 1948 in South Korea
under the supervision of the United Nations Temporary Commission
on Korea. Out of a population of 20 million, 7,036,750 voted,
amounting to approximately 72 percent of qualified voters. 205 On
May 31 the elected representatives convened as the Korean National
Assembly. The United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea approved the result of the election. 206
After the election, the National Assembly of Korea hurried to
form a national government. The National Assembly adopted the
Constitution of the Republic of Korea on July 12 and promulgated it
on July 17. They elected Syngman Rhee as the first President of the
Republic of Korea on July 20. The formation of a national government was completed on August 15, 1948, and received the authority of
government from the United States Military Command. This Korean
203. U.N.G.A. Res. 112(11) (November 14, 1947); Resolutions Relating to Korea, supra
note 2, pp. 39-41.
204. U.N.G.A. Res. (February 26, 1948); Resolutions Relating to Korea, supra note 2, p.
57.
205. U.N. Doc. A/Ac.19/80, Officials Records of the Third Session (1948), supp. no. 9,
vol. 1; Goodrich, supra note 5, p. 59.
206. Ibid., p. 59.
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Government was inaugurated on August 15, 1948. 207 The United Nations General Assembly approved the newly formed Government of
the Republic of Korea as a legitimate government:
The General Assembly . . . declares that there has been established a lawful government [the Government of theRepublic of Korea] having effective control and jurisdiction
over that part of Korea where the Temporary Commission
was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of all Korea reside; that this Government
is based on elections which were a valid expression of the
free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which
were observed by the Temporary Commission; and that this
is the only such government in Korea . . .208
South Korea's legitimacy prompted the United Nations to intervene in the Korean War. The Security Council, declaring "that the
Government of the Republic of Korea is a lawfully established government . . . and that this is only such government in Korea," 209 recommended that the Members of the United Nations furnish such
assistance to South Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack.210 Thus, given the relative weight placed on the issue by the
United Nations, it would be unreasonable to exclude South Korea
from the armistice agreement. Following this line of reasoning, it
would be all the more unacceptable that the condemned North Korean regime as an aggressor, which had been recognized only as a belligerent by most nations, be a principal party to the agreement. 211
ii.

Legal Foundations Supporting South Korea as a Legal
Party to the Korean Armistice Agreement
(a)

Legal Analysis of the Relations between the
United Nations Command and the South
Korean Armed Forces

When the United Nations forces arrived in Korea, the South Korean Government assigned the command authority over all South Korean forces to the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations
207.
208.
note 2,
209.
210.
211.

Ibid., p. 59.
U.N.G.A. Res. 195(111) (December 12, 1948); Resolutions Relating to Korea, supra
pp. 58-59.
U.N. Security Council Res. 82, U.N. Doc. S/1501 (June 25, 1950).
U.N. Security Council Res. 83, U.N. Doc. S/1511 (June 27, 1950).
Lyou Byung Hwa, supra note 1, p. 83.
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Command. President Rhee's letter to General MacArthur of July 15,
1950 documented this decision:
In view of the common military effort of the United Nations
on behalf of the Republic of Korea, in which all military
forces, land, sea, and air, of all the United Nations, fighting
in or near Korea have been placed under your operational
command, and in which you have been designated as
Supreme Commander, UN forces, I am happy to assign to
you the command authority over all land, sea, and air forces
of the Republic of Korea during the period of the continuation of the present state of hostilities, such command to be
exercised either by you personally or by such military commander or commanders to whom you may delegate the exercise of this authority within Korea or in adjacent areas
212

General MacArthur replied through then Ambassador to Korea John
J. Muccio on July 18, 1950: "Please express to President Rhee my
thanks and deepest appreciation for the action taken in his letter of
July. It cannot fail to increase the coordinated power of the United
Nations forces operating in Korea. I am proud indeed to have the
gallant ROK forces under my command. . . . " 213
After this move, South Korean forces performed military operations under MacArthur together with the other UN forces. The South
Korean forces were different, however, from the other forces of the
United Nations Command in terms of legal character. First, the
United Nations forces were formed under Security Council Resolutions 83 and 84, which "recommend[ed] that the Members of the
United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as
may be necessary to repel the armed attack . . . " 214 and "recommend[ed] that all Members providing military forces . .. pursuant to
the aforesaid Security Council resolutions make such forces . . . to a
unified command... .'m 5 However, South Korean forces were not
deployed under these resolutions, but rather had been engaged in the
war before the resolutions. In addition, the resolutions were directed
to members of the United Nations, South Korea was not, however, a
member of the United Nations. Third, the United Nations forces were
engaged in the Korean War to repel the North Korean attack, and to
212.
213.
214.
215.

Korea-U.S.
Korea-U.S.
U.N. Doc.
U.N. Doc.

Relations, supra note 128, pp. 556-557; FRUS, supra note 192, p. 388.
Relations, supra note 128, pp. 557-558.
S/1511 (June 27, 1950).
S/1588 (July 7, 1950).
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restore international peace and security, while South Korean forces
were engaged in the war for their survival, which had been threatened
by the North Korean attack. For this reason, the Allied Nations sent
only a portion of their armed forces in Korea, while South Korea engaged all its troops in the war. Last, South Korean forces joined the
United Nations Command through an assignment in the form of a
letter, and not by United Nations resolutions.
Considering the importance of the assignment, it is appropriate to
clarify its legal character. President Rhee's letter to General MacArthur of July 15, 1950, was clear on its purpose. "In view of the common military effort of the United Nations on behalf of the Republic of
Korea in which all military forces . . . of the United Nations, fighting
in or near Korea have been placed under your operational command
. . . " The composition of troops and duration of assignment are also
expressed: "I am happy to assign to you command authority over
. . . all forces of the ROK during the period of the continuation of the
present state of hostilities . . . . " Therefore, unless the South Korean
Government recalled this assignment of command authority, it would
continue in legal effect until the termination of the "present state of
hostilities." In other words, if armed hostilities ceased, the assignment
would also be terminated. In this sense, this act of assignment is a socalled "legal act under the resolutive condition" or "legal act with the
resolutive clause," in which the subject of legal act preestablishes the
end of its legal effects, bound to an uncertain event. This assignment's
resolutive condition or clause is "during the period of the continuation
of the present state of hostilities," and the uncertain event was the end
of the hostilities. Thus, since the armistice brought an end to actual
armed hostilities, command authority automatically reverted to the
South Korean Government. A separate legal act from either side was
unnecessary to achieve this goal. 216
In this regard, after the conclusion of the Korean Armistice
Agreement, there was an agreed minute of conference between the
governments of the United States and South Korea of November 17,
1954, based on the conference held between President Eisenhower and
President Rhee during the latter's visit to the United States, July 2730, 1954. It read:
. . . It is the intention and policy of the Republic of Korea
to: 1) cooperate with the United States in its efforts to unify
Korea . . . 2)retain ROK forces under the operational control of the United Nations Command while that Command
216. Lyou Byung-Hwa, supra note 1, pp. 85-86.
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has responsibility for the defense of the ROK, unless after
consultation it is agreed that our mutual and individual interests would be best served by a change. . . . Based upon
the conditions which the Republic of Korea declares it will
create, it is the intention and policy of the United States to:
1) continue its program of helping to strengthen the Republic of Korea . . . 217
The legal character of the agreed minute of the conference is not
clear. The terms of the agreed minute are general global principles of
cooperation. Its expression and form are different from an international treaty, as expressed in the language "it is the intention and policy of. . . " In light of the above considerations, the agreed minute of
the conference is more akin to a statement of intent, and does not
contain the legally binding nature of an international treaty between
two nations. The document takes the form of a kind of gentlemen's
agreement or some temporary agreed policy-cooperation between two
friendly governments, the binding force of which is political and moral
rather than legal.
In light of the foregoing discussion, we may now address the issue
of the legal relation between the United Nations and South Korean
forces. As explained above, South Korean forces under the United
Nations Command differed from the other forces of the United Nations Command. South Korean forces were placed under the United
Nations Command by a separate act of the South Korean Government
simply for effective military operation. Therefore, it would be reasonable to conclude that the relation between the United Nations Command and South Korean forces is that of a coalition army. There are
many examples of coalition armies in military history, especially in the
two World Wars. 218
(b)

A Coalition Army and the Conclusion of an
Armistice Agreement

As the argument above demonstrates, the United Nations forces
and South Korean forces formed a coalition army under the commanding authority of the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations
Command. As relevant to this discussion, the question arises as to
how to conclude an armistice agreement for a coalition army. This is
217. U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin (November 29, 1954), pp. 810-811; FR US, supra note
80, pp. 1875-1877.
218. Lyou Byung-Hwa, supra note 1, p. 88.
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the key to the determination of parties to the Korean Armistice
Agreement.
Several examples involving coalition armies can be found in armistice agreements relating to the two World Wars, such as: the Armistice between Austria-Hungary and the Allied Powers, November 3,
1918 (signed at Villa Giusti- Padua); 219 the Armistice Convention
between the Great Britain and the Allied Powers, and Turkey, signed
at Murdos on October 30, 1918; 220 the Armistice with Germany,
signed at Compeigne on November 11, 1918;221 the Armistice with
Italy, signed at Fairfield, Sicily, September 3, 1943; 222 the Armistice
with Italy: Instrument of Surrender, September 29, 1943; 223 the Armistice with Rumania at Moscow, September 12, 1944; 224 the Armistice
with Bulgaria, October 28, 1944; 225 the Armistice with Hungary, Jan219. This armistice was concluded between Austria-Hungarian Representative Victor
Weber Elder von Webnau and the Supreme Commander of the Italian Army, Pietro Badoglio. Badoglio signed the agreement on behalf of the Allied and Associated Powers. With
his signature, all member nations of the Allied and the Associated Powers became parties
to the armistice agreement. U.S. Dept. of State, Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America, 1776-1949, vol. 2, Charles Bevans, ed., pp. 1-8.
220. This armistice agreement was signed by Vice Admiral Somerset Artur GoughCalthorpe, British Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Station and Turkish Minister of Marine, Rechard Hickmet Bey. British Commander Gough-Calthorpe signed for the
Allied Powers. Clive Parry, Consolidated Treaties Series 1918-1919, vol. 224, New York:
Oceana, pp. 169-171.
221. This armistice was concluded between Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the
Allied Armies, acting in the name of the Allied and Associated Powers, and Admiral
Wemyss, First Sea Lord, and Herr Erzberger, Secretary of State, President of the German
Delegation, Marshal Foch signed on behalf of the Allied and Associated Powers. Bevans,
supra note 219, pp. 9-19; Parry, supra note 220, pp. 286-299.
222. This agreement provides: "The following conditions of an armistice are presented
by General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces, acting by
authority of the Government of the United States and Great Britain and in the interest of
the United Nations, and are accepted by Pietro Badoglio, Head of Italian Government."
Bevans, supra note 207, pp. 769-775.
223. This armistice was concluded by letter from the Commander-in-Chief of Allied
Forces Dwight D. Eisenhower to the Italian Supreme Commander Pietro Badoglio. Eisenhower signed on behalf of all Allied Forces. Ibid., pp. 775-784.
224. The "Agreement between the Governments of the United States of America, the
Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, on the one hand, and the Government of Rumania
on the other hand, concerning armistice" was concluded between the Soviet Representative
Malinovski and the Rumanian Representative Lucretiu Patrascanu. Malinovski signed this
armistice on behalf of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. Ibid.,
pp. 901-907.
225. The United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom concluded this armistice with Bulgaria. Representative of the Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean Station J.A.H. Gammell signed the armistice for the United States, the Soviet Union
and the United Kingdom, and P. Stainov signed it for Bulgaria. Ibid., pp. 909-913.
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uary 20, 1945. 226 All these examples indicate that if the Commanderin-Chief of a coalition army signs an armistice agreement, all member
nations of the coalition army become parties to this armistice agreement. As a result, it is not necessary that all representatives of each
composing member nation of the coalition army sign the armistice
agreement. Rather, it is the general tendency and international custom that one representative of the coalition army signs the armistice
agreement on behalf of all member nations of the coalition army. 227
There might be an expressed or implied agreement among the nations
of the coalition army concerning the conclusion of the armistice before
the representative signs it. It would be a reasonable legal interpretation that this expressed or implied agreement among the composite
nations of the coalition army delegated to the representative of the
coalition army to conclude the armistice agreement. Sometimes this
internal agreement may be expressed in the text of the armistice agreement itself. For example, the Armistice between Turkey and the Allied Nations of October 30, 1918 reads "Conditions of an armistice
agreed to and concluded between Vice Admiral Sommerset Arthur
Gough-Calthorpe, British Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean
Station, acting under authority from the British Government, in agreement with their Allies, H.E. Rechad H. Bey, Turkish Minister of
Marine . . . acting under authority from the Turkish Government."228 Usually, however, this internal agreement is not expressed
within the text of the armistice agreement.
(c)

The Signature of the Commander-in-Chief of the
United Nations Command and South
Korea as a Legal Party to the
Armistice

The Korean Armistice Agreement of July 27, 1953 was concluded between the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command and the Commanders of the Communist side. The legal effects
of the signature of the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations
Command should be applied to the coalition army under his commanding authority. As explained above, he commanded a coalition
army composed of the United Nations forces in proper sense and the
226. "Agreement concerning an armitstice between the USSR, the UK and the USA, on
the one hand, and Hungary on the other hand," was signed by K. Voroshilov and Gyongyyosi Janos." Voroshilov signed for the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the
United States. Ibid., pp. 994-1104.
227. Lyou Byung-Hwa, supra note 1, pp. 88-89.
228. Parry, supra note 220, p. 169.
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South Korean forces. The United Nations forces in proper sense were
created by the Security Resolutions 83 and 84 in 1950, while the coalition of the United Nations forces and South Korean forces were
formed by the South Korean Government's assignment of the commanding authority to the United Nations Command on July 15, 1950.
Thus, the signature of the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations
Command represents the composite members of the coalition army,
i.e., the United Nations and South Korea. It was not necessary for the
representative of South Korea to sign directly the text of the armistice
agreement in order to be a legal party to this agreement.
In order for South Korea to be a legal party to the armistice
agreement, two conditions should be fulfilled. First, there should be
an internal agreement between the United Nations Command and
South Korea concerning the conclusion of the armistice agreement;
second, there should be a lawful conclusion of the armistice agreement
by the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command.
The first condition - that is, the internal agreement between the
United Nations Command and South Korea, can be substantiated by
several documents. The joint statement between President Rhee and
Special Envoy WalterS. Robertson of July 11, 1953, is one of the documents. It reads:
During the past two weeks we have had many frank and cordial exchanges of views which have emphasized the deep
friendship existing between the Republic of Korea and the
United States and have gone far toward achieving mutual
understanding of the troubled questions which have arisen in
connection with arrangements for an armistice, the exchange
of prisoners, and the forthcoming political conference . . .229
In addition, President Rhee's letter to the United States Secretary of
State, July 24, 1953, President Rhee's letter to President Eisenhower,
July 27, and President Eisenhower's letter to President Rhee, July 27,
confirmed this internal agreement. 230
The Communist Delegation was aware of this internal agreement
and required South Korean agreement to the armistice. At the plenary meeting of armistice talks on July 12, 1953, United Nations delegate Harrison informed the anxious Communist delegate Nam 11
about this agreement:
In consequence of negotiations completed with the Govern229. U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin (July 20, 1953), pp. 72-73.
230. FRUS, supra note 80, pp. 1428-1445.
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ment of the Republic of Korea, we have received suitable
assurances from the ROK Government that it will, during
the post hostility period, work in close collaboration for our
common objectives. During this period provisions of the
present draft armistice agreement will be implemented. You
are assured that the United Nations Command, which includes the ROK forces, is prepared to carry out the terms of
the armistice. 23 1
The second condition - that is, the lawful conclusion of the armistice agreement, was also fulfilled. The two sides lawfully signed
the armistice and continued to abide by its terms. Therefore, with the
signature of the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command, South Korea must be a de jure party to the armistice. However, there is an opinion that considers the United Nations forces
themselves as a coalition army. 232 It is beyond question that the
United Nations Command was created by the Security Council Resolutions 83 and 84 in 1950 and maintained for several decades, despite
some procedural problems could be recognized in the course of the
adoption of these resolutions. Therefore, the United Nations Command is a subsidiary organ of the United Nations, not a coalition
army.233
It is clear now that the armed forces under the United Nations
Command were a coalition army composed of the United Nations
forces and South Korean forces. Furthermore, with the signature of
the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command, South Korea and the United Nations were made parties to the Korean Armistice Agreement. Thus, since South Korea was the host country, it is
reasonable to state that South Korea should be a principal party to the
Korean Armistice Agreement.
Over the course of several decades, the United Nations has experienced a structural change, particularly after the massive entry of the
new third world countries after decolonization. This structural
change modifies the legal status of the United Nations as a party to the
Korean Armistice Agreement. This problem and the United States
relationship to the Korean Armistice Agreement will be considered in
the next chapter.
231. Ibid., p. 1378.
232. J. Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict, London: Garland, 1973, p. 234.
233. For the details, see Lyou Byung-Hwa, supra note 1, Chapter 1.
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(d)

Practices

More than 30 years have passed since the conclusion of the Korean Armistice Agreement. This long period is sufficient to evaluate
the South Korean legal status as a party to the Korean Armistice
Agreement in light of actual practices. These practices shall be considered from several points of view.
iii.

South Korean Participation in the Operation of the
Military Armistice Commission

The Military Armistice Commission is a permanent organ for the
implementation of the armistice agreement. It was established by Article 2(B) of the Korean Armistice Agreement. The general function
of this Military Armistice Commission is to supervise the implementation of the armistice agreement and to settle through negotiations all
the disputes arising from alleged violations of the armistice agreement.
For this purpose, this Commission was to be assisted by the Joint Observer Team in supervision for the implementation of the armistice
rules concerning the demilitarized zone and the Han River estuary.
This Military Armistice Commission is composed of ten senior officers, five of whom are appointed by the Commander-in-Chief of the
United Nations Command, and the other five are appointed by the
Communist side.
South Korean participation in this Commission began on March
9, 1954. South Korean General Lim was appointed as one of the five
representatives of the United Nations Command. General Lim's credentials were examined and accepted by the Communist side without
any objection. 234 This acceptance implied that the Communist side
had no objection to South Korean participation in the Military Armistice Commission. It also implied that they recognized the South Korean role in the implementation of the armistice agreement. South
Korean participation in the Commission gradually grew more important. The present composition of the five representatives of the United
Nations Command are two South Korean, one American and two representatives from other Allied Nations. The two representatives from
other Allied Nations are appointed by turns among several Allied Nations and their actual role in the Commission is nominal. This confirms the important role of South Korea in the implementation of the
Korean Armistice Agreement. 235 If one examines the actual opera234. Chee Chong-11, "Legal Problems Involving the UNC in Korea and the Korean
Armistice Agreement," Korea Observer, vol. VII, No. 2 (Spring 1976), pp. 133-134.
235. Lyou Byung-Hwa, supra note I, p. 92.
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tions of the Military Armistice Commission, it will become clear that
operations are carried out by South Korea and the United States, on
the one hand, and North Korea and China on the other hand. These
practices support the proposition that South Korea is a legal party to
the Korean Armistice Agreement.
iv.

South-North Korean Dialogue

In the early 1970s Koreans harboured great hopes of peace and
unification after long years of frustration over the Korean division.
This began with the South-North Red Cross Contact negotiating the
reunion of the families dispersed in South and North Korea. This dialogue culminated in the issue of South-North Joint Communique on
July 4, 1972. This was the first agreement between the two governments since the conclusion of the Korean Armistice Agreement. This
Joint Communique had special meaning in terms of the political future
of the Korean Peninsula considering the hostile confrontation between
the two sides over the three decades that had passed. This Joint Communique provided basic principles for Korean unification and SouthNorth Korean relations. According to this Communique, Korean unification should be achieved through independent efforts without being
subject to external imposition or interference, and the unification
should be achieved through peaceful means, and not through use of
force against one another. In order to implement these agreements,
the two sides created the South-North Coordinating Committee. 236
Thus, the South-North Korean Dialogue clearly illustrated that the
Korean problem, including the maintenance and implementation of
the armistice agreement, should be solved by the Korean people themselves. This also indicated that South Korea should be an essential
party to the Korean Armistice Agreement. 237
v.

Withdrawal of Foreign Forces from Korea

More than three decades have passed since the conclusion of the
Korean Armistice Agreement. Since that time, most foreign troops,
both United Nations forces and Chinese Communists have been withdrawn from the Korean peninsula. Only 40,000 United States forces
remain in South Korea, in accordance with the Mutual Defense
Treaty (October 1, 1954) between two countries. Thousands of troops
of South Korea and North Korea are engaged in the maintenance and
implementation of the armistice agreement. This actual situation
236. White Paper, supra note 164, pp. 85-86.
237. Lyou Byung-Hwa, supra note I, pp. 92-93.
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clearly indicates that South and North Korea are principal parties to
the Korean Armistice Agreement. 238

238. Ibid., p. 93.
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CHAPTER TWO. THE DISSOLUTION OF THE UNITED
NATIONS COMMAND AND INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL MECHANISMS FOR PEACE IN
THE KOREAN PENINSULA
Section A.

1.

Structural Change Of The United Nations And The
International Political Situation Surrounding
Korea

Decolonization and the New Situation in the United Nations

Before the Korean War, the United Nations had only 59 member
states. From the late 1950s, however, decolonization began and numerous new nations entered in the United Nations. By 1970 about 70
nations became new members, doubling the number of member
states. 239
This new situation drastically changed the United Nations. Until
that time, the United States was the predominant power in the United
Nations because most member states were dependent on American
economic assistance after the destruction of World War II. However,
in the 1970s the situation changed. Most new member states were
newly born from European colonies. As a result, their tendency was
to lean ideologically towards socialism. The Communist propaganda
of equality appealed to those states who had suffered so much under
the western colonialism. 240 These new states claimed to be nonaligned, but in fact, were opposed to the United States in the United
Nations. Thus, the United States could not continue to exercise its
predominant role in the United Nations. In other words, these states
blocked many resolutions which the United States supported.
This drastic change also affected the United Nations' role in the
Korean problem. Until 1960, South Korean legitimacy in the United
Nations had been absolute because the Government of South Korea
was established under the auspices of the United Nations and protected by it. On the other hand, North Korea was not even permitted
to attend discussions of the Korean problem in the United Nations.
Since the 1960s the situation has changed. Many newborn nations
knew little about the Korean problem in the United Nations, nor were
they interested in it. They simply were opposed to the "superpower"
United States, and thus also its seeming protege, South Korea.
239. C. A. Colliard, Institutions des Relations Internationales, Paris: Dalloz, 1978, pp.
378-380.
240. Lyou Byung-Hwa, Le Commandement des Nations Unies en Coree et Ses Problemes
Juridiques, Seoul, 1980, p. 95.
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The first concrete result of this change, in terms of the Korean
question, appeared in the fifteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly in April 1961. After the United States proposed to invite the South Korean representative to the discussion of the Korean
question at the First Committee, 241 the Soviet Union counterproposed
to also invite the North Korean representative, saying that without
participation of both parties, the discussion could not be fruitfut2 42
The Indonesian representative proposed a simultaneous invitation of
both representatives, slightly modifying the Soviet proposal. In the
face of such circumstances, United States Delegate Stevenson proposed a compromise. Stevenson proposed a simultaneous invitation of
both representatives under the condition that North Korea "first unequivocally accepts the competence and authority of the United Nations within the terms of the Charter to take action on the Korean
question as has already been done by the Republic of Korea. " 243
North Korea did not participate in the discussion of the Korean
question in the United Nations General Assembly, refusing to accept
the competence and authority of the United Nations. However, this
change would be very important, because it reflected the structural
change in the United Nations. The change continued to evolve. Thus,
the situation of the Korean question in the United Nations in the early
1970s differed greatly from that of the 1950s.

2.

The People's Republic of China's Entrance in
the United Nations

After Communist China took over mainland China from Nationalist China, the Communists cabled the President of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on November
18, 1949, saying that Nationalist China should not represent the Chinese people in the United Nations. The Soviet Union, supporting this
position, proposed that the Security Council should exclude the Nationalist delegate. But this proposal was defeated on January 13, 1950
by six to three with two abstentions. The Soviet delegate then declared that the Soviet Union would not participate in any further Security Council meetings until the delegate of Nationalist China was
excluded, and that it would not recognize as legal any decision made
by the Security Council with the participation of the Nationalist dele241. UN Doc. A/C.l/L268 (April 10, 1961).
242. UN Doc. A/C.1/L270 (April 10, 1961).
243. UN Doc. A/C.l/837 (April 12, 1961).
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gate. 244 The question of Chinese representation in the United Nations
from then on confronted the General Assembly and other organs of
the United Nations. The United States stubbornly opposed, however,
the entrance of the People's Republic of China into the United
Nations.
In 1961, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 1688 (XVI), deciding that any proposal to change Chinese representation in the United Nations was an important question requiring a
two-thirds majority vote for approval under Article 18 of the United
Nations Charter. This requirement was necessary for blocking the
proposal of the replacement of Chinese representation in the United
Nations because many nations leaned towards the People's Republic
of China. In fact, Article 18, Paragraph 2 of the United Nations Charter is not so clear: "Decisions of the General Assembly on important
questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of members present
and voting. These questions shall include recommendation with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security, . . . the
admission of new members to the United Nations . . . the expulsion
of members." There is no mention about the replacement of the representation. As a result, the question whether or not the replacement of
Chinese representation is an important problem is not clear. But Article 18, Paragraph 3 of the Charter provides that decisions on other
questions, including the determination of additional categories of
questions to be decided by a two-third majority, shall be made by a
majority of the members present and voting. Thus, every year the
United Nations General Assembly reiterated the same decision on
whether the replacement problem would be an important problem or
not, and under the influence of the United States, tried to reject the
replacement. The number of votes supporting the People's Republic
of China continued to increase, however, and on October 25, 1971, the
United Nations General Assembly rejected the opinion that the replacement question is an important problem requiring a two-thirds
vote. On the same day, the General Assembly supported the replacement of the Chinese representation in the United Nations by a vote of
seventy-six to thirty-five with seventeen abstentions, more than a twothirds majority (Resolution 2758). Thus, the People's Republic of
China was admitted into the United Nations, and became a permanent
member of the Security Council, although the United States voted
against the replacement. It is no question that the Sino-American rap244. UN Doc. S/PV.461 (January 13, 1950); Public Papers of the Secretary-Genera/ of
the United Nations, Vol. I, Trygve Lie, 1946-1953, pp. 257-267.
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prochement developed after Nixon's "Ping-pong diplomacy" of April
1971 greatly influenced this change.
This replacement of the Chinese representation in the United Nations deeply affected the Korean question in the United Nations. On
one hand, North Korea now got the support of two permanent members of the Security Council. On the other hand, the influence of the
United States in the United Nations was comparatively reduced.

3.

Sino-American Rapprochement

Since the Korean War, in which the United States had fought
against Communist China (the People's Republic of China), the two
nations' relationship continued to be bad. In the 1960s, however,
Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated, culminating in the Ussuri River
clash in 1969. As a result, the People's Republic of China felt more
imminent danger from the Soviet Union than from the United States.
This worry was justified by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in
August 1968. 245 On the other hand, the United States had suffered a
lot of difficulties from the Vietnam War. President Nixon announced
the Guam doctrine in July 1969, stating that the United States would
gradually reduce its military involvement in Asia and try to avoid direct military involvement in local conflicts. 246 In this situation, both
the United States and China tried to improve their relations. First, the
United States showed its favorable attitude by permitting its citizens to
travel in China. The United States also relaxed the trade embargo on
the mainland of China and interrupted the Seventh Fleet's regular patrolling of the Taiwan Strait. 247 China invited the United States' table
tennis team to China in April, 1971. The relations quickly developed
and President Nixon announced on July 15, 1971 his plan to visit
China. Nixon's advisor Henry Kissinger had prepared this plan in a
secret visit to Peking. President Nixon visited China from February
21 to 28, 1972. This visit resulted in the issuance of the Shanghai
Communique, on February 28, between President Nixon and Premier
Chou En-lai:
During the visit, extensive, earnest and frank discussions
were held between President Nixon and Premier Chou En245. J. C. Hsiung, "The Conceptual Foundation of the United States China Policy,"
University of Maryland Law School Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary
Asian Studies, Baltimore: University of Maryland Law School Press, 1980, No. 1, p. 2.
246. "U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s: A New Strategy for Peace," The President's
Report to the Congress and the Nations on American Foreign Policy, 1970, pp. 5-6.
247. Kim Hak-Joon, Unification Policy of South and North Korea, Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1977, p. 236.
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lai on the normalization of relations between the United
States of America and the People's Republic of China. . . .
The United States acknowledges that all Chinese . . . maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of
China. . . . [i]t affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. . . . They agreed to facilitate the progressive
development of trade between their two countries. The two
sides agreed that they will stay in contact through various
channels . . . for concrete consultations to further the
normalization of relations between the two countries and
continue to exchange views on issues of common
interest. . . .248
Sino-American relations continued to develop in accordance with
the principles of the Shanghai Communique. In May, 1973, liaison
offices between two countries were established in Peking and Washington to carry out the de facto function of regular embassies. As a result, the volume of trade between the nations increased from $95
million in 1972 to $937 million in 1974. Exchanges and cooperations
in other domains were similarly increased. This development of SinoAmerican rapprochement culminated in the announcement of a joint
communique on December 15, 1978 on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two nations beginning January 1, 1979.249
This Sino-American rapprochement made great impact on the
Korean question. It meant that China would accept the status quo in
Korea and try to maintain it, saying that the Korean problem should
be solved by Koreans themselves through peaceful means.

4.

South-North Korean Dialogue

The fundamental change of external environment surrounding
Korean Peninsula naturally influenced both South and North Korea
to seek new policy on Korean unification. That is, a South-North dialogue without external interference. This dialogue began in a humanitarian way. In a commemorative address on the twenty-fifth
anniversary of national liberation on August 15, 1970, President Park
248. U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin (March 20, 1972), pp. 435-438; Hungdah Chiu, ed.,
"Normalizing Relations with the People's Republic of China: Problems, Analysis and
Documents," Occasional Papers, No.2, 1978, Baltimore: University of Maryland School of
Law Press, 1978, pp. 146-150.
249. U.S. Dept. of the Army, China: A Country Study, Washington: GPO, 1981, pp.
411-413.
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of South Korea said that if North Korea would desist forthwith from
perpetrating all sorts of military provocations and renounce their policy of communizing the whole of Korea by force, he would be "prepared to suggest epochal and more realistic measures, with a view to
remov[e], step by step, . . . in the interest of laying the ground work
for unification and on the basis of humanitarian consideration . . . " 250
As a concrete proposal of this Declaration, the South Korean
Red Cross proposed on August 12, 1971, a conference between the
two Korean Red Cross delegates to discuss reunion of dispersed families. Two days later the North Korean Red Cross accepted this proposal. As a result, preliminary talks between the two Red Cross societies
were held on September 28, 1972, at Panmunjom. 251 This humanitarian talk quickly developed into important political negotiations concerning the Korean question. These negotiations were secretly carried
out by two high ranking delegates from South and North Korea. The
secret negotiations resulted in the issue of the South-North Joint Communique on July 4, 1972.2 52
According to this Communique, in an effort to remove misunderstanding, mistrust, and to mitigate increased tensions that had arisen
between the South and the North resulting from the long separation,
the two sides agreed to the basic principles concerning the SouthNorth relations and unification.
First, as the basic principles for unification, they agreed: 1) unification should be achieved through independent efforts without being
subject to external imposition or interference; 2) unification should be
achieved through peaceful means, and not through use of force; 3) a
great national unity, as a homogeneous people, should be sought first,
transcending differences in ideas, ideologies, and systems.
Second, in order to ease tensions and restore severed national ties,
they agreed not to slander one another, and to carry out various exchanges in many areas.
Third, in order to prevent unexpected military incidents and to
solve problems arising in South-North relations directly and promptly,
they agreed to install a direct telephone line between Seoul and
Pyongyang.
Fourth, they agreed to cooperate for successful South-North Red
Cross talks. Fifth, in order to implement aforementioned agreements
250. ROK, National Unification Board, A White Paper on South-North Dialogue in Korea, Seoul, 1982, pp. 313-319.
251. Ibid., pp. 63-84.
252. Ibid., pp. 85-86.
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and settle other problems arising from South-North relations, they
agreed to create a South-North Coordinating Committee.
Even after the South-North Joint Communique, the fundamental
disparity between South and North Korea still remained, but this historical trend, together with the sudden changes of Korea's external
situation, made a great change in foreign policy on both sides. South
Korea, realizing the changing trend in the external environment, especially sought accommodations to the new political current rather than
being forced to accept the imposing result of this change. On June 23,
1973, South Korean President Park Chung Hee announced the Special
Statement Regarding Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification. 253
The main purposes of this Statement were the peaceful coexistence,
gradual reconciliation between South and North Korea, and long-term
unification of Korea. In his Statement, President Park explained the
process of the South-North Korean dialogue: South Korea had taken
the position that both sides should endeavor to gradually remove the
artificial barriers between the South and the North by solving easier
and more practical problems first and to phase out feelings of mutual
distrust and replace them with those of mutual confidence through
concrete results. On the other hand, North Korea, in disregard of the
existence of deep-rooted feelings of distrust between the South and the
North, insisted that military and political problems that might endanger South Korean security must first be dealt with as a package in the
talks.
President Park continued to explain Korea's external environment: the era of cold war after World War II came to an end, and a
new era of peaceful coexistence, based on the status quo, began.
In these circumstances, he declared a new foreign policy of South
Korea:
1) The peaceful unification of the fatherland is the supreme task
of the Korean people. We will continue to exert every effort to accomplish this task.
2) Peace must be maintained in the Korean peninsula by all
means. The South and the North should neither interfere with each
other's internal affairs nor commit aggression against each other.
3) We will continue to make efforts with sincerity and patience
to secure concrete results from the South-North dialogue based on the
spirit of the South-North Joint Communique dated July 4, 1972.
4) We shall not oppose North Korea's participation with us in
253. The Institute for East Asian Studies, Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification, Seoul, 1975, pp. 161-167; White Paper, supra note 12, pp. 320-325.
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international organizations, if it is conducive to the easing of tensions
and the furtherance of international cooperation.
5) We shall not object to our admittance into the United Nations together with North Korea, if the majority of the member states
of the United Nations so wish, provided that it does not cause hindrance to our national unification. Even before our admittance into
the United Nations as a member, we shall not be opposed to North
Korea also being invited to the United Nations General Assembly's
deliberation of the Korean question in which the representative of the
Republic of Korea is invited to participate.
6) The Republic of Korea will open its doors to all the nations
of the world on the basis of the principles of reciprocity and equality.
At the same time, we urge those countries whose ideologies and social
institutions are different from ours to open their doors likewise to us.
7) Peace and good-neighborliness are the firm bases of the foreign policy of the Republic of Korea. It is reaffirmed that we will
continue to further strengthen the ties of friendship existing between
our friendly nations and our country. 254
President Park added that these policies were interim measures
during the transitional period pending the achievement of unification
and that taking these measures did not signify the recognition of
North Korea as a state.
This statement opened the United Nations' door and its Special
Agencies to North Korea. As a result, several western countries established diplomatic relations with North Korea. Ironically, this statement had better results for North Korea than South Korea.

5.

North Korea's New Attitude Toward the United Nations

Until the 1970s, the United Nations did not recognize the North
Korean regime as a legal government, condemning it as an aggressor.
As a result, the United Nations did not allow North Korean participation in its meetings, even in discussions of the Korean problem. Following the Special Statement Regarding Foreign Policy for Peace and
Unification of President Park, however, North Korea established a
permanent mission to the United Nations in New York in July
1973. 255 At the same time, North Korea took a seat in several Special
Agencies. North Korea strategically chose leftist Algeria, not the Soviet Union, as its spokesman to get support among the majority third
254. Ibid., pp. 323-325.
255. Ibid., pp. 84-91.
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world countries in the United Nations. 256 Now the North Korean regime not only participated in the discussion of the Korean question in
the United Nations, but also criticized South Korea and the United
States in the United Nations. After more than two decades, the
United Nations was fundamentally changed concerning the Korean
question. As a result, South Korea, who had until then monopolized
the support of the United Nations, was on the defensive in the United
Nations.
This situation continued to deteriorate and culminated in 1975
when the United Nations General Assembly adopted the two contradictory resolutions concerning Korea. 257 Subsequently, the international situation was once again changed. Because the rapid economic
growth of South Korea overshadowed North Korean diplomatic tactics, the international environment became more favorable toward
South Korea. 258
Section B.

Legal Problems Surrounding The Dissolution Of The
United Nations Command

The United Nations Command was created by the United Nations Security Council to repel North Korean aggression against South
Korea. The Communists have always demanded United Nations
Command's dissolution from its creation. The Communists demand,
however, had been ignored until this structural change in the United
Nations. In the 1970s North Korea began to pursue aggressive diplomatic attacks against South Korea in the United Nations. The main
purpose of these activities was to encourage the dissolution of the
United Nations Command and withdrawal of U.S. military forces in
South Korea. This purpose was partially achieved in 1975, when the
United Nations General Assembly adopted the two contradictory resolutions on the Korean question. The main content of these resolutions concerned the dissolution of the United Nation's Command.
From an international legal point of view, it is important to clarify the legal character of the dissolution of the United Nation's Command, because both South and North Korea are deeply concerned
with this problem. Their concerns are groundless, however, from the
legal point of view. Their arguments are based upon wrong interpretations of the legal status of the United Nations Command in connection
256. Lyou Byung-Hwa, supra note I, pp. 96-97.
257. ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Question of Korea at the 30th Session of the
U.N. General Assembly, Vol. 1-2, Seoul, 1975.
258. Lyou Byung-Hwa, supra note 1, p. 97.
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with the Korean Armistice Agreement. It seems that both South Korea and North Korea assume that South Korea is not a legal party to
the Korean Armistice Agreement, and that the United Nations Command is essential in maintaining the Korean Armistice Agreement.
South Korea, however, is a legal party to the Korean Armistice Agreement. (See Chapter I) The question of whether the United Nations
Command is essential in maintaining the Korean Armistice Agreement is considered hereinafter.

1.
a.

The Dissolution of the UNCURK and Its Legal Implication
The Function of the UNCURK

The United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) was established in the optimistic prospect for the unification of Korea. After the success of the celebrated
amphibious landings at Inchon on September 15, 1950, the United Nations' Command continued victorious operations against the retreating
Communists. The question then was whether the United Nations
Command should push back the Communists just to the north of the
38th Parallel or should it try to achieve the unification of Korea by
force. Resolution 83 of the United Nations Security Council on June
27, 1950, recommended that members of the United Nations "furnish
such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel
the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the
area." This resolution could be interpreted to authorize an advance
into North Korea for the complete restoration of peace in the area.
The United Nations, however, decided to adopt another resolution
which would be more concrete and clear. Resolution 376 (V) was
adopted by the General Assembly on October 7, 1950. This resolution
established UNCURK to implement its decision concerning the unification and rehabilitation of Korea on the threshold of total military
victory for the United Nations Command in Korea.
This resolution provided detailed processes of the Korean unification such as elections and formation of a unified government. It also
provided the functions of UNCURK: 259
1) to assume the function exercised by the United Nations Commission on Korea;
2) to represent the United Nations in bringing about the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government for all
Korea;
259. U.N.G.A. Res. 376(V) (October 7, 1950); ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Resolutions of the UN Principal Organs Relating to Korea, Seoul, 1976, pp. 93-96.
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3) to exercise such responsibilities in connection with relief and
rehabilitation in Korea as may be determined by the General
Assembly;
4) To prepare a report to the next regular session of the General
Assembly and to any prior special session.
In sum, the function of the UNCURK was to carry out the
United Nations programs concerning the unification and rehabilitation of Korea. Since most people expected to see imminent total military victory of the United Nations Command, 260 the United Nations
created this Commission to carry out concrete programs of
unification.
b.

The Dissolution of the UNCURK

This optimism was not premature. At the beginning of October
1950, several hundred thousand Chinese Communist forces intervened
in Korea by attacking the United Nations forces on all fronts. As a
result, the military situation was reversed and the Communists again
took North Korea under their controP61
By concluding the Korean Armistice Agreement, the United Nations gave up its objective of Korean unification by force. The original
purpose and function of the UNCURK were modified. Korean unification was deemed impracticable for the foreseeable future. Thus, the
UNCURK could not carry out its expected function but simply
helped the rehabilitation of South Korea and observed South Korean
political situations and general elections. 262
The Communist side first proposed dissolving UNCURK in the
early 1950s. The Soviet Union proposed a draft-resolution on March
10, 1953, but it was rejected by a vote of fifty to five in the General
Assembly. 263 Proposals were repeatedly made to the General Assembly by the Communist side and each time rejected by the great majority of the United Nations members. 264 It is interesting to note,
however, that the reason given for the proposed dissolution of UNCURK since 1961 is that the unification of Korea is a domestic prob260. "The 7th Report of the United Nations Command in Korea," U.N. Doc. S/1883
(November 3, 1950).
261. A. S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, New York: Macmillan Co., 1960, pp. 116124; "The lOth Report of the United Nations Command in Korea," U.N. Doc. S/1953.
262. U.N. Doc. A/1493; A/2711; A/2947; A/3172.
263. U.N. Doc. A/C.l/Ll44 (March 10, 1953).
264. U.N. Doc. A/C.l/Ll17 (December 1, 1954).
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lem of the Korean people. 265
As explained above, since the 1960s the United Nations has undergone a structural change with the massive entrance of new born
nations from decolonization. This change in the United Nations itself
deeply affected the Korean question in the United Nations. The dissolution of UNCURK was once more at issue. North Korea chose Algeria as its spokesman and proposed the dissolution of UNCURK.
After the issue of the South-North Joint Communique on July 4, 1972,
which declared that peaceful unification of Korea was to be achieved
without external interference, the North Korean voice demanding the
dissolution of UNCURK became louder:
In the light of the new elements which exist in the regime, it
is now more than ever necessary to reconsider the terms of
reference and activities of the United Nations Commission
for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea and the presence of the United Nations Military Command in Korea. 266
On June 23, 1973, after South Korean President Park announced
in the Special Statement Regarding Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification stating that he would not oppose North Korea's participation
in international organizations and discussions of the Korean question
before the United Nations, the situation quickly evolved. North Korea immediately sent its permanent mission to the United Nations in
New York, and accelerated its diplomatic activity, with the strong
support of the Communist bloc and many Third World countries.
After the structural change in the United Nations, South Korea
realized that the United Nations would no longer be useful for the
Korean question. It agreed with the North Korean side in adopting a
consensus statement without vote concerning the dissolution of UNCURK. The General Assembly adopted this consensus statement
without vote on November 28, 1973. 267 According to this statement,
it was noted with satisfaction that a joint communique had been issued
by South and North Korea on July 4, 1972, providing the following
principles of the Korean unification: 1) the unification should be
achieved independently without external interference, 2) by peaceful
means; and 3) great national unity should be promoted. Hoping that
the South-North dialogue would continue to develop, the statement
265. U.N. Doc. A/C.1/L303 (December 7, 1961); A/C.l/L404 (October 25, 1967); A/
C.1/L455 (December 9, 1968).
266. U.N. Doc. A/8752 (July 17, 1972); A/8752 (September 15, 1972).
267. U.N. Doc. A/C.l/L661; A/9030; A/9341; Resolutions, supra note 259, pp. 443445.
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expressed the General Assembly's decision to dissolve immediately the
United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of
Korea (UNCURK).
c.

The Legal Implication of the Dissolution

The legal implication of the dissolution of UNCURK should be
considered in terms of its function and purpose. According to Resolution 376(V) of the United Nations General Assembly, the purpose and
function of UNCURK were to assume the function exercised by the
United Nations Commission on Korea, to represent the United Nations in establishing a unified, independent, democratic government of
Korea and to help the rehabilitation of Korea. The purpose and function of the United Nations Commission on Korea were also the Korean unification.2 68 Again, the purpose and function ofUNCURK are
the unification and rehabilitation of Korea. Between these two purposes of UNCURK, the rehabilitation was no longer necessary because the Korean economy had grown strong. The remaining purpose
was the Korean unification.
The dissolution of UNCURK was not the result of achievement
of its purpose but abandonment of its purpose. After the structural
change in the United Nations, the Korean unification through the
United Nations seemed almost impossible. The consensus statement
that dissolved UNCURK indicated that the Korean unification should
be achieved by the Koreans themselves without external interference.269 In sum, the United Nations retreated from its involvement in
the Korean unification by dissolving UNCURK. Thus, the legal implication of the dissolution of UNCURK means that the question of
the United Nations was taking heads off from the Korean question.
The dissolution of UNCURK is not only a consequence of the consensus statement of November 28, 1973, but also the natural result of the
structural change of the United Nations itself.

2.

The Two Contradictory Korean Resolutions of the United
Nations General Assembly in November 1975

a.

Background

After the dissolution of UNCURK, the immediate objective of
North Korean policy focused on the dissolution of the United Nations
Command. To North Korean eyes, this dissolution would be the last
268. U.N.G.A. Res. 112 (II) (November 14, 1947); U.N.G.A. Res. 195 (III) (December
12, 1948).
269. U.N. Doc. A/9030; A/9341; A/C.l/L661.
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symbolic organ connecting South Korean legitimacy with the United
Nations. Therefore, it would be North Korean strategy to try to cut
off this symbolic connection between the United Nations and South
Korea through the dissolution of the United Nations Command.
North Korea expected to be able to more effectively demand the withdrawal of the United States troops in Korea once the United Nations
Command was dissolved. In other words, the final objective of North
Korean policy would be the withdrawal of the United States troops in
South Korea.
With this strategy North Korea proposed the dissolution of the
United Nations Command and the withdrawal of foreign troops from
South Korea at the twenty-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1974. South Korea, defending its position, tried to
maintain the United Nations Command which it thought was essential
for the implementation of the armistice agreement. In this backdrop,
the General Assembly adopted Resolution 3333 (XXIX), which was a
compromise but closer to the South Korean position:
The General Assembly . . . expresses the hope that the Security Council, bearing in mind the need to ensure continued
adherence to the Armistice Agreement and the full maintenance of peace and security in the area, will in due course
give consideration, in consultation with the parties directly
concerned, to those aspects of the Korean question which
fall within its responsibilities, including the dissolution of the
United Nations Command in conjunction with appropriate
arrangements to maintain the Armistice Agreement which is
calculated to preserve peace and security in the Korean peninsula, pending negotiations and conciliation between the
two Korean Governments leading to a lasting peace between
them. 270
Immediately after the adoption of Resolution 3333, both sides began to prepare for another showdown in the 30th session of the United
Nations General Assembly in 1975. Both South Korea and North
Korea dispatched several goodwill missions to Third World countries
and invited several high ranking officials from these countries lobbying
for their support in the United Nations. 271 This tragic rivalry of South
and North Korea culminated in the adoption of the two contradictory
resolutions at the Thirtieth session of the General Assembly. This un270. U.N.G.A. Res. 3333 (XXIX) (December 17, 1947; Resolutions, supra note 259, pp.
459-460.
271. Foreign Policy, supra note 253, pp. 76-82.
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reasonable event clearly showed the inability of the United Nations to
solve the Korean question after its structural change.
b.

Resolution 3390A (the South Korean Position)
i.

Content

The gist of Resolution 3390A, proposed by South Korea, is based
on Resolution 3333 of the General Assembly, 17 December 1974.
South Korea agreed to the dissolution of the United Nations Command on condition that appropriate arrangements be made to maintain the Korean Armistice Agreement. In support of this position, the
United States sent a letter on June 27, 1975 to the President of the
Security Council stating that it was prepared to terminate the United
Nations Command on January 1, 1976, provided that there were alternative arrangements for maintaining the Armistice Agreement. 272
The South Korean Foreign Minister also announced a statement on
June 27, 1975 affirming South Korean willingness to enter into arrangements for maintaining the Armistice Agreement.2 73
Resolution 3390A contains primarily a continuation of the SouthNorth Korean dialogue, alternative arrangements for the maintenance
of the Armistice Agreement, and the dissolution of the United Nations
Command. 274 South Korea considered the United Nations Command
to be essential to the implementation of the Korean Armistice Agreement. Consequently, South Korea agreed to the dissolution of the
United Nations Command only in conjunction with alternative arrangements for maintaining the Armistice Agreement. In order to
emphasize its willingness to dissolve the United Nations Command,
South Korea suggested that the Command might be dissolved on January 1, 1976, once the alternative arrangements were made.
n.

Legal Interpretation of the South Korean Position

The principal objective of the South Korean position is to maintain peace and security in Korea. The external situation around the
Korean peninsula and the structural change of the United Nations itself confused and embarrassed the South Korean Government. The
United Nations, which had helped form the South Korean Government and defended it in the face of Communist aggression, now lost its
traditional principles and direction with the addition of new members
272. U.N. Doc. S/11737 (1975).
273. Korea Question, supra note 257, pp. 197-200.
274. U.N.G.A. Res. 3390 A (XXX) (November 18, 1975); Resolutions, supra note 259,
pp. 475-477.
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not even in existence before the 1960s. In this uncertain situation,
South Korea concentrated on maintaining peace and security on the
Korean peninsula. The South Korean Government, modifying its traditionally dominant position of legitimacy in the United Nations as
compared to the North Korean regime, proposed minimum security
measures if the present security mechanism was to be changed. The
South Korean Government presumed that the United Nations Command, whose Commander-in-Chief had signed the Korean Armistice
Agreement, would be essential at least for the implementation of the
Armistice Agreement. This position, however, was based on an incorrect legal interpretation of the Korean Armistice Agreement.
The South Korean interpretation erred in two respects. The first
error was the presumption that South Korea was not to be a legal
party to the Armistice Agreement. The second error was that the
United Nations would be a party to, or at least an essential organ for
the implementation of, the Armistice Agreement.
According to the statement of the South Korean Foreign Minister, responsibility for the implementation of Resolution 3333 now resides with the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command.
Therefore, before the dissolution of the Command, the Commanderin-Chief should designate officers of South Korea and the United
States to take over maintenance of the Armistice Agreement from the
Commander-in-Chief. This statement implied that the dissolution of
the United Nations Command without appropriate arrangements
would invalidate the Armistice Agreement. 275 The United States
Government's letter to the President of the Security Council on June
27, 1975 confirmed this position.?276 The South Korean Memorandum on the Korean question at the 30th session of the United Nations
General Assembly of October 13, 1975, maintained the same
position. 277
Considering these arguments, the South Korean position clearly
presumed that South Korea would not be a legal party to the Armistice Agreement and that the United Nations Command would remain
the essential organ for the continued legal effect of the Armistice
Agreement. However, South Korea should be a principal legal party
to the Korean Armistice Agreement under coalition army rules. If the
commander of a coalition army signs an armistice agreement, all
members composing the coalition army become parties to the agree275. Korean Question, supra note 257, pp. 197-200.
276. U.N. Doc. S/11737 (1975).
277. U.N. Doc. A/C.l/1060 (October 13, 1975).
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ment. 278 Furthermore, the United Nations Command functions
merely as a subsidiary organ with no international legal personality,
and thus cannot act as legal party to an international agreement.
Legal effects of actions of this subsidiary organ belong to the organization itself, namely the United Nations. Therefore, if the United Nations Command is dissolved, the problem of extinction of a legal party
to the Korean Armistice Agreement never arises; the only problem
may be some technical arrangements. In this sense South Korean concerns may be groundless, at least in terms of legal interpretation.
c.

Resolution 3390 B
1.

Content

The North Korean position concentrates on the unification of
Korea, while South Korea occupies itself with peace and security in
Korea. North Korea insists on the withdrawal of foreign troops and
dissolution of the United Nations Command emphasizing self-determination and the non-intervention of foreign countries. According to
Resolution 3390 B, the North Korean position, it is urgently necessary
to terminate foreign interference in Korea's internal problems, in order to guarantee a durable peace in Korea and to accelerate independent and peaceful Korean reunification. North Korea proposed:
1) to dissolve the United Nations Command and withdraw all
foreign troops stationed in South Korea under the flag of the United
Nations;
2) to call upon the real parties to the Korean Armistice Agreement to replace the Armistice Agreement with a peace agreement;
3) to urge South and North Korea to observe the principles of
the South-North Joint Communique; and
4) to take practical measures to stop arms reinforcement, drastically reducing the armed forces of both sides to an equal level. 279
u.

Legal Interpretation of the North Korean Position

Possessing several contradictory elements, North Korea's position is not initially clear. First, North Korea proposes to put an end to
the Korean Armistice Agreement, yet it speaks of durable peace in
Korea. According to the North Korean Memorandum of the Korean
question at the thirtieth session of the United Nations General Assem278. See the conclusion in Chapter I of this Volume.
279. U.N.G.A. Res. 3390 B (November 18, 1975); Resolutions, supra note 259, pp. 477479
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bly, the Armistice Agreement represents no more than a temporary
cease-fire taken by two belligerent parties in an unstable state. Therefore, according to the North Korean arguments, the Korean Armistice
Agreement should be replaced by a peace agreement because "the Armistice Agreement cannot perform its original function owing to the
constant sabotage of the Armistice Agreement by the United States
side." 28° Furthermore, North Korea holds that as the United Nations
Command is a signatory to the Korean Armistice Agreement, once
the United Nations Command dissolves, the Armistice Agreement
must also cease to exist. 281
North Korea's position that the Korean Armistice Agreement is
imperfect, unstable, and should be put to an end is unreasonable. A
peace agreement is neither a suspension nor a termination of an armistice agreement, but rather its achievement and development. Moreover, an armistice today serves to terminate war itself even without
resolving its cause. If North Korea really wants peaceful relations
with South Korea, both sides should conclude a peace agreement that
would make the principles of the South-North Joint Communique real
legal terms.
Second, it is absurd that North Korea proposes to negotiate a
peace agreement with the United States while ignoring South Korea,
when North Korea also speaks of the non-intervention of foreign powers and self-determination. According to the North Korean claim, the
Korean Armistice Agreement was originally signed between the North
Korean Commander and the Communist Chinese Commander, on the
one hand, and the Commander of the United Nations Command on
the other. The Chinese Communists "(h]ave already withdrawn totally from Korea, and the so-called United Nations forces present in
South Korea now are in fact U.S. troops. Therefore, the real parties to
the Armistice Agreement . . . " are North Korea and the United
States. 282
It might be partially correct that North Korea recognizes the important position of the United States in the Korean Armistice Agreement. However, it is obviously wrong not to realize the absolutely
necessary position of South Korea as host country in the Korean question. According to the international customs of the coalition army,
South Korea must be the de jure party to the Korean Armistice
Agreement as a result of the signature of the Commander-in-Chief of
280. U.N. Doc. A/C.l/1054 (1975), p. 12.
281. Ibid., p. 16.
282. Ibid., p. 13.
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the United Nations Command, under which the South Korean forces
and the United Nations forces formed a coalition army.2 83
Third, North Korea incorrectly believes that the Korean Armistice Agreement would cease to exist if the United Nations Command
is dissolved. Again, the United Nations Command represents only a
subsidiary organ that cannot be an international legal person. The international legal person in this case is the United Nations. Therefore,
if the United Nations Command is dissolved, there is no extinction of
a party to the Korean Armistice Agreement.
It is superficial and naive to determine the North Korean position
only through the arguments expressed in official documents. Unfortunately, the credibility of Communist North Korea is low. For example, during the active South-North Korean dialogues of the early
1970s, North Korea had prepared several infiltration tunnels for a surprise attack against South Korea. 284 Thus, North Korea lost credibility as a good faith negotiator with South Korea.
d.

Adoption of the Two Contradictory Resolutions

Two contradictory resolutions on the Korean question were
adopted on November 18, 1975 by the General Assembly of the
United Nations. South Korea proposed Resolution 3390 A, which
was adopted by a vote of fifty-nine to fifty-one with twenty-nine abstentions.285 North Korea proposed Resolution 3390 B, which was
adopted by a vote of fifty-four to forty-three with forty-two abstentions. The two resolutions contradict each other in that Resolution
3390 A proposes the dissolution of the United Nations Command in
concurrence with appropriate arrangements for maintaining the Armistice Agreement, while Resolution 3390 B proposes unconditional dissolution of the United Nations Command. Resolution 3390 A
concerns the maintenance of the Korean Armistice Agreement while
Resolution 3390 B seeks the end of the Armistice Agreement. The
simultaneous implementation of both resolutions is impossible. The
United Nations' irresponsible act not only undermines the authority of
the organization, but also clearly demonstrates the ineffectiveness and
incapacity of the United Nations regarding the Korean question.
Furthermore, the adoption of the two Korean resolutions leads to
283. See Chapter I, Section 3.
284. Three infiltration tunnels in the demilitarized zone were discovered in November
1974, March 1975 and October 1978. For further information, see Korean Overseas Information Service, A Handbook of Korea, 5th ed., Seoul: 1983, pp. 460-461.
285. U.N. Doc. A/PV 2409 (November 18, 1975), pp. 47-55.
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possible polemics concerning their legality. After the adoption of the
two contradictory resolutions, the Swedish delegate Rydbeck made a
significant statement:
The Swedish delegation deeply regrets that the question of
Korea has not been treated in a more positive manner during
the present session of the General Assembly. Polemics and
confrontation cannot solve the difficult problems involved in
the Korean issue, nor can controversial resolutions pressed
to the vote and adopted with a number of affirmative votes
far below the majority of member states. 286
This statement did not directly question the legality of the adoption, but simply indicated the adoption was carried on a number of
votes far below the majority of member states. However, Article 18
Paragraph 2 of the United Nations Charter provides that decisions of
the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a twothirds majority of the members present and voting, and that these
questions include recommendations with respect to the maintenance of
international peace and security. The Korean resolutions at the thirtieth session of the General Assembly concerned the maintenance of the
Korean Armistice Agreement, dissolution of the United Nations Command, and maintenance of peace and security in the region, probably
important questions demanding a two-thirds majority of member
states present and voting. Despite this, the legality of this adoption
was not questioned. The Korean question has long been treated in this
manner. For example, the General Assembly's Resolution 2268
(XXV) of December 7, 1970, concerning the Korean question, was
adopted by a vote of sixty-three to thirty-seven, with twenty-five abstentions. Resolution 3333 (XXIX), December 17, 1974, on the Korean question, was adopted by sixty-one votes to forty-two, with
thirty-one abstentions. All of these adoptions are possible objects of
legal polemics. 287

3.

The Withdrawal of United Nations Forces and the Actual
Situation of the United Nations Command

a.

The Withdrawal of United Nations Forces

When the Korean Armistice Agreement was concluded, United
Nations forces began withdrawing from Korea. Two-thirds of the
United Nations forces were withdrawn from Korea within two years
286. Ibid., p. 62.
287. Lyou Byung-Hwa, supra note 1, pp. 130-131.
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after the armistice, including more than six divisions of the United
States forces. 288 The withdrawal continued and was almost completed
in the early 1970s. At the thirtieth session of the United Nations General Assembly, United States Representative D. P. Moynihan explained the present situation of the United Nations Command:
The United Nations Command today comprises those military personnel directly involved in the carrying out by the
United Nations Command of its Armistice Agreement responsibilities, and includes less than 300 non-Korean personnel. Most of these are U.S. military personnel assigned as
staff personnel to the Command itself, and the remainder are
part of the ceremonial honor guards of the Command.
American forces serving in Korea in accordance with the
U.S.-Republic of Korea Mutual Security Treaty of 1954 are
not part of the United Nations Command. . . . 289
In other words, there are virtually no combat troops except a
small number of staff personnel to the Command itself and a ceremonial honor guard. The staff personnel are mostly the United States
military personnel.
b.

The Actual Situation of the United Nations Command

According to the 1950 United Nations Security Council Resolutions 83 and 84, which created the United Nations Command, the mission and function of the Command was to repel the Communist armed
attack against South Korea and to restore international peace and security in the region. The original United Nations Command was a
military command for combat operations. The present United Nations Command cannot carry out such military operations. Less than
three-hundred staff members and ceremonial honor guards by no
means constitute combat troops. What is a reasonable legal explanation of the actual situation of the United Nations Command? Frankly,
it should be recognized that the original military command for combat
operations no longer exists. The nominal existence of the United Nations Command, whose forces comprise less than 300 non-combat personnel, cannot be interpreted as the continuation of the original
United Nations Command. Why should this nominal existence of the
United Nations Command be sustained? This has resulted from an
incorrect legal interpretation of the United Nations Command and the
288. U.S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1952-54, vol.
XV, part 2 (Korea), Washington: GPO, 1984, pp. 1768, 1943-1956.
289. U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV 1065 (October 23, 1975).
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Korean Armistice Agreement, based on two groundless suppositions.
One is that South Korea is not a legal party to the Korean Armistice
Agreement. The other supposition is that the United Nations Command is a party to the Korean Armistice Agreement (North Korean
position) 290 or that the United Nations Command is an essential organ
for the implementation of the armistice (supposed South Korean position). 291 However, South Korea should be a legal party to the Korean
Armistice Agreement and the United Nations Command is merely a
subsidiary organ of the United Nations and cannot be a legal party to
an international agreement.
Bearing this argument in mind, it may be said that the United
Nations Command was already de facto dissolved by the withdrawal
of almost all United Nations forces from Korea. The dissolution of
UNCURK in 1973 was a clear expression of the United Nations' intention that it would no longer handle this complicated problem. In
fact, the United Nations cannot handle this problem due to its structural change resulting from the presence of numerous new nations. In
the political domain, the United Nations would become an international forum for various political opinions.
Although it is an undeniable truth that the United Nations has
helped and protected the existence and development of South Korea,
it is also true that the United Nations Command was de facto dissolved when United Nations forces retreated from Korea. If the Korean War recurred, it is unlikely that the sixteen nations would again
send their troops to Korea to defend South Korea despite the great
sanction declaration. The sixteen nations issued this declaration at the
conclusion of the Korean Armistice Agreement. The probable re-engagement of the United States would be based on the Mutual Defense
Treaty between the two countries, not the framework of the United
Nations action.
Section C. International Legal Mechanisms Of Peace In Korea
Without The United Nations Command
1. The Legal Significance of the Dissolution of the United
Nations Command: Three Contending Opinions
Structural change in the international situation relating to Korea
made the United Nations Command in Korea, the long time guarantee
for Korean security, not only the object of international polemics, but
290. U.N. Doc. A/C.l/1054 (September 24, 1975), p. 13.
291. U.N. Doc. S/11861 (October 31, 1975); Korea Question, supra note 257, pp. 198200.
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also the de facto dissolution of the Command by the withdrawal of
United Nations forces from Korea. Notwithstanding the symbolic
presence of the staff members and honor guards, it is reasonable to say
that the original United Nations Command no longer exists. Some
40,000 of the United States forces now present in Korea are not
United Nations forces, but are in fact United States forces serving in
Korea under the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States
and South Korea. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the international legal mechanisms of peace in Korea without the United Nations
Command. First, the legal significance of the dissolution of the United
Nations Command will be considered.
a.

Opinion 1: Extinction of One Party to the Korean
Armistice Agreement

This opinion is based on the premise that the United Nations
Command would be the only legal party of the United Nations to the
Korean Armistice Agreement. In this context, if the United Nations
Command is dissolved, extinction of a legal party to the Armistice
Agreement would result. Thus, the Armistice Agreement itself would
be extinct. The North Korean position is very clear on this point, as
expressed in its Memorandum on the Korean question at the thirtieth
session of the United Nations General Assembly:
If the United Nations Command, a signatory to the Korean
Armistice Agreement, is dissolved, the Armistice Agreement, too, will have no alternative but to cease its existence
. . . Moreover, since the South Korean Authorities are not a
signer of the Armistice Agreement and have consistently opposed the Armistice itself, they cannot become a signatory to
the Armistice Agreement . . .292
The South Korean position is not clear. At times its position
seems consistent with this opinion. For example, the South Korean
Aide-Memoire on the Korean question at the thirtieth session of the
United Nations General Assembly appears to be along these lines:
The North Korean position is unrealistic and dangerous, because it does not mention at all how to ensure continued adherence to the Armistice Agreement after the dissolution of
the United Nations Command which is a party signatory to
the agreement . . .293
292. U.N. Doc. A/C.l/1054 (September 24, 1975), pp. 16-17.
293. Korea Question, supra note 257, p. 175.

92

CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES

But the South Korean position does not say that the dissolution
of the United Nations Command would result in the extinction of the
Armistice Agreement, and in this respect differs from the North Korean position. This opinion is legally incorrect because it holds that
the United Nations Command, a subsidiary organ of the United Nations, is a legal party to the Korean Armistice Agreement, and that
South Korea is not a legal party to it.
b.

Opinion 2: The Disappearance of an Essential Organ for
Implementing the Armistice Agreement

This opinion holds not that the dissolution of the United Nations
Command would result in the extinction of the Armistice Agreement,
but that eventually some similar situation would ensue due to the disappearance of the essential organ for implementing the Armistice
Agreement. The positions of South Korea and the United States are
similar to this opinion, although they do not clearly address the legal
meaning of the dissolution. These positions are somewhat obscure.
This opinion is found in the letter of the United States Government
addressed to the President of the Security Council, dated June 27,
1975:
The Government of the United States, in consultation with
the Government of the Republic of Korea . . . is ready to
terminate the United Nations Command and, together with
the Republic of Korea, to designate military officers of the
United States and the Republic of Korea as successors in
command, as provided for in Paragraph Seventeen of the Armistice Agreement of July 27, 1953, who would ensure implementation and enforcement of all provisions of the
Armistice Agreement, which are now the responsibility of
the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command
294

The same opinion is expressed in the statement of the South Korean
Government concerning the implementation of the General Assembly
Resolution 3333. 295
Based on the supposition that South Korea might not be a legal
party to the Korean Armistice Agreement, this opinion is incorrect.
Furthermore, this opinion does not reflect the real practices concerning the implementation of the Armistice. In fact, South Korea and the
United States have an exclusive role in implementing the Armistice
294. U.N. Doc. S/11737 (June 27, 1975).
295. Korea Question, supra note 257, pp. 198-200.
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Agreement through the Military Armistice Commission. They receive
virtually no influence from the United Nations or other nations.
The legal order should reflect the reality, rather than the reality
be subject to the legal order. The reality is that the United Nations
Command is already de facto dissolved and that South Korea and
North Korea should be the principal parties to the Korean question,
including the implementation of the Armistice Agreement. Moreover,
South and North Korea are determined to solve the Korean question
independently without the intervention of external powers, as expressed in the South-North Joint Communique of July 4, 1972. There
would never be any feasible agreement if it excluded either South Korea or North Korea. 296
c.

Opinion 3: The Quasi-Withdrawal of the United Nations
as a Party to the Korean Armistice Agreement

The legal significance of the dissolution of the United Nations
Command is difficult to ascertain with clarity. It involves two different legal acts at the same time: 1) the withdrawal of the United Nations as a party to the Korean Armistice Agreement and 2) the
transfer of its responsibility to the parties directly concerned. As the
United Nations Command serves merely as a subsidiary organ of the
United Nations, the United Nations Command was never a legal party
to the Armistice Agreement. The United Nations itself was the legal
party. Therefore, if the United Nations Command is dissolved, there
is no extinction of a party to the Armistice Agreement, unless the
United Nations itself ceases to exist.
The dissolution of the United Nations Command, however,
would provide a clear expression of the intention of the United Nations to cease direct involvement in solving the Korean question. The
consensus statement adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on November 28, 1973, which decided the dissolution of UNCURK, also expressed this intention. This statement encouraged the
South-North Joint Communique dated July 14, 1972, which expressed
the principle of self-reliant unification without external interference. 297
In this case, the act of the United Nations would not represent a denunciation of the Armistice Agreement. A denunciation is a unilateral
act denouncing the legal obligation of an international treaty. The dissolution would not mean under any circumstances a denunciation of
legal obligations of the United Nations for the Korean Armistice
296. Lyou Byung-Hwa, supra note 1, p. 133.
297. U.N. Doc. A/9341 (November 28, 1973).
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Agreement. It means simply that the United Nations intends to transfer its responsibility to directly concerned parties and to withdraw
from direct involvement in the Korean question. The directly concerned parties are principally South and North Korea, and to a lesser
degree the United States and China.
In conclusion, the dissolution of the United Nations Command
means that the United Nations withdraws from a direct role in the
Korean question and transfers its responsibility to the directly concerned parties.
The expression "quasi-withdrawal of the Untied Nations as a
party to the Armistice Agreement" is inexact, but it is justified in the
absence of a more proper term. 298

2.

Parties to the Korean Armistice Agreement After the
Dissolution of the United Nations Command

a.

The General Problem

The United Nations status as a superficial party to the Korean
Armistice Agreement by the signature of the Commander-in-Chief of
the United Nations Command gives rise to questions concerning the
legal parties to the Korean Armistice Agreement upon dissolution of
the Command. These questions concern South Korea and the United
States and do not affect the Communist side. The dissolution of the
United Nations Command, whose commander signed the Armistice,
leaves uncertainty as to the identity of the parties on the Untied Nations side.
First, South Korea's legal status would be consolidated by the
dissolution. South Korea, though it should be a principal party to the
Korean Armistice Agreement, has been over-shadowed by the United
Nations Command. Some have denied South Korea's legal status as a
party to the Armistice Agreement. The dissolution of the Command
would remove this shadow from South Korean sovereignty.299
.
Second, the dissolution of the United Nations Command is legally interpreted as quasi-withdrawal of the United Nations as a party
to the Korean Armistice Agreement. This presents questions as to the
successor of the United Nations as a party to the Armistice Agreement
and the relationship between the United Nations and the United
States. The next section addresses these questions.
298. Lyou Byung-Hwa, supra note I, pp. 133-135.
299. Ibid., p. 136.
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The Relationship Between the United Nations and the
United States

The role of the United States in the Korean question has been
very important from the beginning. The United States had the most
important role in the liberation of Korea from the Japanese, the division of Korea, and the establishment of the South Korean government
by initiating the United Nations action and United Nations Command
military operations in Korea. The United States also had the principal
responsibility for the negotiation and conclusion of the Korean Armistice Agreement, as well as post-war peace-keeping in Korea through
the operation of the Military Armistice Commission. After the de
facto dissolution of the United Nations Command, the United States
role did not change. Thus, it is necessary to clarify the legal status of
the United States with regard to the Korean Armistice Agreement and
the relationship between the United Nations and the United States.
The North Korean position is very clearly expressed in its Memorandum on the Korean question at the thirtieth session of the United
Nations General Assembly. 300 According to this Memorandum, the
Armistice Agreement was originally signed by the Commander of the
North Korean Army and the Commander of Communist China's
forces, and also by the United Nations Command. The Chinese have
already withdrawn from Korea. "The so-called United Nations Command present in South Korea now are, in fact, United States troops."
Therefore, the Memorandum said, the real parties to the Armistice
Agreement are North Korea and the United States.
The positions of South Korea and the United States are not clear.
Although both South Korea and the United States strongly suggested
that the United States would continue to take responsibility for maintaining the Korean Armistice Agreement even after the dissolution of
the United Nations Command. For example, the United States Government's letter dated June 27, 1975, to the President of the Security
Council expressed this position:
The Government of the United States, in consultation with
the Republic of Korea, wishes to bring to the attention of the
Security Council that it is ready to terminate the United Nations Command and, together with the Republic of Korea, to
designate military officers of the United States and the Republic of Korea as successors in command, as provided for
300. U.N. Doc. A/C.I/1054 (September 24, 1975); ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Memoranda Submitted to the UN General Assembly Regarding the Korean Question, Vol. 2
Seoul: 1977, pp. 1018-1019.
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in Paragraph 17 of the Armistice Agreement of July 27,
1953, who would ensure implementation and enforcement of
all provisions of the Armistice Agreement, which are now
the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief of the United
Nations Command. 301
Here the expression "designate military officers of the United States
and the Republic of Korea as successors in command" would mean
that after the dissolution of the United Nations Command, South Korean and American officers would take responsibility for implementation of the Korean Armistice Agreement. The statement by the South
Korean Foreign Minister dated July 7, 1975, concerning the implementation of General Assembly Resolution 3333 expressed the same
position. 302
South Korea and the United States planned to take responsibility
for the implementation of the Armistice Agreement after the dissolution of the Command. Since South Korea has been the principal party
to the Armistice Agreement, this position indicates that the United
States would replace the United Nations as a party to the Armistice
Agreement after the dissolution of the United Nations Command.
This replacement would be somewhat different from a succession of
treaty in the strict sense. A succession of treaty in international law
takes place as a result of a territorial change or the extinction of an
international organization. 303 In this case, however, there is just the
extinction of the United Nations Command, a subsidiary organ, and
not the United Nations itself. Considering all these elements, it is reasonable to conclude that the United States would replace the United
Nations as a party to the Korean Armistice Agreement in conjunction
with the de facto dissolution of the United Nations Command. 304
Practices such as the operation of the Military Armistice Commission
confirm this position.

3.

The Implementation of the Korean Armistice Agreement
After the Dissolution of the United Nations
Command

a.

The Validity of the Armistice Agreement

According to the North Korean Memorandum on the Korean
301. U.N. Doc. S/11737 (June 27, 1975).
302. Korea Question, supra note 257, pp. 198-200.
303. Dictionaire de Ia Terminologie du Droit International Public, Paris: Sirey, 1960, p.
587; A.G. Pereira, La Succession d'Etats en Matiere de Traites, Paris: Pedone, 1969, p. 4.
304. Lyou Byung-Hwa, supra note 1, pp. 137-139.
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question at the thirtieth session of the United Nations General Assembly, the dissolution of the United Nations Command would result in
the extinction of the Korean Armistice Agreement.
If the United Nations Command, a signatory to the Korean
Armistice Agreement, is dissolved, the Armistice Agreement, too, will have no alternative but to cease its existence.
Accordingly, it is out of the question from the outset to
change only the signatory to the Armistice Agreement while
keeping it as it is, though it may be another matter to replace
the Armistice Agreement. 305
The North Korean position is legally incorrect and contradictory.
North Korea's incorrect position results from legal ignorance. North
Korea believes that the United Nations Command is a party to the
Korean Armistice Agreement, but in reality the United Nations Command is merely a subsidiary organ. This subsidiary organ cannot be a
party to an international treaty. Only international organizations such
as the United Nations and Special Agencies can be parties to an international treaty. Furthermore, the North Korean position is contradictory because it claims that the United States is a real party to the
Korean Armistice Agreement and that the dissolution of the United
Nations Command would result in the extinction of the Armistice
Agreement.
Since South Korea should be a principal party to the Korean Armistice Agreement, there would not be an extinction of the Armistice
Agreement if the United Nations withdrew from the Armistice Agreement. The United States would replace the United Nations as a party
to the Korean Armistice Agreement when the United Nations Command is dissolved. 306
In conclusion, the Korean Armistice Agreement would not be extinct under any circumstances with the dissolution of the United Nations Command.
b.

The Operation of the Military Armistice Commission

Although there is no problem in the legal mechanisms for peacekeeping in the Korean peninsula after the dissolution of the United
Nations Command, there may be some technical problems in implementation of the Armistice Agreement. Some technical and administrative measures will be necessary for continued operation of the
305. U.N. Doc. A/C.l/1054 (September 24, 1975), Korea Question, supra note 257, pp.
1007-1026.
306. Lyou Byung-Hwa, supra note 1, p. 141.
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Military Armistice Commission, which serves as an important organ
for the implementation and enforcement of the Armistice Agreement
because the United Nations Command Commander-in-Chief is responsible for the operation of the Military Armistice Commission in
accordance with Paragraphs 17 and 20 of the Armistice Agreement.
As South Korean and American officers are already taking responsibility for the operation of the Military Armistice Commission, the
only necessary technical measure is to replace the nominal title of the
Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command with South
Korean and American officers.
The analogic solution to the problem can be found in the history
of international politics. Following decolonization, new-born states
recognized the binding force of the treaties concluded by the preceding
colonial state with the exception of expressive denunciation. For example, according to Article seven of the Treaty between the United
States and the Philippines of July 4, 1946, the Philippines are engaged
in the legal obligation of treaties concluded by the United States. 307
Another similar case was seen when Ivory Coast, Congo, Central Africa, and Senegal declared that, after independence, they would abide
by the terms of the treaties 308 concluded by France in the colonial
period. In all these cases the same technical problems of replacing the
original responsible organ exist, showing that this problem is not
unique to the dissolution of the United Nations Command. Accordingly, the analogy would apply to the Korean Armistice Agreement
after the dissolution of the Command. The peace would depend not
upon legal interpretation, but rather upon the goodwill of the parties
concerned. 309

307. Whiteman, Digest of International Law, Vol. II, Washington: GPO, p. 985.
308. Ibid .• p. 979.
309. Lyou Byung-Hwa, supra note I, p. 142.
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CHAPTER THREE. THE UNIFICATION OF KOREA AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Although a voluminous number of books and articles concerning
Korean unification have been published, most of them concentrate on
describing the expressed policies of South and North Korea. They fail
to offer either positive suggestions for unification or legal analysis for
unification planning. This is understandable, given the possibility that
Korean unification might not be easily achieved in the foreseeable future under the present circumstances.
However, Korean unification is a prerequisite to the development
of the Korean nation as a democratic and rich country playing its
proper role in the history of the world. The Korean nation, with a
population of sixty million and a cultural tradition spanning
thousands of years, has not taken its proper place in the modern
world. Korea has thus suffered the tragic national division imposed by
outside powers.
Geographically situated among the major powers of the world,
Korea has struggled for survival throughout most of its history. The
clear truth emerging from Korea's long historical experience shows
that the way of Korean survival and prosperity is not to pursue a balanced policy toward the major powers, but rather to become one of
them. Korean unification is the first prerequisite for reaching this
goal. In this sense, it is essential for Korea's future to seek out feasible
means of unification and to formulate a legal basis for this national
task. For this purpose, after a very brief survey of South and North
Korean unification policies, various facts directly relating to Korean
unification will be studied. The legal situation of a divided Korea will
also be analyzed. Finally, in light of this research, some feasible methods for Korean unification will be suggested.
Section A. The Unification Policies Of South And North Korea
1. South Korea
a. President Rhee (1950s)
President Rhee Syngman, the first president of South Korea, initially tried to consolidate the fragile new-born government of South
Korea in the face of domestic factional disputes and the tense confrontation with North Korean Communists. For this purpose, President Rhee on the one hand lobbied for international recognition of his
government and, on the other hand, exerted all his efforts to persuade
the United States government to assist in assuring Korean security.
As to the first objective, President Rhee succeeded in achieving clear
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recognition from the United Nations under the auspices of the United
States. The United Nations General Assembly endorsed the South
Korean Government with very strong words on December 12, 1948:
The General Assembly . . . declares that there has been established a lawful government (the Government of theRepublic of Korea) having effective control and jurisdiction
over that part of Korea where the Temporary Commission
was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of all Korea reside; that this Government
is based on elections which were a valid expression of the
free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which
were observed by the Temporary Commission; and that this
is the only such government in Korea. . . .310
With respect to the second objective of South Korea, the South Korean government failed to persuade the United States to provide
enough military assistance to assure South Korean security, due to the
"Europe first" policy of the United States government. 311
During the latter part of the Korean War, President Rhee attached much importance to the unification of Korea, stubbornly opposing an armistice without the solution of the Korean division. It is
understandable that he could not help but resist an armistice without
the solution of the Korean division after such heavy casualties and
despite the favorable military situation of the United Nations Command. President Rhee's letter of May 30, 1953 to President Eisenhower expressed this emotional situation:
We are fearfully aware . . . that to accept any armistice arrangement which would allow the Chinese Communists to
remain in Korea would mean to the Korean nation, in terms
of eventualities, an acceptance of a death sentence without
protest . . . I beg you to allow the Korean people to continue the fighting, for this is the universal preference of the
Korean people to any divisive armistice or peace. Our first
choice, if we are allowed to make it, is still to have our allies
by our side to actively help us fight out our common issue.
But, if that is no longer possible, we would rather wish to
have the right of self-determination to decide the issue our310. UN General Assembly Resolution 195 (III), 12 December 1948; ROK, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Resolutions of the UN Principal Organs Relating to Korea (1947-1976),
Seoul, 1976, pp. 58-59.
311. Kim Hak-Joon, The Unification Policy of South and North Korea, Seoul: Seoul
National University Press, 1977, p. 72.
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selves conclusively one way or the other. Anyway, it is beyond question that we cannot any longer survive a stalemate
of division. . . . 312
President Rhee's stubborn position continued even after the conclusion of an armistice agreement. Although South Korea attended
the Geneva Political Conference on the Korean question, it did so reluctantly and under heavy pressure from the United States government. President Rhee never believed that negotiations with the
Communist side could lead to positive results. 313 He insisted on unification by force, but in the face of strong U.S. opposition his claim
became more and more a bluff without much chance of realization.
President Eisenhower's letter of March 20, 1953, to President Rhee
confirmed the United States' position:
If you should initiate such military action, my obligation to
both United States forces and to other United Nations forces
would be to plan how best to prevent their becoming involved and to assure their security. . . . 314
President Rhee's bluff of unification by force did not benefit the
objective of unification. Instead, it created unnecessary tension in
United States-Korean relations and isolated Korea from world opinion. Furthermore, his bluff delayed the fortification of South Korean
forces through U.S. military assistance. 315
This is not to say that President Rhee never proposed any policy
of peaceful unification. He did propose such policies, but never with
the intention that the Communist side would accept his proposal. For
example, at the Geneva Conference on the Korean question, his government proposed a fourteen point proposal. The main points were: 316
1) free elections under United Nations supervision, in proportion to
the population of the whole of Korea, to be determined by a national
census under United Nations supervision;
2) complete withdrawal of Chinese forces before elections, and the
312. US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 19521954, volume XV, Korea, part 1, Washington: Government Printing Office (GPO), 1984,
pp. 1124-1126.
313. The South Korean Government's Statement dated 18 April 1954 concerning its
participation in the Geneva Conference, in US Department of State, Foreign Relations of
the United States (FRUS), 1952-1954, volume XVI, The Geneva Conference, Washington:
GPO, 1981, pp. 114-115.
314. Ibid., pp. 44-46.
315. US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1952-1954,
volume XV, Korea, part 2, Washington: GPO, pp. 1598-1666.
316. FRUS, The Geneva Conference, supra note 313, pp. 278-279; 310-313.
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withdrawal of United Nations forces to be completed upon effective
control of a unified government; and
3) continuation of the South Korean constitutional system. In sum,
President Rhee's proposal was the annexation of North Korea under
the South Korean constitutional system through a general election.
Considering the legitimacy of the South Korean Government, his proposal might have some legal ground, but it was very clear that North
Korea would not accept this proposal and President Rhee himself did
not expect acceptance. ·
b.

President Park and Beyond

The unification policy of President Park Chung-Hee is much
more realistic and steady than that of President Rhee. In summary,
President Park's policy was economic development prevailing over
North Korea, and then a gradual approach to the peaceful unification
by easing tensions between South and North Korea through dialogue
and reconciliation based on various exchanges between South and
North Korea. This unification policy can be divided into two periods.
First, in the 1960s, President Park concentrated on building national
strength through a rapid economic development policy under a
staunch anti-Communist approach without dialogue with North Korea. His statements and addresses repeatedly expressed this policy
trend. "[O]ur basic principle for unification is to foster our strength
by expediting economic construction and modernizing our country to
the level of advanced nations as rapidly as possible. . . . " 317
We need a certain period of time before we can elevate our
economic might to be a far more superior position than that
of the North Korean puppet regime by completing the establishment of a self-sufficient economy and the modernization
movement, and before we equip ourselves with an absolutely
superior might over the puppet regime . . . [t]he more eager
we are for unification, the more we must realize that we are
the very persons who have to do this task.. Y 8
Second, in the 1970s, President Park continued to pursue rapid
economic growth and also attempted some gradual contact with the
North Korean regime on the base of national strength which he had
achieved. He expressed this position in his commemorative address on
August 5, 1970, the twenty-fifth anniversary of the national liberation.
317. Major Speeches by Korea's Park Chung Hee, compiled by Shin Bum-Shik, Seoul,
1970, p. 257.
318. Ibid., p. 254.
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In this address, he reiterated his past remarks, stating that it might be
the latter part of the 1970s before major efforts could be made for
unification, believing that by that time South Korean national strength
could help the South Koreans to unravel the entanglement of the unification problem. Then, he suggested his unification approach:
Any approach toward the unification by peaceful means is
not feasible without easing tensions. Therefore, such an approach should be preceded above all by an unequivocal expression of attitude. In case we can recognize that the North
Korean Communists comply with and accept the prerequisites in deeds . . . I would be prepared to suggest epochal
and more realistic measures with a view to removing, step by
step, various artificial barriers existing between the South
and the North, in the interest of laying the groundwork for
the unification and on the basis of humanitarian considerations . . . . 319
This new approach of President Park succeeded in opening initial
contacts. In August 1971, the Red Cross of South and North Korea
began to negotiate on reunions of families dispersed in South and
North Korea. 320 On July 4, 1972, the South-North Joint Communique was announced, offering some hope for Korean unification. This
Communique, the first formal agreement between the governments of
South and North Korea since the conclusion of the Armistice Agreement, formulated some basic principles of unification.
Although the South-North Joint Communique did not make
much progress, President Park continued to pursue his gradual approach. He believed that both sides should endeavor to gradually remove the artificial barriers between thee South and the North by
solving easier and more practical problems first, and to phase out feelings of mutual distrust and replace them with those of mutual confidence through concrete results. 321
In conclusion, his basic formula for unification was clear and realistic. First, national strength should be built through rapid economic
development. On the basis of prevailing national strength, gradual
peaceful unification should be carried out, by easing tensions and rec319. The Institute for East Asian Studies, Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification, Seoul, 1975, pp. 148-157.
320. ROK, National Unification Board, A White Paper on SouthNorth Dialogue in Korea, Seoul, 1982, pp. 63-84.
321. The Institute for East Asian Studies, Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification, supra
note 319, pp. 161-167.
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onciling South and North Korea. For this purpose, he proposed three
basic principles: 322 1) Peace should be finally established on the Korean peninsula through a mutual non-aggression agreement between
the South and the North; 2) the South and the North should open
doors to each other and restore mutual trust by pursuing rapid progress of South-North dialogue with sincere and open exchanges and
cooperation; and 3) based on the above foundations, free general elections should be held throughout Korea under fair election management and supervision and in direct proportion to the indigenous
population, thereby achieving the unification of the country.
Although President Park's unification policy was very reasonable
and realistic, he did not envision a concrete program for unification in
the foreseeable future. In this sense, his policy was to lay a long-term
basis for unification, rather than to realize the concrete objective of
unification.
After the death of President Park, the South Korea unification
policy has continued along the lines he established. For example,
President Chun's Declaration of the Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification on January 22, 1982, expressed a
similar position. In this declaration, President Chun said that it would
be essential to promote trust between the South and the North and
eliminate from national life all impediments to unification to facilitate
the drafting of a unified constitution. For this purpose, he proposed:
1) to normalize relations between South and North Korea, and to
conclude a provisional agreement on basic relations between South
and North Korea; 2) to open their societies to each other through
various forms of exchanges and cooperation; and 3) to establish a resident liaison mission in Seoul and Pyongyang and appoint a plenipotentiary envoy with the rank of cabinet minister to head the liaison
mission. 323
The South-North Korean dialogue has made no substantial progress, and the two sides continue to maintain nominal contacts. However, it is noteworthy that, after the South Korean proposal of August
20, 1984, to open trade and economic cooperation with North Korea,
South Korea accepted the North Korean offer on September 8 for relief goods to victims of floods in South Korea. 324 This was the first
concrete result after long nominal contacts between South and North
322. Ibid., pp. 175-186.
323. ROK, National Unification Board, A White Paper on South-North Dialogue in Korea, supra note 320, pp. 352-356.
324. Korean Overseas Information Service, Inter-Korean Economic Talks, Seoul, 1984,
pp. 5-6.
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Korea. Then the two sides began talks on various economic exchanges
between South and North Korea. A recent meeting was held at
Panmunjom on May 17, 1985, but still achieved no tangible results. 325
The two sides also resumed Red Cross talks, suspending twelve
years ago, to arrange reunions for many families separated by the national division. On May 27, 1985, an eighty-four member North Korea delegation visited Seoul to hold a meeting with the South Korean
delegation. The two sides agreed to exchange a limited number of separated family members around August 15, the fortieth anniversary of
the national liberation. They agreed to hold another meeting on July
15 at Panmunjom to work out the procedures for the exchange. 326 At
last, the reunion of separated families was possible on September 20,
1986. Each side sent a one hundred fifty-one member delegation to
the other's capital, and among them were fifty persons of separated
families. 327

2.

North Korea

With only a superficial survey of the North Korean proposals, it
would be difficult to pinpoint exactly the unification policy of North
Korea due to the propagandistic character of its proposals. For example, just before the North Korean invasion of South Korea on June 25,
1950, North Korea carried out an intensive campaign for peaceful unification, proposing a general election in August 1950. The campaign,
however, was intended only to camouflage the preparation of an impending armed attack. 328 During the active South-North dialogue in
the early 1970s, North Korea constructed several infiltration tunnels
in the demilitarized zone. 329 In light of this, examination of North
Korean official proposals or public pronouncements would not render
an objective analysis, but rather would amount to superficial observations. The real intentions and objectives of North Korean unification
policy should be discerned through all available means. In keeping
with this, it would be reasonable to summarize the main points of the
North Korean proposals and analyze them in terms of possible objectives and actual deeds.
325. The Washington Post, May 17, 1985.
326. The Washington Post, May 28 and 31, 1985.
327. The Dong-A Ilbo September 20, 1986.
328. ROK, National Unification Board, A White Paper on South-North Dialogue in Korea, supra note 320, p. 210-211.
329. Korean Overseas Information Service, A Handbook of Korea, fifth edition, Seoul,
1983, p. 461.
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a.

North Korean Proposals for Unification

Over four decades North Korea made numerous proposals for the
unification of Korea, but the main points of all these proposals are
very similar. This consistency over time in the North Korean position
might be partially explained by the fact that while the head of the
South Korean government has changed several times, in North Korea
Kim 11-Sung has maintained his power for four decades and is now
preparing the succession of power for his son.
The key points of the North Korean proposals for unification include withdrawal of United States forces, the guarantee for Communist activities in South Korea, a national conference of all political
parties and social organizations in preparation for general elections
which would exclude certain anti-Communist leaders, the reduction of
armed forces or integration of armed forces of South and North Korea, general elections, and the formation of a unified government. In
addition to these points, pending perfect unification, North Korea also
proposed the establishment of a federal republic permitting two existing regimes. An eight-point unification formula adopted by North
Korea on June 28, 1949, illustrates these key points. The main points
consisted of: 1) peaceful unification of the Korean people; 2) general
elections throughout South and North Korea on September 15, 1949,
the promulgation of a new constitution, and the establishment of the
Republic of Chosun; 3) elimination of the oppression of democratic
parties and social organizations (Communist activities) in South Korea; 4) a joint conference of democratic political parties and social organizations in preparation for a general election; and 5) exclusion of
anti-people reactionary persons (anti-Communist leaders) in South
Korea from the joint conference. 330 A North Korean proposal of June
1950 detailed its personanon-grata, including the most influential antiCommunist leaders such as President Rhee Syngman, Kim Sung-Soo,
Cho Byung-Ok, and others. After the conclusion of the Armistice
Agreement, North Korea made similar proposals at the Geneva Political Conference on the Korean question held April 26 to June 15,
1954, resisting the general elections under the United Nations
supervision. 331
The North Korean proposals of the 1970s reveal the recent policy
330. ROK, National Unification Board, A White Paper on South-North Dialogue in Korea, supra note 320, p. 209; Kim Hak-Joon, supra note 311, p. 183.
331. US Department of State, The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference, April 26June 15, 1954, Washington: GPO, 1954, pp. 39-40; FRUS, The Geneva Conference, supra
note 313, pp. 149-150.
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of North Korea. On April12, 1971, the North Korean Foreign Minister Ho Dam proposed an eight-point formula for unification. The
main points were: 1) American forces should be withdrawn from
South Korea; 2) The armed forces of South and North Korea should
be reduced to 100,000 men each or less; 3) The South Korea-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty and the South Korea-Japan Treaty should be declared null and void; 4) After the withdrawal of American forces from
South Korea, a free election should be held throughout South and
North Korea to establish a unified government; 5) The political activities of all political parties and social organizations throughout South
and North Korea should be guaranteed; 6) Pending complete unification, a confederation system should be formed between South and
North Korea to permit two different systems; 7)The South and the
North should engage in mutual trade and cooperation, and exchanges
in various domains; and 8) A South-North political conference should
be held with the participation of all political parties and social organizations for consultation over these problems. 332
This formula of unification has since been reaffirmed. For example, on June 23, 1973, North Korean President Kim 11-Sung confirmed
this proposal in a speech at the mass rally welcoming visiting Czechoslovakian Communist leader Gustav Husak, in which he proposed the
so-called five-point unification program. The salient features were: 1)
Dissolution of military confrontation and relaxation of tension between the South and the North; 2) Multilateral collaboration and exchange between the South and the North; 3) Convocation of a grand
national conference composed of representatives of all walks of life,
political parties, and social organizations in the South and the North;
4) Institution of a South-North confederation system under the name
of Confederal Republic of Koryo (Korea); and 5) Joint entry of the
South and the North into the United Nations as a single member. 333
b.

An Analysis of North Korean Proposals
1.

The Main Points of North Korean Proposals

Although the North Korean regime proposed numerous unification programs, they could all be summed up in the following main
points: 1) the withdrawal of American forces; 2) the guarantee of
Communist activities in South Korea; 3) the release of all political
prisoners including North Korean spy agents; 4) a national conference
332. ROK, National Unification Board, A White Paper on South-North Dialogue in
Korea, supra note 320, pp. 212-213.
333. Ibid., 215.
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organized under North Korean terms to carry out a general election
and the formation of unified government; and S)pending the formation
of unified government, the establishment of a confederal republic.
First, North Korea concentrates on the withdrawal of United
States forces. This demand is understandable considering that the
North Korean invasion in 1950 almost achieved its objective, and was
thwarted only by United States intervention. They seemed to judge
that as long as American forces stayed, their objective of unification
would be impossible. Consequently, they took the withdrawal of
American forces as a prerequisite for unification. For this reason they
tried a variety of measures to realize the withdrawal of United States
forces, sometimes through the use of provocations such as the ax-murder of United States officers by North Korean soldiers on August 18,
1976, and other times through peace propaganda. Their attempts,
however, have yet to succeed.
Second, North Korea has attempted to establish a Communist
connection in South Korea. For this purpose it demands the guarantee of Communist activities, permission for a Communist party in
South Korea and release of Communist spy agents imprisoned in
South Korea, the abolition of the Anti-Communist Law, and repeal of
the National Security Law. 334 It seems strange, however, that the
North Koreans unilaterally demand such conditions at a serious conference. Such demands indicate clearly that it would be very naive to
expect something extraordinary from negotiations with the North Korean Communists.
Third, North Korea requires a national conference of all political
parties and social organizations to organize general elections for Korean unification. According to North Korean Representative Ryu
Jang-Shik at the third meeting of the Vice-chairmen of the SouthNorth Coordinating Committee on January 30, 1974, the "Grand National Congress" would be composed of an equal number of delegates
from sixty to seventy political parties and social organizations in South
and North Korea under the following conditions which applied only
to South Korea: 1) Include in the South Korean delegation representatives of political parties and social organizations based on the North
Korean Communistic view of class, as well as civil representatives; 2)
Include in the South Korean delegations of the so-called "Unification
and Revolutionary Party," which was fabricated by North Korea and
non-existent in South Korea; and 3) Exclude anti-Communist political
334. Ibid., pp. 200-201.
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parties, organizations and individuals. 335 It would be very difficult for
rational men to imagine the shameless demand of the North Korean
Communists. Study of such an infeasible proposal would prove
useless.
Fourth, North Korea proposed the "Confederal Republic of
Koryo (Korea) pending the complete unification of Korea. This has
been repeatedly proposed since August 14, 1960, when North Korean
President Kim 11-Sung made a commemorative address on the national liberation day, stating:
If South Korea is not yet prepared to accept a free all-Korea
general election, there should be one provisional measure or
another. As such a provisional measure, we propose a confederation system between the two halves of the country.
Under the confederation system we propose, the existing
political systems of South and North Korea will be allowed
to remain as they are for some time . . . and a supreme national committee will be formed with representatives from
the governments, mainly to coordinate economic and cultural development in South and North Korea. . . .336
Since then this confederation system has been proposed on many occasions. This vague concept of a confederal system may mean some kind
of federal system, not a confederal system, because members of a confederal system maintain their international legal persons as independent states in internationallaw. 337 Thus, members of a confederation
are admitted in the United Nations individually, not as a confederation. Because the North Korean proposal insists that South and
North Korea should be admitted in the United Nations as a single
nation, this system cannot be a confederation. Aside from this discrepancy, this proposal contains some positive ideas. If it offers a temporary measure for the consolidation of national unity in trying to
restore mutual trust and ease tension between South and North Korea,
pending a complete unification, it deserves further study. This measure would be also useful for preventing external interventions.
However, the problem is found in the measure's preconditions
and concrete implementation. The Central Committee's report at the
Sixth Congress of the North Korean Worker's Party on October 10,
1980, clarified the proposal for a confederation system:
335. Ibid., pp. 221-222.
336. Ibid., pp. 240-241.
337. Dictionnaire de 1a Terminologie du Droit International, Paris: Sirey, 1960, pp.
145-146.
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To achieve independent peaceful unification of the fatherland, the fascist military rule should be done away with and
democratization of the society should be realized in the
South. The Anti-Communist Law and the National Security
Law . . . should be abrogated. At the same time, all political parties and social organizations should be legalized. The
unjustly arrested and imprisoned democratic personages . . .
should be set free. . . . The American authorities should
. . . behave in a way meeting the wishes and views of all the
world peoples . . . by withdrawing their troops from South
Korea at an early date. . . . Our party suggests that the fatherland be unified through the establishment of a confederal
republic. . . . The Democratic Confederal Republic of
Koryo (Korea) should be a neutral state which does not affiliate itself with any political or military alliance or bloc. 338
In conclusion, this vague concept of a confederal system would have
the same problems as does the national conference for unification.
Both proposed unacceptable preconditions for South Korea.
ii.

The Objective of North Korean Proposals

In light of the above considerations, it seems clear that the final
objective of the North Korean proposals is a communization of the
entire Korean nation. More concretely, North Korea concentrates
first on the withdrawal of United States troops, then on carrying out
the Communist revolution in South Korea, and finally focuses on unification under Communism.
This objective is not merely a conclusion based on research of
North Korean unification policies, but also continues to be expressed
publicly by the North Korean authorities. For example, Kim 11-Sung
enunciated the so-called three revolutionary capabilities at the Ali
Arham Social Science Institute on April 15, 1965. According to
North Korean President Kim, they must: 1) strengthen their revolutionary base politically, economically, and militarily by successful socialist construction in the Northern half; 2) strengthen the
revolutionary capability in South Korea by politically awakening and
solidly uniting the South Korea people; and 3) strengthen the solidarity between the Korean people and the international revolutionary
force. 339 North Korean President Kim more clearly expressed this
338. A White Paper on South-North Dialogue in Korea, supra note 320, pp. 253-255.
339. Ibid., pp. 225-226.
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idea at the Fifth Convention of the Worker's Party on November 2,
1971 when he stated:
The South Korean revolution is an integral part of the whole
Korean revolution. For the nationwide victory of the Korean revolution, we must accelerate the socialist construction
in the northern half of the Republic while further fostering
the revolutionary struggle in South Korea. . . . The basic
mission is to expel the American imperialists from South
Korea . . . and establish an advanced social system in the
South. . . . [t]he South Korean revolutionaries . . . must
positively carry out the revolution by correctly combining
various patterns and methods of struggle such as political
and nonpolitical struggle, legal . . . as well as nonlegal
struggle, violent and non-violent struggle. . . .340
The North Korean "peaceful unification" would be quite different
from the common sense notion of that concept. It would not be a
peaceful unification achieved through free elections reflecting the free
will of the people. Peaceful unification cannot be on North Korean
terms, considering that the South Korean population is more than
double that of North Korea, and that the standard of living and economic strength of South Korea is far greater than that of North Korea. Essentially, North Korean peaceful unification means at best a
Communist revolution. This cannot be achieved by peaceful means,
but can only be achieved by force. This intention is seen in brutal
incidents such as the Rangoon incident of October 1983, which attempted to kill South Korean President Chun but instead killed seventeen members of the presidential delegation. 341
Section B.

1.

Various Facts Relating To Korean Unification

The Neighboring Countries and Korean Unification

Several countries neighboring the Korean peninsula are major
world powers. Their interests in Korea have deeply affected Korean
self-determination through its history. In modem history, Korea has
been a victim of the power struggle among these neighboring countries. The Korean division was not a result of Korean action but was
imposed by external powers against the will of the Korean people. As
Korean politics have been involved in the power struggle of major
powers since Korean independence, it is necessary to study the posi340. Ibid., pp. 226-227.
341. The Dong-A Ilbo, October 10, 1983; The Joong-ang Daily News, October 10, 1983.
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tions of the major powers toward Korean unification. This does not
mean that Korean unification depends on their policy, but that a practical policy of Korean unification should consider the important interests of its neighbors. If any of these major powers consider that its
vital interests might be harmed by a formula of Korean unification, it
would strongly oppose such a unification formula and impede the
achievement of unification. Therefore, it is clear that any feasible plan
for the unification of Korea should consider the vital interests of
neighboring countries. In this regard, it is useful to study the position
and interests of Korea's neighboring countries with respect to Korean
unification.
a.

The United States

The United States has been directly involved in the Korean question since the end of World War II. After the Korean War, in which
the United States sacrificed a great deal of its human and material
resources in repelling the Communist attack against South Korea,
both the strategic and economic aspects of American interests in the
Korean peninsula increased. The basic position and the interest of the
United States on the Korean question continued to develop with some
variation depending on the U.S. administration. What are the basic
positions and objectives of the United States in the Korean question?
After the conclusion of the Armistice Agreement, the United
States considered two alternatives for the future of the Korean peninsula. This policy was formulated during the final stages of armistice
negotiations when the conclusion of an armistice agreement was imminent. According to the Report by the National Security Council, concerning United States objectives with respect to Korea in the period
following the armistice dated July 7, 1953 the United States government considered two alternative feasible objectives:
(a) A Korea divided for an indefinite period by the present
demarcation line, with the Republic of Korea tied into the
United States security system and developed as a military
ally.
(b) A unified, neutralized and substantially unchanged Republic of Korea (such an objective would entail Communist
agreement to a unified Korea with the United States political
orientation in exchange for United States agreement to remove United States forces and bases from Korea . . . This
objective should also involve guarantees for the territorial
and political integrity of a unified Korea under the Republic
of Korea and its admission to the United Nations and possi-
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bly would involve limitation on the level and character of the
Republic of Korea defense forces. ) 342
Between these two alternatives, the United States government at that
time preferred a unified Korea. The same report explained the reasons
for that preference:
An independent and united Korea has been a constant
United States political objective. This objective can now feasibly be achieved only through the neutralization of Korea.
The relinquishment of its military position in Korea which
would result from neutralization would not be critical for the
United States. In the event of general war, the desirability of
attempting to defend Korea would be problematical. With
respect to the danger of local aggression against Korea, it
would in any case be only the prospect of retaliation by the
United States forces that would deter such aggression. The
danger of internal subversion or indirect aggression in Korea
could and should be countered by adequate Korean security
forces and United States covert activity and economic assistance. On the positive side, the security of Japan would be
favored by the withdrawal of Communist military power (including air forces) beyond the Yalu and Tumen Rivers. The
savings made possible for the United States by its being relieved of the necessity of supporting United States bases in
Korea and large, heavily-armed Korean forces would make
possible strengthening of the military position of the free
world in other areas. The unification of Korea under the Republic of Korea, even on a neutralized basis, would . . . be
regarded as a more constructive result of the war and more
to the credit of the United States than the restitution of the
status quo ante. 343
However, after the failure of the Geneva Conference on the Korean question the United States Government chose the alternative of a
divided Korea because the Communist side would not give up the
Communist regime in North Korea. The Second Progress Report by
the Operations Coordinating Board to the National Security Council
dated December 29, 1954, on the United States Objectives and
Courses of Action with Respect to Korea explained the position of the
United States.
First, the Report explained the contents and problems of the first
342. FRUS, 1952-54, Volume XV, Korea, part 2, supra note 315, pp. 1344-1345.
343. Ibid., p. 1346.
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alternative objective. This objective was "a unified and neutral Korea
under an independent and representative goveJll.ment." More specifically, this objective was: 1) A unified Korea fnendly to the United
States, without foreign forces or bases in Korea; 2) United States and
Communist assurances of the territorial and political integrity of Korea under the Republic of Korea but foregoing all rights granted to the
United States under a U.S. Korean mutual assistance pact; and 3) A
level of Korean armed forces sufficient for internal security and capable of defending Korean territory short of an attack by a major
power. 344 According to this Report, in the discussion of the Korean
question it was evident that the Communists would not agree to any
unification that did not permit continuance of the Communist regime.
The Communist representatives at the Geneva Conference refused to
agree to free elections impartially supervised by the United Nations.
Thus, there would be little prospect for fruitful negotiation on the Korean problem in the foreseeable future.
In light of these circumstances, the Report chose the second alternative objective. The second objective was: pending a political settlement and in the absence of a violation of the armistice, the United
States should, conditioned upon the satisfactory cooperation of South
Korea, 1) continue to observe the armistice and try to avoid renewed
fighting; 2) accept the division of Korea on the present demarcation
line while seeking a satisfactory solution of the Korean question by the
use of other than military pressures; and 3) tie South Korea into the
United States security system and develop it as a military ally. This
report concluded that the prospect for Korean unification appeared
remote and that the primary emphasis to the United States policy was
to achieve a position of strength in South Korea.
Two decades have passed without major changes since the adoption of the Report. Only after the Vietnam War were there some
changes in the Korean policy of the United States, including withdrawal of U.S. ground troops in Korea. This movement does not imply any significant change in American policy toward Korea based on
the two alternative objectives. If there is any change in the United
States policy on the Korean question, it is simply a change in the
methods due to environmental changes such as the Vietnam War, and
Sino-American Rapprochement. Following these environmental
changes, the United States might want to reduce its active role in the
Korean question. This might appear to be the maintenance of the sta344. Ibid., pp. 1950-1951.
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tus quo in the Korean peninsula, putting greater responsibility on the
Koreans themselves and encouraging South-North Korean dialogue.
The United States' economic interest in Korea represents another
important factor in U.S.-Korean relations. The traditional American
interest in Korea may have been strategic and military, but after the
wonderful growth of the South Korean economy, South Korea has
become one of the major economic partners of the United States, and
this interest is ever increasing.
In conclusion, the United States position on the Korean question
has been based on two alternative feasible objectives. The first objective is a unified Korea friendly to the United States without any foreign troops or bases in Korea. The second objective offers a Korea
divided on the present demarcation line with South Korea tied into the
United States security system and developed as a military ally. The
first objective is not a neutral unified Korea in the proper sense, but
simply a unified Korea friendly to the United States without any foreign troops, including United States troops. Because the prospect of
the first objective is remote, the United States government has implemented the second objective, a divided Korea. Of course, it is possible
that a unified Korea would be a U.S. military ally serving American
interests. But this might not be possible unless the United States risks
a global war against one or two major powers. Without the use of
force, there may be only two alternatives left to the United States.
Between them, the United States has chosen the second objective,
which ultimately equates to the maintenance of the status quo m
Korea.
b.

The Soviet Union

As a neighboring country of the Korean peninsula, the Soviet
Union historically has been interested in Korea. In the early twentieth
century, Russian ambition in Korea was curtailed only by its defeat in
the Russo-Japanese War during 1904 to 1905.
In the March 20, 1946 opening statement of the U.S.-Soviet Joint
Commission, Soviet delegate Terenti Shtikov frankly expressed the
modern Soviet position:
The Soviet Union has a keen interest in Korea being a true
democratic and independent country, friendly to the Soviet
Union, so that in the future it will not become a base for
attack on the Soviet Union. 345
345. US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, volume VIII,
pp. 652-653.
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The Soviet policy to maintain a favorable government in Korea was
stubbornly manifested in the U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission as well as
in the United Nations and was one of the factors resulting in the Korean War. United States intelligence research estimated that the aggressive imperialism of Stalin attempted to resolve the Korean
question on his terms throughout the Korean War. The Intelligence
Estimate prepared by the Office of Intelligence Research, U.S. Department of State just after the start of the Korean War (June 25, 1950)
evaluated in detail the Soviet role in the Korean War. 346 This Estimate stated that the North Korean government was completely under
Kremlin control and there was no possibility that the North Koreans
acted without prior instruction from Moscow. According to this Estimate, there had been indications since early June that the Soviet
Union was reviewing its Far Eastern policy in a Moscow conference of
practically all top Soviet representatives in Far Eastern areas. Thus,
the move in Korea would be decided only after the most minute examination of all factors involved in the Far Eastern situation.
The Intelligence Estimate also analyzed the Soviet motives for the
Korean War in terms of Soviet global strategy and found: 1) It would
offer a test on grounds militarily most favorable to the Soviet Union
and detrimental to the resolution of the United States' announced policy of total diplomacy. 2) A severe blow would be dealt to U.S. prestige throughout Asia. 3) Soviet military control of all Korea would be
an important step securing the approaches to the Soviet Union. 4)
Soviet military domination of all Korea would give Moscow an important weapon for the intimidation of the Japanese in connection with
Japan's future alignment with the United States. Eventually the Soviet attempt failed and reduced Soviet influence in Korea. This bitter
failure of the Soviet Union prompted modification of its position on
the Korean question, and the Soviet Union has since tried to maintain
the status quo in Korea rather than to pursue an aggressive expansionism. Furthermore, the consolidation of the American position in Korea makes it more difficult for Soviet expansionism to control all of
Korea.
The fundamental change of the international situation relating to
Korea in the three decades after the Korean War is important in analyzing the Soviet Union's Korea policy. The most important change
in this respect is the Sino-Soviet conflict which culminated in the military clash at the Ussuri River in 1969. Because the Sino-Soviet con346. US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1950, volume VII, Korea, Washington: GPO, 1976, pp. 148-151.

PEACE AND UNIFICATION IN KOREA AND INT'L LAW

117

flict has grown to such a degree that the Soviet Union is China's most
dangerous enemy and vice versa. 347 In this situation, the Soviet Union
would not pursue aggressive expansionism or endorse North Korean
adventurism in the Korean peninsula.
From the mid-1950s, Soviet Premier Nikita Khruschev pursued
coexistence with the West resulting in three decades without a major
armed conflict between the two blocs. This international trend preferred to maintain the status quo in Korea. This trend does not mean,
under any circumstances, that the Soviet interests in Korea have
changed or that the Soviet Union would oppose any unification of Korea. It simply means that the Soviet Union would prefer to maintain
the status quo in Korea rather than to take the risks of the Korean
unification.
Of course, the Soviet Union has strongly supported North Korea
in the South-North Korean confrontation. The North Korean regime
was formed and developed under the auspices of the Soviet Union.
Soviet economic assistance to North Korea from 1946 to 1960
amounted to U.S. $700 million.3 48 Despite this, relations between
North Korea and the Soviet Union deteriorated after the Korean War,
due particularly to Khruschev's de-Stalinization campaign and his
policy of peaceful coexistence with the United States. This deterioration in relations did not mean that the Soviet Union would not support
North Korea. The Soviet Union cannot help but support North Korea in the context of the Sino-Soviet conflict and U.S.-Soviet confrontation. However, the Soviet Union would not want to risk again
supporting a North Korean attempt to unify Korea by force. In sum,
the Soviet Union supports North Korea in maintaining the status quo
in Korea.
c.

China

Until the twentieth century, Korean foreign relations had been
limited primarily to those with China. This long tradition explains the
varied and traditional Chinese interests in Korea. Chinese intervention in the Korean War also can be interpreted in this context. The
November 11, 1950 statement issued by the Chinese foreign minister
concerning Chinese intervention in the Korean War confirmed this
position:
347. See George Ginsburg and C.F. Pinkele, The Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute 19491964, New York: Praeger, 1978; Harry Gelman, "Beijing Looks Ahead: Outlook for SinoSoviet Relations," Problems of Communism XXVIII, No. 5-6, Sept.-Dec. 1979, pp. 50-66.
348. US Department of the Army, North Korea: A Country Study, Washington: GPO,
1981, p. 255.
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[T]he question of the independent existence or downfall of
Korea has always been closely linked with the security of
China. To help Korea and repel United States aggression
means to protect our own homes and our own country. It is,
therefore, completely natural for the Chinese people to be
ready to help Korea and offer resistance to United States
.
aggression.
. . .349
After the Korean War, Communist China contributed substantial
economic assistance to North Korean post-war reconstruction.
Although it is very difficult to get exact statistics about North Korean
economics, reliable estimates revealed that Chinese economic assistance to North Korea from 1946 to 1960 amounted to U.S. $600 million.350 Communist China has always supported North Korea in the
South-North Korean confrontation. Relations between North Korea
and China have been better than North Korean-Soviet relations.
However, continuing changes in the international situation over the
three decades after the Korean War modified the Chinese position on
the Korean question, although Chinese interests in Korea have never
changed. The major relevant changes in the international situation are
the Sino-Soviet conflict and the Sino-American rapprochement. These
changes fundamentally affected Chinese foreign policy in the sense
that the "friend" and the "enemy" of Communist China were completely reversed. This situation complicated the Chinese position in
the Korean question. China tried to maintain a close relationship with
North Korea while attempting to improve relations with the United
States, a country North Korea considered an enemy. It seems inevitable that China would be in an awkward position on the Korean question, considering its desire not to lose North Korea to the Soviet bloc
and to improve its relations with the United States. Therefore, it is
difficult to evaluate China's long-term position on the Korean question. China undoubtedly will continue to support North Korea in the
South-North Korean confrontation. However, supposing that South
Korea succeeded in the unification of Korea on its terms, would this
situation be advantageous or dangerous to China? This hypothetical
situation would be advantageous to China in the context of the SinoSoviet conflict and economic relationship. The problem is that China
will support North Korea in the South-North Korean confrontation to
keep North Korea away from the Soviet bloc. Considering these com349. UN Document S/1902, IS November 1950.
350. North Korea, supra note 348, p. 255.
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plications, it is understandable why China wants to maintain the status quo in Korea.
Relations between South Korea and China have steadily developed in this context. Although no diplomatic relations exist, the two
countries have on several occasions negotiated directly with each
other. For example, with the hijacking of a Chinese civil airliner on
May 5, 1983, 351 the two countries directly negotiated the handling of
the problem in Seoul. During the intrusion of a Chinese naval torpedo
into South Korean territorial waters in March 1985, the two governments again had direct talks resulting in the Chinese government's
apology to the Korean government. 352
The development of relations between South Korea and China is
particularly remarkable in the area of trade. Although trade between
the two countries is indirect, usually through middlemen in Hong
Kong or Japan, the volume of trade has rapidly increased and
amounted to about U.S. $300 million in 1984, roughly double the 1983
level. 353 China also permitted South Korea to hold a trade exhibition
in Macao on December 3-5, 1984. In mid-November of 1984, a
chartered Swiss-Air flight brought 146 European tourists directly from
Seoul to Peking. 354 An official Chinese delegation participated at the
Asian Pacific Tele-Community Conference held in Seoul in November
1984. 355
In the domain of sports, the two countries have rapidly developing relations. In March 1984, a South Korean sports team participated in the Davis Cup's preliminary games held at Kunming in China
and in April of that year Chinese athletes came to Seoul to compete in
the Asian Junior Basketball Championship as well as the Second
Asian Swimming Championship. In addition, in September 1984 a
Chinese delegation attended the Olympic Council of Asia meeting in
Seoul, where Chinese Representative He Zhenlian stated that China
would take part in the Asian Games and the Olympic Games to be
held in Seoul in 1986 and 1988 respectively. 356
351. The Korea Times, and The Korea Herald, May 5 - 11, 1983.
352. The Washington Post, March 27, 1985.
353. Charles Smith, Paul Ensor, Carl Goldstein, "Economics Comes First," Far Eastern
Economic Review, Hongkong, 28 February 1985, p. 98.
354. Ibid., p. 29.
355. Richard Nations, "An Olympian Task," Far Eastern Economic Review, Hongkong,
17 January 1985, p. 29.
356. Lee Chae-Jin, "South Korea in 1984," Asian Survey, Berkeley: University of California Press, January 1985, p. 85.
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d.

Japan

Considering the facts that Japan is an island country and that
Korea provides an important access for Japan to the Asian and European continents, it is easy to understand Japan's interest in Korea.
Historically, Japanese imperialist forces occupied Korea and Manchuria, provoking bitter anti-Japanese sentiment in the area. This animosity prevented the Japanese from establishing normal relations with the
area. Only in 1965 did South Korea and Japan normalize their diplomatic relations.
As soon as Korea-Japanese diplomatic relations were established,
general relations between the two countries rapidly developed. Japan's primary concern in the Korean question seems to be Japanese
security. A Communist Korean peninsula would pose an imminent
threat to Japan, considering that two major Communist powers would
completely encircle the Japanese islands. The Japanese government
has repeatedly expressed its concern over this security issue. The
Nixon-Sato Joint Communique of November 1969 manifested this
concern: "The President and the Prime Minister specifically noted the
continuing tension over the Korean peninsula. The Prime Minister
deeply appreciated the peacekeeping efforts of the United States in
that area and stated the security of the Republic of Korea was essential to Japan's own security." 357 Japanese economic interests in Korea
are also very important. South Korea is now Japan's second largest
export market after the United States. 358
The varied and close relations between South Korea and Japan
have been consolidated by Nakasone's active Korean policy. The two
governments recently exchanged visits of heads of government, and
Japan offered an apology for Japan's past invasion into Korea. 359
Japan has supported South Korea in the Korean question and has
maintained limited unofficial relations with North Korea. Due to Japan's situation after World War II, Japanese influence in the Korean
question is relatively small as compared to other neighboring countries. As the Japanese military is still weak, Japanese relations with
Korea are predominantly economic.
357. Kim Hak-Joon, The Unification Policy, supra note 311, p. 253.
358. Koh Byung-Chul, The Foreign Policy Systems on North and South Korea, Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1984, p. 215.
359. Lee Chae-Jin, "South Korea in 1984," supra note 356, pp. 8688.
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The Sino-Soviet Conflict and the Sino-American
Rapprochement

a.

The Sino-Soviet Conflict
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After the emergence of Nikita Khruschev in the Soviet Union,
Sino-Soviet relations began to deteriorate. His policy of peaceful coexistence with the United States and the de-Stalinization campaign disturbed the Chinese. Mainland China expected active Soviet assistance
in its military operations against Nationalist China in 1958, but the
Soviet Union did not want to provoke the United States under the
peaceful coexistence policy. The Soviet Union did not help Communist China in its attempt to blockade the Nationalist-held off-shore islands of Quemoy and Matsu in 1958. 360
Tension from deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations resulted in the
eruption of hostilities in the 1960s after centuries of territorial disputes. In the western sector, China yielded 440,000 square kilometers
to Russia under the 1860 Treaty of Peking, and also yielded 70,000
square kilometers under the Treaty of St. Petersburg. 361 In the northeastern region, China yielded 59,000 square kilometers to Russia
under the 1858 Treaty Aigun, and another 400,000 square kilometers
were lost under the 1860 Treaty of Peking. 362 The actual disputed
area is 41,000 square kilometers in the region of the western sector and
900 square kilometers in the northeastern area along the Ussuri
River. 363 This territory conflict escalates into armed conflicts in the
late 1960s. The hostilities were formalized in April 1979, when China
decided not to extend the thirty-year-old treaty of friendship, alliance,
and mutual assistance of 1950 beyond its expiration date of April
1980. 364 In light of the historical animosity between the Soviet Union
and China and the difficult nature of territorial dispute, the Sino-Soviet conflict will not be easily resolved. In this respect, all possible
implications of the Sino-Soviet conflict in the Korean question should
be considered in planning a long-term unification policy.
First, it seems that North Korea has managed to maintain its independence and maximize its leverage to its benefit in this dispute.
North Korea carefully watched the confrontation between the Soviet
Union and China in the late 1950s. It was indeed embarrassing for the
360. US Department of the Army, China: A Country Study, Third Edition, Washington: GPO, 1981, p. 406.
361. Ibid., pp. 47-49.
362. Ibid., pp. 47-49.
363. Ibid., pp. 47-49.
364. Ibid., pp. 408-409.
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North Koreans, who depended heavily on both Chinese and Soviet
economic and military assistance. At first North Korea did not
choose a side in the dispute and hoped that the Soviet Union and
China would resolve their differences. However, after the Congress of
East European Communist Parties in late 1962 attacked the North
Korean attitude, North Korea stood on the Chinese side. 365 North
Korea's position resulted in a decline of Soviet assistance which affected the North Korean economy.
After the fall of Khruschev from power in October 1964, North
Korea tried to improve its relations with the Soviet Union, especially
since supporters of the so-called Cultural Revolution of China attacked North Korean President Kim 11-Sung as a "fat revisionist." 366
Since then, North Korea has pursued a path independent of both the
Soviet Union and China. 367 Since 1969, North Korea has maintained
a comparatively balanced policy toward the Soviet Union and China.
The Soviet Union and China, both afraid of losing North Korea to the
other, tried to maintain a close relationship with North Korea. In this
context, Kim 11-Sung visited China in April 1975, and the Soviet
Union in May 1948, while Chou En-lai visited North Korea in April
1970 and Deng Xiaoping visited in September 1978 and again in April
1982. 368
Second, the North Korea-China-Soviet Union triangle is very
complicated and implies various possible future evolutions. A recent
news article on the subject demonstrates the complexity of this
triangle:
The military balance in the mid-1980s . . . is moving in the
opposite direction (in favor of South Korea) . . . Only Moscow can provide the North with the MIG 23s to match the
F15s ... in the South, and the price Moscow is demanding
to up-grade North Korea's defense is access to its military
facilities for the Soviet Pacific fleet, . . . anchorage and refueling rights at the ports on North Korea's western
coast. . . . Japanese officials believe that the Chinese succeeded in convincing (North Korean) Kim that this was too
high a price to pay, before Kim departed for Moscow last
May (1984) for his first visit to the Soviet Union in seventeen
years. . . . Kim's Moscow trip apparently did not yield a
365. U.S. Department of the Army, North Korea, supra note 348, pp. 29-30.
366. Ibid., pp. 21-31.
367. Koh Byung-Chul, supra note 358, pp. 204-206.
368. Kihl Young-Whan, "North Korea in 1984," Asian Survey, Berkeley: University
California Press, January 1985, pp. 7172; Koh Byung-Chul, supra note 358, pp. 207-208.
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new military accord . . . . Moscow, however, has hardly
given up. On November 13 (1984), Kapitsa was dispatched
to Pyongyang on a 14-day visit to make up lost ground. Observers view the border treaty initialled to resolve the two
countries long standing dispute as a significant concession on
Moscow's part . . . Kapitsa's unpublicized mission . . . was
to negotiate a military package which would provide Pyongyang with MIG 23s . . . in return for access to North
Korean military facilities . . . [t]he outward signs indicate
that his mission was less than a success. . . . On December
1 (1984) publicly announced Kim's three day unofficial visit
to the Chinese capital from November 26-28 . . . 369 and his
talks with Hu Yaobang on the Kapitsa's visit.
Third, considering North Korea's insecure position in the context
of the Sino-Soviet conflict, it has been North Korea's good fortune to
maintain its balancing policy in the Sino-Soviet conflict and succeed in
assuring the support of both China and the Soviet Union. Strangely
enough, South Korea has had no positive policy on this issue. If the
Sino-Soviet conflict creates insecurity for North Korea, it would be
expected that South Korea would pursue some positive policy to take
advantage of this conflict to weaken North Korean ties with one or
both of its major allies.
b.

The Sino-American Rapprochement

The Sino-American rapprochement is not an event independent
of the Sino-Soviet conflict, but another aspect of the conflict. The process of Sino-American rapprochement explained above will not be repeated here, but its implications for Korean unification shall be
considered.
The Sino-American rapprochement quickly changed the cold war
in the Korean peninsula. The U.S. and China, the two opposing major
powers directly involved in the Korean question, normalized their diplomatic relations and became friends. This sudden turn of events
greatly affected the mechanism for peace and unification in the Korean
peninsula. A superficial observation suffices to see this change in Korea. Just after the Shanghai Communique made by Nixon and Chou
Enlai, 370 the South-North Joint Communique was issued on July 4,
369. Far Eastern Economic Review, Hongkong, 17 February 1985, pp. 26-27.
370. US Department of State, Bulletin, March 20, 1972, pp. 435438; Hungdah Chiu ed.,
Normalizing Relations with PRC. Occasional Paper, School of Law, University of Maryland, Baltimore, No. 2-1978, pp. 146-154.
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1972, constituting the first significant movement toward the unification of Korea since the Korean War. This movement did not, however, indicate any significant agreement on Korean unification in the
Nixon-Chou talks or in the South-North Joint Communique. It
showed only a change in environment concerning the Korean question. This change of environment has several aspects. First, the SinoAmerican rapproachment ended the confrontation between the United
States and China, even in Korea. However, the rapprochement did
not make peaceful unification of Korea feasible. Even in the Shanghai
Communique the two sides failed to reach an agreement on the Korean question: 371
The United States will maintain its close ties with a support
for the Republic of Korea; the United States will support
efforts of the Republic of Korea to seek a relaxation of tension and increased communication in the Korean
peninsula. . . .
It (China) firmly supports the eight-point program for
the peaceful unification of Korea put forward by the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North
Korea) on April 12, 1971, and the stand for the abolition of
the United Nations Commission for the Unification andRehabilitation of Korea.
Although China stated that it would support the North Korean
position of unification, it might not have believed that the North Korean unification program was feasible. It merely expressed its support
for North Korea, conscious of Chinese-North Korean relations. The
statement of the United States was more frank. It did not mention
Korean unification but a "relaxation of tension and increased communication in the Korean peninsula." 372 A reasonable interpretation of
their intentions was that they accepted the status quo and peace in
Korea while they encouraged both sides to carry out negotiations by
themselves. By encouraging the South-North Korean dialogue, did
they believe that it would result in peaceful unification? It is not clear,
but it seems that they hoped more for an easing of tensions than for
peaceful unification, although they did not expressly give up the goal.
The fact that the United States' statement did not mention Korean
unification might indirectly indicate this attitude.
371. Ibid., pp. 147-148.
372. Ibid., p. 147.
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The National Strength of South and North Korea

No matter what unification policy South and North Korea may
pursue, it is beyond question that national strength is the most important factor in unification. Both South and North Korea clearly know
and have repeatedly expressed this truth. Therefore, national strength
is an essential element to be considered in planning any unification
policy. It is naive to interpret "peaceful unification" as a unification
achieved by agreement through negotiations without any consideration of national strength or other real factors. In light of this, several
aspects of the national strength of South and North Korea will be
studied.
a.

Economic Strength
1.

South Korea

South Korean economic development from a poor, war-destroyed
economy to a prosperous, industrial state is often called an economic
miracle. President Park Chung-Hee, after taking power in a military
coup d'etat in May 1961, concentrated on the economic development
of South Korea through a rapid expansion of exports based on several
five year economic development plans beginning in 1962.
In the twenty-year period between 1962 and 1981 the GNP
at 1975 prices grew from U.S. $6.3 billion to $30.4 billion, an
increase of 483 percent, and per capita GNP at current
prices rose from U.S. $87 to $1,607. This growth was fueled
by the rapid expansion of exports, which increased from approximately U.S. $50 million to $21.3 billion over the same
period. 373
This economic growth continued in the 1980s, and in 1983 the
GNP of South Korea was U.S. $75.3 billion, per capita GNP was U.S.
$1,884 and the dollar volume of commodity exports was U.S. $24.4
billion. In 1986, the last year of the Fifth Five Year Plan (1982-1986),
the GNP is expected to exceed U.S. $90 billion, with the value of commodity exports at U.S. $50 billion and per capita GNP of U.S.
$2,200. 374 As South Korean industry developed, the structure of industry also changed. Heavy and chemical industries represent the
fastest growing industrial sectors. During the Fifth Five Year Plan
period, these industries are projected to grow at an annual rate of 12.2
373. Korean Overseas Information Service, A Handbook of Korea, supra note 329, pp.
489-493.
374. Ibid., pp. 490; 504; Lee Chae-Jin, supra note 43, p. 82.
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percent, while light industry is projected to grow at 9.5 percent per
annum. 375
Having emerged as an important industrial country, South Korea
is now concentrating on becoming a new power in high technology
industries. Through strategic joint ventures with leading companies in
the United States and Japan, domestic research and development,
South Korea is rapidly developing high technology industries such as
computers, robots, and fiber optics.
South Korea is on the threshold of advancing into export
markets for very large scale integrated circuits and is shaping
up as a potential strong telecommunications competition
... Lately, semiconductors have grabbed the spotlight . . .
Samsung Semiconductor has introduced South Korea's first
64 K dynamic random-access memory (DRAM) chip to be
made without foreign license . . . Meanwhile, Hyundai
Electronics has developed 16 K static random-access memory (SRAM) that will be mass produced sometime later in
1984. 376
n.

North Korea

North Korea also performed well in economic development immediately after the Korean War. Compared to South Korea, North
Korea possessed extensive natural resources including eight billion
tons of coal and four billion tons of iron ore beneath its soil as of 1980,
and other non-ferrous metals such as tungsten, lead, copper, and
zinc. 377
After the First Five Year Plan (1957-1961), which gave priority
to heavy industry and collectivization of agriculture, North Korea
succeeded in establishing an industrial foundation. Actual production
surpassed the planned target one year ahead of schedule and was completed in 1960. However, due to the excessively vigorous pursuit of
economic development, both workers and machinery were exhausted.
The concentration on heavy industry and the unbalanced development
plan led to imbalances between different sectors. As a result, North
Korea's Kim 11-Sung proclaimed 1960 as the year of adjustment. 378
The first Seven Year Plan (1961-1967) failed, as the North Ko375. Korean Overseas Information Service, A Handbook of Korea, supra note 329, pp.
489-493.
376. Far Eastern Economic Review, Hongkong, 19 July 1984, p. 64. NIL.
377. U.S. Department of the Army, North Korea, supra note 348, p. 111.
378. Ibid., p. 113.
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rean Government admitted, and it was extended for another three
years. According to official explanations, the reason for its failure was
the disproportionate amount of funds expended on national defense.
But the actual reason for the failure appeared to be the drastic reduction in economic assistance from the Soviet Union and China during
the Sino-Soviet conflict. Thereafter, North Korea discontinued the
publication of annual economic statistics. 379
After initial contacts with South Korea through South-North
Korean dialogue in the early 1970s, North Korea seemed to be surprised at the rapidly growing economy of South Korea. North Korea
immediately began to import machinery from Western Europe and Japan during the period of the Six Year Plan (1971-1976). Excessive
imports resulted in an embarrassing international balance of payments
problem and a growing foreign debt beyond North Korea's financial
ability. In order to overcome these difficulties, the North Korean authority launched several mass campaigns such as the Three Revolutions Team Movement and the Seventy Day Speed Battle but were
unsuccessful. 380
The Second Seven Year Plan (1978-1984) tried to rectify the
problems of past economic plans by establishing major targets in various industrial sectors. However, the planned targets were not
achieved judging from various indicia. No announcement has been
made that the targets of the plan have been attained, as was done in
the past. An article in Nodong Sinmun (the official North Korean
newspaper) appeared on October 9, 1984, titled, "Let Us Vigorously
Advance Toward the Attainment of the Goals of the Second Seven
Year Plan." A new foreign economic policy was adopted on January
26, 1985, aiming to revitalize the stagnant North Korean economy by
importing new technology and capital from abroad. 381 Although several economic plans of North Korea did not succeed as planned,
North Korea has nevertheless developed some industrialization
through these plans. According to South Korean estimates, North
Korean GNP in 1983 amounted to U.S. $14.5 billion with per capita
GNP of U.S. $765. 382
North Korea's stagnant economy can be attributed to the centrally-directed economic system of a communist society, excessive mil379. Ibid., p. 113; Koh Byung-Chul, The Foreign Policy Systems, supra note 358, p. 41.
380. Asia 1977 Yearbook of Far Eastern Economic Review, Hongkong, p. 15; U.S. Department of the Army, North Korea, supra note 348, p. 114.
381. Kihl Young-Whan, "North Korea in 1984" supra note 368, pp. 6970; 74-75.
382. Korean Overseas Information Service, Seeking A Breakthrough, Seoul, 1984, p. 55.
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itary expenditures (23. 8 percent of GNP in 1983), inefficient economic
planning and management, and the closed society of North Korea.
b.

Population, Territory and Military Strength
i.

South Korea

South Korea's population is very large when compared to its territory. Its total population as of 1984 was 40,578,000 in a territory of
99,022 square kilometers, for a density of 404 persons per square kilometer. Furthermore, the Korean territory is mountainous, with
mountains covering roughly seventy percent of the whole peninsula. 383
However, population growth in South Korea has been remarkably reduced from an annual growth rate of 2.3 percent in the period 19661970 to an annual growth rate of 1.6 percent in the period 1976-1980.
The growth rate is expected to be further reduced to an annual rate
below 1.5 percent through government policy. 384 The total population
of South Korea is expected to be around 50 million by the year 2000.
The military strength of a country is difficult to determine accurately because of several factors. To attempt to determine the military
strength of a country only in terms of military personnel and the quantity of weapons is deceptive. The most important factor in military
strength is economic strength, the fundamental base of potential military power.
After the Korean War, the military forces of South Korea were
equipped and trained primarily by the United States. However, fearing a possible recurrence of war in Korea, certainly influenced by the
bluff policy of President Rhee, and considering the economic ability of
South Korea to support armed forces, the United States government
limited the military strength of South Korea to the level of sustained
military operations while relying upon the United States supporting
forces. The Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to
the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) of
April 2, 1954, clearly expressed this position. According to this memorandum, the security of South Korea depended on the deterrent effect
of the military posture of the United States and on the immediate employment of U.S. forces in support of South Korean forces in the event
of Communist aggression in Korea, rather than on the size of South
383. Korean Overseas Information Service. A Handbook of Korea, supra note 329, pp.
13-19; Korean Overseas Information Service. Seeking a Breakthrough, supra note 382, p.

55.
384. Ibid.
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Korean forces themselves. 385 As "the deterrent effect of the military
posture of the United States" the United States considered use of
atomic weapons coupled with the announced intention of the United
States to resist renewed aggression. This position was confirmed by
the Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of
Defense of March 31, 1954. 386
In this context, the United States government refused the expansion program of South Korean forces proposed by the South Korean
government. The proposed program consisted of thirty-five to forty
Army divisions; 6DD, 16DE, 4AM, 2AO, 2AE and 1AF for the
Navy; and five fighter wings, two light bomb wings, one reconnaissance wing, and one transport squadron for the Air Force. 387 Instead,
the levels of military strength the United States government authorized for South Korea were 655,000 Army personnel (twenty divisions);
15,000 Navy personnel with a maximum of eighty-three ships; 23,500
Marine personnel; and 9,000 Air Force personnel for one fighting
wing.388
South Korea maintained this level of military forces until 1961.
In the early 1960s, however, the South Korean government began to
build up a self-reliant defensive capacity. In the early 1970s, when the
United States government decided to withdraw its ground forces from
Korea, South Korea boosted its defense industry to assure self-reliant
defense capabilities. For this purpose, the South Korean government
enacted the Law on Military Supplies, and also took various measures
to support the defense industry, such as the creation of a support fund,
subsidies, tax privileges, defense fund raising, and other steps. 389 In
1975, the Defense Tax System was enacted to assure the funds necessary for the defense industry. This policy of defense industry development succeeded in producing almost every kind of military material
including long-range missiles, multi-firing rockets, M-48 A3 and M-48
A5 tanks (the equivalent of U.S. M-60 A1), 500 MD helicopters, destroyers, and F-5F fighter bombers. 390 The number of military personnel has not changed much, but paramilitary manpower and reserve
forces have increased to several million.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
464.

FRUS, 1952-54, part 315, supra note 315, p. 1778.
Ibid., p. 1780.
Ibid., p. 1781.
Ibid., p. 1782.
Ibid., p. 464.
Korean Overseas Information Service, A Handbook of Korea, supra note 329, p.
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n.

North Korea

There are no official statistics for the North Korean population.
The most recent official statistics on its population were those of 1963.
Strangely enough, North Korean authorities have kept secret most indicators of its national strength, probably fearing South Korea's
greater economic and military potentiaJ.3 91 However, reliable estimates based on indirect methods such as totaling electoral districts
(one district contains 30,000 persons) or official statement indicating
the percentage of the population in certain domains suggest that the
total North Korean population in mid-1983 was approximately 18.9
million. 392 The annual growth rate of its population varies with the
demographer, but on the whole was 2.5 percent or less in the period
1975-1980. 393 Some scholars visiting North Korea in the first half for
1980 were told by North Korean authorities that the annual growth
rate of its population was 1. 6 percent. 394 Although the North Korean
government encourages its people to have as many as four to six children, late marriage due to social conditions such as long periods of
military service (five to seven years) slows down a rapid growth in
population. 395
The total area of North Korean territory is 122,370 square kilometers, roughly fifty-five percent of the Korean peninsula (221, 120
square kilometers). Although the total area of North Korea slightly
exceeds that of South Korea, some eighty percent of North Korea's
land area is composed of mountains and uplands, making the actual
habitable land of North Korea smaller in area than that of South
Korea. 396
After the Korean War, which devastated 500,000 North Korean
troops, 397 North Korea concentrated on rebuilding its armed forces,
largely relying on military assistance from the Soviet Union and
China. Furthermore, North Korea concluded the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union and
China in July 1961. These treaties are, in reality, mutual defense treaties. The treaties provide that if one party is invaded, the other party
will render military and other assistance with every available means at
391. U.S. Department of the Army, North Korea, supra note 348, p. 58.
392. Korean Overseas Information Service, Seeking a Breakthrough, supra note 382, p.
52; North Korea, supra note 348, p. 58.
393. Ibid., p. 61.
394. Ibid., p. 61.
395. Ibid., p. 61.
396. Ibid., p. 52.
397. Ibid., p. 222.
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its command. These treaties are to be automatically renewed periodically, unless one of the parties gives notice one year in advance of its
termination. Soviet and Chinese support for North Korea is not limitless. After several aggressive actions were taken by North Korea in
the late 1960s, such as infiltration of North Korean commandos into
South Korea and the shooting down of American EC 121 reconnaissance aircraft, the Soviet Union declined to supply new advanced
weapons and military equipment to North Korea. 398
In relation to its small population, less than nineteen million in
1983, North Korea maintains a surprisingly large level of armed forces
of 700,000 to 800,000 regular troops with five million para-military
forces. 399 To maintain such a large number of armed forces, North
Korea has extended its compulsory military service term to longer
than the official five year term, and women also share military service,
making up as much as thirty percent of armed forces. This policy
greatly affects the manpower available for economic production. 400
North Korea's armed forces are well equipped. For ground
forces, they are equipped with 2,600 tanks, FROG missiles, and large
numbers of artillery guns, rocket launchers, and anti-aircraft weapons.
The North Korean Navy is equipped with nineteen submarines, 317
fast-attack craft, and 150 coastal amphibious ships. North Korea has
emphasized its Air Force by providing it with 700 aircrafts, containing
twenty-eight fighter wings and three bomber wings. 401 According to
the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), North
Korea apparently received permission from the Soviet Union to manufacture the MIG-21 in 1975. 402
With its determined and aggressive policy of unification, North
Korea concentrated on its defense industry and succeeded in producing most military weapons and equipment such as AK-47 rifles, mortars, rocket launchers, artillery, anti-aircraft weapons, personal
carriers, submarines and probably combat aircraft. It is very expensive for North Korea's population of eighteen million to maintain such
large armed forces. Actual annual defense expenditures are estimated
398. Ibid., p. 223.
399. Korean Overseas Information Service, A Handbook of Korea, supra note 329, p.
469; for details see, The Military Balance 1982-1983, International Institute for Strategic
Studies, London.
400. Korean Overseas Information Service, A Handbook of Korea, supra note 329, p.
234.
401. Ibid., pp. 468-472.
402. U.S. Department of the Army, North Korea, supra note 348, pp. 228-233.
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at as much as twenty to twenty-five percent of GNP. 403 Since South
Korean economic development is much more rapid and dynamic than
that of North Korea, North Korea will continue to be hard-pressed to
compete to increase its military strength, and in the long run, it will be
in a very difficult situation.
c.

A Brief Comparison of the National Strength between
South and North Korea
i.

Population and Area of Territory

The population of South Korea in 1983 was 39.95 million while
North Korean population was estimated at 18.90 million. The annual
growth rate of the South Korean population in 1983 was 1.56 percent
while the North Korean growth rate was estimated at 2.23 percent.
Thus, the South Korean population is more than twice that of North
Korea. Furthermore, South Korean labor productivity is estimated to
be much higher than that of North Korea because of the lag of North
Korean technology behind that of the South. North Korean industrial
facilities are obsolete, and its communist economy has systematic defects which hamper more effective economic operation as its economic
structure develops to a higher degree.
Superficially, North Korean territory is larger than that of South
Korea. The total area of the Korean peninsula is 221,120 square kilometers, of which fifty-five percent or 122,098 square kilometers belongs to North Korea and forty-five percent or 99,022 square
kilometers belongs to South Korea. However, North Korean territory
is very mountainous and eighty percent is composed of mountains and
uplands, leaving only twenty percent for habitation and agriculture.
Therefore, the population has been concentrated in the South. In addition, North Korea possesses far more natural resources than does
the South. 404
ii.

GNP

The gross national product of South Korea in 1983 was U.S.
$75.3 billion and its per capita GNP was U.S. $1,884 while North
Korean GNP in 1983 was estimated at U.S. $14.5 billion with a per
capita GNP U.S. $765. Thus, South Korean economic strength in
403. Ibid., p. 242; Korean Overseas Information Service, Seeking a Breakthrough, supra
note 382, p. 55.
404. U.S. Department of the Army, North Korea, supra note 348, pp. 50-55; 121-122;
Korean Overseas Information Service, Seeking A Breakthrough, supra note 382, pp. 52-54;
Korean Overseas Information Service, A Handbook of Korea, supra note 329, pp. 13-18.
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1983 was five times greater than that of North Korea. This wide gap
of economic strength between South and North Korea is expected to
increase because the economic growth rate of South Korea (around
nine percent) is far larger than that of North Korea (about four percent). If this trend continues, the estimated gap between two sides
after ten years is forecast as follows:
South Korean GNP
5(1 + 0.09) 10
8

North Korean GNP
(1 + 0.04) 10
The South Korean economy after ten years would be eight time
larger than that of North Korea, and before the year 2000 South Korean economic strength will grow so much that North Korean economic strength will no longer be comparable to it.
m.

Trade

The gap in trade volume between South and North Korea is even
greater than the gap in GNP. In 1983, South Korean exports
amounted to U.S. $24.4 billion and its imports were valued at U.S.
$26.2 billion, for a total volume of U.S. $50.6 billion. In the same
year, North Korean exports were estimated at U.S. $1.49 billion and
its imports at U.S. $1.66 billion, for a total volume of North Korean
trade of U.S. $3.15 billion, only seven percent of the South Korean
trade volume. If the trade growth rate of both sides are taken into
account, the gap in trade volume between the two sides is expected to
increase rapidly. North Korean annual export and import growth
rates in that 1970s were 13.6 percent and 11.4 percent respectively,
while South Korean annual export and import growth rates in the
1970s were thirty-seven percent respectively. 405
405. Korean Overseas Information Service, Seeking a Breakthrough, supra note 382, pp.
89-94.
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iv.

A Table of Comparison
Major Economic Indicators (1983)4() 6

Unit

Classification
Population
Pop. Growth Rate
Area
GNP
Per Capita GNP
Real Growth Rate
Exports
Imports
Total Trade

North Korea
South Korea
(A)
(B)

1,000
%
square km
billion $

u.s.$

%
billion $
billion $
billion $

39,950
1.57
99,022
75.3
1,884
9.1
24.4
26.2
50.6

18,900
2.23
122,098
14.5
765
4.3
1.49
1.66
3.15

A:B
2.1:1
5.2:1
2.5:1

100:7

Major Products (1983)4()1

Classification
Automobiles
Ship Building
Machine Tools
TV Sets
Refrigerators
Cement
Chemicals
Chemical Fertilizers
Major Synthetic Resins
Pig Iron
Crude Steel
Rolled Steel
406. Ibid., pp. 55; 91.
407. Ibid., pp. 79-83.

Unit
1,000
1,000 tons
1,000
1,000
1,000
1,000 tons
1,000 tons
1,000 tons
1,000 tons
1,000 tons
1,000 tons
1,000 tons

South Korea
340
4,000
50
10,500
1,540
23,450
200
1,200
1,000
8,852
13,200
18,870

North Korea
15
400
30
200
15
8,700
20
620
90
4,010
4,030
3,190
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Military Strength 408

Classification
Population
Regular Troops
Army
Navy
Air Force
Para-military
Homeland Reserve
Forces
Tanks
Armored Personnel
Carriers
SAM
SSM
Combat Aircraft
Bombers
Submarines
Destroyers
Other Naval Vessels

4.

South Korea
38.9 million
601.6 thousand
520 thousand
49 thousand
32.6 thousand
3.38 million

North Korea
Remarks
18.6 million
784.0 thousand
700 thousand
33 thousand
51 thousand
5.2 million

3.98 million
1,000

5.2 million
2,825

850
180
12
434

1,140
250
54
700

South Korean
tanks are higher
quality

South Korean
aircrafts are
higher quality

70
19
18
91

515

In total tonnage,
South Korea
outpaces North
Korea

The Special Environment of a Closed North Korean Society

Through four decades of division, the societies of South and
North Korea have become more heterogeneous in relation to one another. Although they had managed to maintain a remarkable national
homogeneity for several thousand years of history, the division of forty
years has already changed much. North Korea, the most closed society in the world, is not progressing toward national unification but
rather is building up a solid barrier for division. Peaceful unification
will not be achieved simply by the removal of an artificial demarcation
line through a sudden agreement by both sides, but rather through the
homogeneous reconciliation of the two opposing societies. Without
this reconciliation of two very different societies, unification is not feasible. If some kind of awkward unification was temporarily estab408. Korean Overseas Information Service, A Handbook of Korea, supra note 329, pp.
469-471.
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lished by some improbable event, it would soon lead to another civil
war. Therefore, in order to make a viable long-term plan for Korean
unification, the closed society of North Korea should be carefully
studied, and some positive measures for opening and changing of this
society should be taken. In consideration of this, the special environment of North Korean society which has evolved for four decades will
be analyzed.
a.

Collective and Controlled Society

A Korean-American scholar visited North Korea in 1974 and described it in these terms:
Outwardly, North Korea's moral and social codes were
much like those of the Puritans. Simplicity and thrift, faithful obedience to the authority, and diligence characterized
the way of life of the people . . . [T]he people were highly
industrious, working six days per week, and on the off-duty
day they went to donate their free labor to the state. In early
spring they began work at 7 a.m. and worked until5:30 p.m.
During the busy season (May through October), they work
from 5 a.m. to 7 or 8 p.m. They take one morning and one
afternoon break, and a lunch period from noon to 2 p.m. I
am not certain whether all workers take an afternoon siesta
(between 1 and 3 p.m.), but we were told that officials take
the 1 to 3 p.m. siesta and work until 9 or 10 at night. There
were two study (of political ideology) periods per day; one
before work began, and the other in the evening . . . Young
men of ages between 17 and 45 and young women between
the ages of 17 and 35 take compulsory military training
which lasts one to two hours per day for ten times per
month. Farmers and factory workers belong to the Workers
and Peasants' Red Militia. Tight internal security is maintained, and check points with barbed wire barricades were
everywhere. Even children marched in formation like
soldiers on the way to or returning from their
schools. . . .409
North Korean society may be described as a society of George
Orwell. In order to maintain this kind of collective society, various
surveillance systems, mass media, and a special education system are
necessary. The official apparatus of control and surveillance over the
409. Andrew C. Nahm, North Korea: Her Past, Reality, and Impression, Center for
Korean Studies, Western Michigan University, 1978, pp. 100-101.
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people and armed forces is the Ministry of Public Security and the
Political Security Department. The Ministry of Public Security carries out multiple functions such as regular police work, civil defense,
prison management, traffic control, fire prevention, and counter-espionage. The Political Security Department is an autonomous agency
whose function is the operation of the secret police and reports directly to Kim Il-Sung. 410
For effective surveillance over the people, the entire population is
classified into fifty-one categories on the basis of political reliability,
and redivided into three broader categories: 1) the core elements are
the Korean Workers' Party members, descendants of revolutionaries
and patriots; 2) the wavering elements are relatives of those who went
to South Korea and merchants and others; and 3) elements to be
watched are the anti-Party elements, political and economic criminals,
and religious believers. 411
Aside from official organs for security, various kinds of social organizations exist to strengthen social control. For example, in all
schools the principal and party cells perform this function. Boys and
girls aged nine to fifteen join the Young Pioneer Corps., and youths
between fifteen and twenty-six join the Socialist Working Youth
League. Women become members of the Korean Democratic Women's League. Manual, clerical, and office workers form a trade association. The Workers and Peasants' Red Guard is composed of
reliable persons and carries out the surveillance over reactionary
activities. 412
To maintain total control over social life, even domestic travel is
severely restricted. Travellers must receive permission in advance and
apply for food rations and coupons. Their itineraries must be approved. Travellers are subject to identification checks on the road and
at hotels. They should have several identification documents such as
residence cards, ration cards, union or party documents and personal
identification cards with information on employment and marital status and military identification. 413
The public media concentrates on the indoctrination of people.
The North Korean regime incessantly disseminates its propaganda
through mass media and various other means. Most radio programs
consist of decisions and information of the Party. Most evening life is
410.
411.
412.
413.

U.S. Department of the Army, North Korea, supra note 348, p. 213.
Ibid., pp. 76-77.
Ibid., p. 214.
Ibid., p. 215.
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filled with political education. During the lunch breaks, propaganda
agents read newspaper and books or carry out indoctrination through
loudspeakers. 414
For the maintenance of this collective society, the North Korean
regime gives priority to the educational system. In 1972, universal
eleven-year compulsory education was established, consisting of one
year of kindergarten, four years of elementary school, and six years of
secondary school. 415 North Korea also developed a comprehensive
system of pre-school nursery and kindergarten facilities which attempt
to raise children in accordance with Communist ideology and at the
same time to free parents for outside work. Through the school period, political and ideological education is emphasized. For example,
in the university, social science students receive ideological education
including the life of Kim which constitutes as much as forty percent of
the total curriculum. 416 It is beyond question that in the long run this
education system is inefficient for economic development.
Professor Nahm who visited North Korea in 1974 pointed out the
problem of North Korean society:
It is true that it has improved the material life of the poor
and increased social benefits for them, but they are utterly
deprived of basic human freedom and civil rights, having no
individual choice to make. Intellectuals have been indoctrinated in such a way that they seem to have no thought of
their own, or are not allowed to express their individual
opinions. . . . The people have no freedom to choose their
profession, the students have no freedom to select schools
. . . and the families, with the exception of a small number
of privileged ones, have no right to stay together. . . . People are fulfilled not by becoming themselves but by becoming
part of the collective whole. 417
b. The Personality Cult of Kim 11-Sung
North Korea's Kim 11-Sung is the symbol of North Korean society and the source of its authority. Obedience to Kim is absolute and
unconditional. His words are at once law and supreme command to
all North Koreans. 418 Every governmental and administrative func414.
415.
416.
417.
418.

Ibid., p. 215.
Ibid., p. 85.
Ibid., p. 89.
Andrew Nahm, North Korea, supra note 409, p. 103.
U.S. Department of the Army, North Korea, supra note 348, p. 164.
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tion serves to ensure strict popular compliance with the will and words
of Kim 11-Sung. As a result, it is impossible to suggest any opinion
which differs from Kim's words. Efficient administration cannot be
expected from this totalitarian regime.
Furthermore, Kim 11-Sung is deified to a surprising degree in
North Korea. All types of mass media are used to incite frenzied
praises of Kim and to ensure this image of Kim in the people's minds.
All religions have been replaced by the cult of Kim in North Korea.
Citing a few examples suffices to demonstrate this:
When General Kim 11-Sung came here, a new bright star appeared in the Galaxy at mid-night . . . [W]ith his magical
power and skills, General Kim 11-Sung attacked the enemy
on both sides of the mountains and in the west and in the
east simultaneously, and wiped them out. 419
All kinds of cultural activities are dominated by the cult of Kim. It is
religious veneration of Kim that credits him with all accomplishment
in North Korea. His birth place is venerated as a holy place where
millions of pilgrims come each year. 420 About 37,950 Kim 11-Sung
libraries and about 35,000 Kim 11-Sung statutes are scattered throughout North Korea. 421
For the purpose of Kim's cult, the modem history of North Korea is completely fabricated. To glorify the background of Kim 11Sung, North Korea creates various legendary stories about his parents,
grandparents and great-grandparents. The government fabricated a
modern history of Korea to support these created stories. Thus, every
member of the Kim 11-Sung clan became an anti-Japanese patriot or
anti-imperialist leader. For example, Kim 11-Sung's great-grandfather
Kim Ung-Woo was established as a symbol for the anti-American
struggle, saying that he had smashed the American ship General Sherman in 1886. 422
Since Kim 11-Sung's eldest son Kim Jong-11 is designated as heir
apparent to Kim 11-Sung, the fanatic idolization of Kim Jong-11 is also
being carried out:
Soon after Korea was emancipated from Japanese rule, three
stars rose over Mount Sorak in Kangwon Province in South
Korea. The stars stood for Great Leader Kim 11-Sung, his
wife, and his son, Kim Jong-11, respectively. . . . Kim Jong419.
420.
421.
422.

Andrew Nahm, North Korea supra note 409, p. 36.
U.S. Department of the Army, North Korea, supra note 348, p. 96.
Naewoe Press, Some Facts about North Korea, Seoul, 1984, p. 35.
Ibid., p. 33.
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II also produces miracles: he buries the sea with mountains
and makes palace-like villas rise out of barren land. 423 In old
days, the Great Leader (Kim 11-Sung) had the power to
move the ground and today the Jucheleader (Kim Jong-11)
has the power to move time. 424
This fanatic cult of Kim is two-faced in relation to Korean unification. First, it has a powerful effect in mobilizing the people in a
short time and in allowing North Korea's Kim to carry out whatever
he wants without any meaningful resistance. Second, in the long run,
Kim's cult greatly hampers national development by cutting off all
creative opinions in North Korean society. Thus, the economic gap
between South and North Korea will continue to grow.
Section C. The Legal Status Of A Divided Korea And The
Sovereign Right For Unification
Although several divided countries resulted from World War II,
there are significant differences among them. The cause of division,
the political and legal situation, the objective of the divided regimes
and balance of power between the two divided parts are quite different.
Therefore, it is difficult to develop a global legal theory which can
accurately reflect the actual situations of all the divided countries.
There is no agreement even in the terminology used to represent these
countries. Some scholars use "multi-system nations," contending that
use of terms such as "divided states," "divided nations," or "two
Koreas" has the misleading connotation that there are two nations or
states, while the term "multi-system nations" reflects faithfully the nature of division in that there are two political systems within one
state. 425 However, if the terms "divided state" or "divided nation"
(singular) is used instead of plural "divided states" or "divided nations," there would be no such connection implying two states or two
nations. Thus, terminology is not important. The reality is that there
are very significant differences among the divided countries. Accordingly, this study concentrates on the particular situation of Korea
rather than on any attempt at a comparative approach.
423. (Radio Pyongyang, April 1, 1983), Naewoe Press, Some Facts About North Korea,
supra note 421, p. 26.
424. Ibid., p. 26.
425. Hungdah Chiu, "The International Law of Recognition and Multi-System Nations," Multi-System Nations and International Law, Occasional Papers, 1981-8, School of
Law, University of Maryland, Baltimore, 1981, p. 45; Yung Wei, "The Unification and
Division of Multi-System Nations," Ibid., p. 61.
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1.

The Legal Status of a Divided Korea

a.

The Artificiality of the Korean Division and the Military
Character of the Demarcation Line

After the atomic bombings destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki on
August 6 and 8, Stalin entered the war against Japan and Soviet forces
rushed on Manchuria and North Korea within three days without any
significant resistance. The Americans, embarrassed by this unexpected situation created by a sudden fall of Japanese forces, then tried
to prevent the rapid expansion of the Soviet Union in the Korean peninsula. The result was the division of Korea. 426
On the concrete division of the Korean division, several explanations have been given by responsible persons and eyewitnesses:
Just before the surrender of Japan several one-star generals
hurried into an office in the Pentagon with the statement
"We've got to divide Korea. Where can we divide it?" A
colonel with experience in the Far East protested to his
superiors, "You can't do that, Korea is a social and economic unit. There is no place to divide it." The general insisted . . . "We have got to divide Korea and it has to be
done by four o'clock this afternoon." 427
"(John McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War) asked on
August 11 Colonel C. H. Bonesteel and me (Dean Rusk) to
retire to an adjoining room and come up with a proposal
which could harmonize the political desire to have U.S.
forces receive the surrender as far north as possible and the
obvious limitations on the ability of the U.S. forces to reach
the area. We recommend the 38th parallel. . . . " 428
"About midnight, August 10-11, 1945, Colonel Charles
H. Bonesteel and Major Dean Rusk . . . began drafting part
of a General Order that would define the zones to be occupied in Korea by American and Russian forces. They were
given thirty minutes to complete their draft, which a StateWar-Navy Coordinating Committee was waiting for. The
State Department wished the dividing line to be as far north
426. U.S. Department of the Army, Korea 1950, Washington: GPO, 1952, P. 4; Harry
Truman, Memoirs L Year of Decision, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1956, p. 433.
427. John Gunther, The Riddle of MacArthur, New York, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950, p. 178; Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 1945-1947, Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1981, p. 489.
428. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, volume IV,
The British Commonwealth and the Far East, Washington: GPO, p. 1039.
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as possible, while the military departments, knowing that the
Russians could overrun all of Korea before any American
troops could land there, were more cautious. Bonesteel and
Rusk wanted to follow a provincial boundary line north of
Seoul. . . . The only map immediately available was a
small-scale wall map of the Far East, and time was pressing.
Bonesteel noted that the 38th parallel passed north of Seoul
and almost divided Korea into two equal parts. He seized on
it as the proposed zonal boundary. " 429
This temporary demarcation line was consolidated as relations
between the two occupying powers deteriorated. They developed their
influences in their respective zones. The Soviet Union in particular
had a different objective in Korea and consolidated its position in
North Korea. As a matter of fact, immediately after arrival in North
Korea, the Soviet Union organized an administrative mechanism
utilizing local political organism. Soviet occupying forces cut off railway and postal service between the two zones. 430
After failure of the initial attempt of the U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission for Korean unification, the United States brought the problem
to the United Nations in the face of Soviet opposition. Although the
United Nations decided on a general election for the whole of Korea,
Soviet opposition prevented the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea from entering North Korea. Under these circumstances, the Commission carried out its mission only in South Korea
which saw the formation of the South Korean Government on August
15, 1948, while North Korea, in turn, established its government
under the auspices of the Soviet Union. 431 This is the well known history of the Korean division, which clearly developed against the will
of the Korean people.
There was no legal agreement or political intention arranged for
the Korean division. In the German case, after its total defeat, the
Allied Powers partitioned German territory. However, the Korean division has no reason behind it. Korean had been a victim of Japanese
429. J.L. Collins, War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons ofKorea, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1969, pp. 25-26; Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, supra
note 427, p. 120.
430. D.J. Dallin, Soviet Russia and the Far East, Yale University Press 1948, p. 261-;
G.M. McCuns and A.L. Greg, Korea Today, Harvard University Press, 1950, pp. 146-152;
Kim Hak-Joon, The Unification Policy, supra note 311, pp. 41-46.
431. For the details see U.S. Department of State, Korea 1945-1948, Washington: GPO,
1948; Leland M. Goodrich, Korea: A Study of US Policy in the United Nations, New York:
Council on Foreign Relations, 1956, Kraus Reprint, 1972, pp. 16- lOl.
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imperialism and the Korean Provisional government in China had
fought with the Allied Forces against the Japanese since 1919, no matter how meager it might have been. Therefore, the Korean division
was an unjustifiable sacrifice from a legal viewpoint.
After the Korean war, the division was consolidated along the
new demarcation line. As for the legal status of the actual demarcation line, the Korean Armistice Agreement very clearly provided it in
its Preamble:
Agree to accept and to be bound and governed by the conditions and terms of armistice set forth in the following Articles and Paragraphs, which said conditions and terms are
intended to be purely military in character and to pertain
solely to the belligerents in Korea. 432
It is beyond question that the demarcation line between South
and North Korea is merely a temporary military demarcation line. It
is not a national boundary between two states under international law.
There is no international legal instrument which can afford this demarcation line some legal significance more than that of a military
demarcation line.

b.

The Legal Status of South and North Korea

Although the demarcation line between South and North Korea
has only a military character, South and North Korea have diplomatic
relations with more than one hundred countries and a great number of
these countries have relations with both South and North Korea. Accordingly, it is difficult to deny the international legal personality of
both sides. What, then, is the legal status of the two parts of Korea?
First, it is easier to determine the legal status of South Korea.
After the formation of the South Korean Government, the United Nations General Assembly firmly approved its legal status:
The General Assembly, . . . declares that there has been established a lawful government (the Government of theRepublic of Korea) having effective control and jurisdiction
over that part of Korea where the Temporary Commission
was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the Korean people of all Korea reside; that this
Government is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea
432. See Korean Armistice Agreement of July 27, 1953.
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and which were observed by the Temporary Commission;
that this is the only such Government in Korea. . . .
(The General Assembly) . . . recommends that Member States and other nations, in establishing their relations
with the Government of the Republic of Korea, take into
consideration the facts set out (above) . . . . 433
Furthermore, the United Nations organized the United Nations Command and repelled the North Korean attack against South Korea on
the ground that a legitimate government was invaded by illegitimate
North Korean aggression. Therefore, the international society endorsed the legal status of South Korea from the start.
The United Nations did not, however, recognize the jurisdiction
of the South Korean government over North Korean territory. The
United Nations Resolution specified only "having effective control and
jurisdiction of that part of Korea" (South Korea). The Resolution added that South Korea was that "in which the great majority of the
people of all Korea reside . . . [and] that this is the only such government in Korea." 434 Accordingly, the United Nations recognized that
the South Korean government represented the great majority of the
Korean people, while it denied the legitimacy of the North Korean
regime, saying that the South Korean government was the only legitimate government existing in Korea. This position does not negate the
North Korean regime under international law. In concluding the Korean Armistice Agreement with North Korea, the United Nations recognized some legal status for North Korea; for example, as a
belligerent. Furthermore, North Korea has developed its legal status
in international society for more than three decades. It now has diplomatic relations with more than one hundred countries. It is admitted
to many special agencies of the United Nations. As a result, North
Korea's legal status would be similar to that of a state in international
society, although its legal status is weak as compared to that of South
Korea. The South Korean government was formed and recognized
under the United Nations. It represents more than two-thirds of the
Korean people. It is recognized by more countries than North Korea.
It has five times the economic strength of North Korea. The greatest
difference between South and North Korea is that the South Korean
government was formed by the free will of its people and that this
democratic system has been maintained (albeit not without problems),
433. UN General Assembly Resolution 195 (III), 12 December 1948.
434. Ibid.
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while the North Korean Government is a Communist totalitarian regime ruled by one dictator who has enjoyed power for four decades.
In conclusion, there are two contradictory aspects of a divided
Korea. One is that the demarcation line between the two parts of Korea is merely a temporary military demarcation line. The other is that
South and North Korea exercise international legal personalities,
although South Korea's legal status is stronger than that of North Korea. This is a legal complexity peculiar to the divided Korea. A reasonable interpretation of this complex problem is possible using two
distinctions.
The first distinction is between the two aspects of a divided Korea: the status of "Sellen" and the status of "Sein." Korea's status of
Sellen is one unified country, but the Korean status of Sein is de facto
two international legal persons. Korea should move from Sein to Sollen. Other countries should respect this particular aspect of a divided
Korea. They should not hamper the process of Korean unification.
The United Nations also recognized this in declaring in the consensus
statement in November 1973: "It is noted with satisfaction that a joint
communique was issued . . . which provides . . . the reunification of
the country should be achieved independently, without reliance upon
outside force or its interference. . . ." 435
The second distinction is between two types of relations of a divided Korea: international relations and South-North Korea relations. This problem will be studied in the next section.
c.

The Legal Interpretation of South-North Korean Relations

The peculiarities of a divided Korea are very clear in the relations
between South and North Korea. The international relations of a divided Korea and South-North Korean relations should be distinguished. Although South and North Korea each exercises its
international legal personality in international society, the inter-relations between the two parts of Korea should not be regarded as international relations. It should be regarded as the internal relations of a
divided Korea, with certain conditions. This important aspect of a
divided Korea is expressed indirectly in the South-North Korean Joint
Communique of July 4, 1972. First, the Communique uses the expression "two sides" instead of "two governments" or "two states." Second, the expression "as a homogeneous people, a great national unity
shall be sought, transcending differences in ideas, ideologies and systems" indicates that South and North Korea should be one nation and
435. UN Documents A/9341; A/9030, November 1973.
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seek out a great national unity. The Communique also emphasizes
that unification should be achieved through independent efforts of the
Korean people without being subject to external imposition or interference. This position implies that unification should be an internal
affair of the Korean people. 436
The positions of South and North Korea have been recognized
several times by the United Nations. 437 In this respect, relations between South and North Korea are different from relations between
East and West Germany. Inter-German relations are ruled by the
Treaty of December 21, 1972, on the Basis oflntra-German relations.
The Constitutional Court of West Germany confirmed that relations
between East and West Germany are governed by the rules of international law and by the special rules flowing from the special character
of a divided Germany. 438
Although the relationship between South and North Korea
should be an internal problem for the Korean people, there should be
certain limitations to intervention in one another's affairs. This would
be a natural limitation resulting from the special character of a divided
country. This limitation should be interpreted in terms of a reconciliation between "Sollen" and "Sein." For example, one part of Korea
should not intervene in any affairs of the other part which are clearly
internal problems. More concretely, South Korea cannot intervene in
the nomination of cabinet members of North Korea. However, beyond the purely internal affairs of North Korea, South Korea has the
right of intervention in North Korea. For example, South Korea can
demand that North Korea guarantee basic human rights of the people
or that North Korea bar the use of military facilities by the Soviet
Union.
The relationship between South and North Korea presents another important factor: South Korea's prevailing status over North
Korean status. The United Nations and international society have traditionally recognized South Korea as the sole legitimate government
in the Korean peninsula, 439 while North Korea had been denied legiti436. ROK, National Unification Board, A White Paper on South-North Dialogue in Korea, supra note 320, pp. 84-86.
437. UN Document A/9341, November 1973.
438. H. Mosler and R. Bernhardt, Fontes Juris Gentium, Series A, Section II, Tom. 7:
Decisions of German Courts Relating to Public International Law, pp. 348-365; recitation
from Hungdah Chiu, "The International Law of Recognition and Multi-System Nations"
in Multi-System Nations, supra note 425, p. 45.
439. UN General Assembly Resolution 195 (III), 12 December 1948; Resolution 293
(IV), 21 October 1949.
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macy for a long time. The legitimacy of South Korea should be reflected in South-North Korean relations. Furthermore, South Korea
represents more than two thirds of the Korean people. This representation of the majority is an important factor because a unified Korean
government must be formed on the basis of the free will of the majority of the Korean people. Therefore, the relative proportions of the
South and North Korean populations should be applied in the process
of unification. Finally, South Korea maintains a free market economy
while North Korea is a collective Communist society which denies
basic human rights. Of course, South Korea itself should improve its
democratic system. But the collective society of North Korea cannot
be compared to South Korean society. Accordingly, North Korean
society must be fundamentally changed before the development of true
relations with the South. In this sense, South Korean society should
provide the basis for a Korean unification.
In conclusion, South-North Korean relations are not international relations, but are internal relations of the whole of Korea.
Therefore, South-North Korean relations, including unification,
should be carried out by Koreans themselves without any foreign interference. As South Korea's legal status prevails over that of North
Korea, South Korea should play a leading role in South-North Korean relations. Although South-North Korean relations are the internal affair of the whole of Korea, the intervention of one side in the
other's affair should have certain limitations resulting from the special
character of a divided country. Thus, one side of Korea could not
intervene in purely internal affairs of the other.

2.

The Sovereign Right for Unification by Self-Determination

For all their differences, every divided country holds that the unification of the country by self-determination is the national goal. For
example, the preamble of West German Basic Law, May 8, 1949, confirms this position. Similarly, the constitutions of South and North
Korea define their territory as the entire territory of the divided country.440 It is one of the most important factors in divided countries that
they look to unification as the national goal. This is particularly clear
for Korea. For this purpose, South and North Korea agreed on the
principles of national unification, as in the Joint Communique of July
4, 1972:
The two sides have agreed to the following principles for unification of the fatherland: First, unification shall be achieved
440. Article 2 of the South Korean Constitution.
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through independent Korean efforts without being subject to
external imposition for interference. Second, unification
shall be achieved through peaceful means, and not through
the use of force against each other. Third, as a homogeneous
people, a great national unity shall first be sought, transcending differences in ideas, ideologies and systems. 441
As the relationship between South and North Korea is an internal
problem of the whole of Korea, Koreans themselves should achieve
Korean unification without any external interference. This Korean
unification by self-determination is the sovereign right of the Korean
nation. This has been recognized several times by the United Nations
over several decades:
In as much as the Korean question which is before the General Assembly is primarily a matter for the Korean people
itself and concerns its freedom and independence . . . (The
General Assembly) . . . calls upon all Members of the
United Nations to refrain from interfering in the affairs of
the Korean people ... [and] to refrain completely from any
and all acts derogatory to the independence and sovereignty
of Korea. 442
It is noted with satisfaction that a joint communique
was issued by the North and South of Korea on 4 July 1972,
which provides . . . the unification of the country should be
achieved independently, without reliance upon outside force
or its interference . . . It is the general hope that the South
and the North of Korea will be urged to continue their dialogue . . . in the above spirit so as to expedite the independent peaceful reunification of the country. 443
The General Assembly, considering that progress be
made towards the attainment of the goal for the peaceful unification of Korea on the basis of the freely expressed will of
the Korean people. . . .444
As a result, it is beyond question that Korean unification by selfdetermination is the sovereign right of the Korean people, and outside
powers must not interfere. What is the extent of this sovereign right?
South and North Korea undoubtedly should achieve their unification
441. ROK, National Unification Board, A White Paper on South-North Dialogue in Korea, supra note 320, pp. 84-84.
442. UN General Assembly Resolution 112 (II), 14 November 1947.
443. UN Document A/9030; A/9341, November 1973.
444. UN General Assembly Resolution 3333 (XXIX), 17 December 1974.
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in peaceful means as expressed in the Joint Communique. But from a
legal viewpoint, is any use of force in the Korean question illegal?
First, self-defense is traditionally recognized as a legal right. Accordingly, if North Korea attacks South Korea, South Korea may exercise its self-defense. Second, if South-North Korean relations are
internal relations of the whole of Korea, under strictly limited conditions, should the right of resistance to the North Korean regime be
recognized? St. Thomas Aquinas explains that this right of resistance
originated from natural law, which is the natural order realizing the
common good (bonum commune). According to St. Thomas Aquinas,
if a dictator commits so serious an injustice to the people that abiding
by the order of the dictator in itself would result in injustice, the right
of resistance is justified. 445 Therefore, if the totalitarian North Korean
regime never changes its suppressive rule, it would be justified, at least
in a legal sense, that South Korea use force in a proper manner against
the totalitarian regime.
Section D.

Possible Means To Achieve Korean Unification

Korean unification is a difficult and complicated problem that
multi-faceted efforts for four decades have not been able to resolve.
Therefore, there is no clearly assured way of unification. We should
try to pursue some feasible means of unification, considering all the
elements that we have studied. The lack of a clear path does not indicate that there is no hope for Korean unification. The rapidly growing
economy of South Korea is clearly preparing a way for unification. If
the growing trend of the South Korean economy continues, the prospects for Korean unification would be much brighter around the year
2000. In this section, we will examine the prerequisites for unification
and necessary measures for it.
We do not desire unification at any cost but only unification based
on a democratic system which guarantees a free market economy and
basic human rights. Therefore, when we say "Korean unification,"
the communization of Korea is excluded.
J.

The Prerequisites for Korean Unification

a.

The Achievement of Economic Maturity

The most important factor in Korean unification is national
strength. Peaceful unification is not a unification achieved simply
445. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I" II.. Qu. 96 Art. 4; II" II.. Qu. 42 Art.
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through negotiations without considering the national strength of the
two sides. The Communists will never resign their ambitions unless
they are forced to do so. Accordingly, maturity of economic development is an absolute prerequisite for Korean unification. According to
actual statistics, South Korean GNP is five times greater than the
North Korean GNP. 446 Economic indicators show that this gap is
expected to increase as much as ten times by 1994. If South Korean
economic strength is fifteen or twenty times greater than that of North
Korea, the interests of neighboring countries in South Korea would
largely prevail over those in North Korea, and South Korea could
pressure neighboring countries to favor it. Moreover, North Korea
would not be able to maintain its present position in South-North Korean relations. North Korea would be forced to modify its position.
South Korea will prevail over North Korea in the area of military
strength as well. Therefore, if present economic trends continue,
South Korea will be able to carry out an active policy for Korean unification in the latter part of the 1990s.
However, South Korea should note one important factor. Economic maturity means not only growth of economic volume but also
improvement of welfare. It must endeavor to improve the living standards of the poorest people. To this end, it should implement a social
security system as soon as possible. It should also extend the term of
free compulsory education to high school, as North Korea has already
realized the goal of free education. At the same time, South Korea
must increase the middle class, which is an important foundation of a
democratic society.
b.

A Strong But Democratic Government

Korean unification is a long-range national task which cannot be
quickly achieved. Social stability is an important prerequisite to successfully carry out this long-term policy. Therefore, voluntary national unity should be consolidated under the leadership for a strong
government. Unfortunately, it is true that the Korean people are not
satisfactorily politically mature. Of course, economic development
would quickly improve the political maturity of the people. But until
then, social turmoil is a possible danger. In this situation, a charismatic leader is desirable for solid national unity. Unfortunately, for
several decades, Korean political power has been held by unpopular
leaders who took control by military coup d'etat. For strong national
unity, this situation must be quickly improved and in the future, South
446. See "Major Economic Indicators," Chapter Three, Section C.3.(4).

PEACE AND UNIFICATION IN KOREA AND INT'L LAW

151

Korea should develop a mature democratic tradition where military
forces are absolutely subject to civilian government and military coups
d'etat are regarded as a national shame, which is possible only in less
developed countries. At the same time, students' involvement in political demonstrations, another phenomenon visible in the developing
countries, should also disappear.
A strong government should be maintained for a stable society.
Considering the military confrontation between South and North Korea, a long-term stable government is absolutely necessary. Some
professors of constitutional law speak for a parliamentary system of
government, but a presidential system is far more realistic in a tense
society like Korea. We often observe the difficult situation of ineffective coalition cabinets in mature parliamentary systems like Italy and
Israel. The term of presidency should also be considered. Frequent
changes of national leadership are not appropriate for carrying out any
long-term policy of unification. This does not mean, under any circumstances, that a one-man dictatorship is preferred. On the contrary, a democratic system must be guaranteed particularly in the
context of the confrontation with the totalitarian regime of North Korea. Considering all these elements, a single term of eight years for the
presidency or possibly two terms of six years would be most desirable
for South Korea.
c.

Persuasion of Neighboring Countries

As we observed, the neighboring countries of Korea would like to
see the maintenance of the status quo in the Korean peninsula. This
does not imply that they would oppose any Korean unification. If
they prefer the status quo in Korea, it is simply because they fear the
uncertainty of a unified Korea in the context of their national interests
and the risk of involvement in another Korean war. If they are persuaded that they will not be involved in another Korean war and that
a unified Korea is better for them than a divided Korea, they will support Korean unification.
In this sense, it would be useful to study the traditional American
policy for Korean unification. As explained above, the United States
policy for Korean unification has been based on two feasible alternatives:447 (1) a Korea divided for an indefinite period on the present
demarcation line with South Korea tied into the United States security
system and developed as a military ally; or (2) a unified, neutralized
Korea under a substantially unchanged South Korea.
447. FRUS, 1952-54, part 2, supra note 315, p. 1344.
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Between these two alternatives the United States Government in
the 1950s preferred a unified Korea, "even on a neutralized basis." 448
However, the United States government thought that both South Korea and the Communists would oppose this alternative. 449 Accordingly, the United States followed the alternative of a divided Korea
tied into the United States security system as a military ally. Despite
this, the first alternative, one that the United States believed to be the
only way to Korean unification without a global war, should be carefully studied. In reality, this alternative would not mean a neutral
Korea. It would mean a unified Korea friendly to the United Sates
without any foreign forces or bases. Therefore, if South Korea attempted to develop this unification program, the United States would
support it.
Other considerations include the positions of the Soviet Union,
China, and Japan. In the context of Sino-Soviet conflict, a unified Korea on South Korean terms would not be a threat to China. Prosperous economic cooperation between China and a unified Korea would
contribute greatly to Chinese economic development. A unified Korea
would clearly give an advantage to Japan. It would not only be assured of an important economic partner, but a unified Korea would be
an essential approach to the Asian Continent. It would remove difficult obstacles in Japanese economic relations with China and the Soviet Union. A unified Korea on South Korean terms would contribute
greatly to Japanese security. The most important factor is the Soviet
Union's interest in a unified Korea on South Korean terms. For the
Soviet Union, a unified Korea would produce mixed results. The Soviet Union would certainly gain several advantages from a unified Korea. If the United States withdrew its armed forces from South Korea,
the Soviet Union would be relieved of the threat of a possible military
confrontation with the United states in this region. It would also be
relieved of the financial and military burden of supporting North Korea. In the context of the Sino-Soviet conflict, the Soviet Union would
at least be assured of a neutral neighbor if Korea is unified on South
Korean terms. Of course, there may be certain disadvantages to the
Soviets from such a unified Korea. For example, in the context of the
U.S.-Soviet conflict, the Soviet Union may lose one friend in North
Korea. On the whole, though, a unified Korea without foreign forces
would be more advantageous to the interests of the Soviet Union than
the present situation of a divided Korea.
448. Ibid., p. 1346.
449. Ibid., p. 1950; FRUS, The Geneva Conference, supra note 313, p. 138.
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Korean unification would be very different from the German case
in terms of the political situation. West Germany alone is the strongest economic power in Western Europe with the largest population.
The West German population is about 62 million, while the East German population is about 17 million. 450 A unified Germany with a
population of 80 million would be the dominant power in Europe as
compared to France (54 million) and the United Kingdom (56 million).451 Besides, Germany's neighboring countries suffered greatly
from two invasions in the twentieth century. They naturally feel some
fear and tension from the possible unification of Germany. Therefore,
there may be no country willing to support the unification of Germany. The Soviet Union in particular would strongly oppose the unification of Germany. Since West Germany alone is already the
strongest power in Western Europe, West Germany may keep its leading role in the modern world even without unification.
Korean unification would differ in several respects from the German case. A unified Korea would have a population of 60 million and
a territory of 221,000 square kilometers. Korea's neighboring countries exceed this size. A unified Korea would never be a threat to its
neighboring countries. Several millennia of Korean history have
shown that it has never committed any aggression against any other
country. Accordingly, if the neighboring countries prefer the status
quo in Korea, it is not because a unified Korea is a threat but simply
because they do not know whether the eventual result of Korean unification would be advantageous to them and because they do not want
to risk involvement in a possible war in unifying Korea. Therefore, if
they can be reassured that these two problems would not occur, they
would support the unification of Korea, or at least not oppose it.
d.

A Social Change of North Korea

As we have observed, the present society of North Korea is a
society unique in the world. Under the deified Kim 11-Sung, almost
the entire population is trained as military personnel and organized as
para-military force. The territory of North Korea is fortified as a military base. The society is totally collectivized and mechanized under
the Communist Party's control. A new generation after the Korean
War has been thoroughly indoctrinated for three decades to Kim's
cult, and a large number of them are fanatical followers of Kim's cult.
450. US Department of State, Status of the World's Nations, Washington: GPO, 1983,
p. 6.

451. Ibid., pp. 6; 11.
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In this situation, unless this society is changed, Korean unification is
not feasible. Even if some superficial unification is made, it would lead
to another civil war. Therefore, before embarking on a program for
unification, some practical measures should be taken to change North
Korean society.
e.

Favorable Situations for Korean Unification

When the prerequisites for Korean unification are fulfilled, the
general environment is then prepared for unification. However, there
may be unexpected events which would accelerate the process of Korean unification. There have always been unexpected events which
have changed the history of world. The presumption that the situation relating to Korean unification would never change is unrealistic.
In order to prove this, it would be sufficient to reflect on the past fifty
years of world history. Friends and enemies in international society
have constantly changed and the order of powerful nations have also
changed. These changes will continue. For example, there is no rule
that the Soviet Union could never be changed. The fact that China is
slowly changing is good evidence. It is also possible that the East European bloc would be broken. So also there may be a true revolution
in North Korea. We do not know the future. What is important is
that we should be prepared for such an unexpected event. If we are
not prepared for that, it will not be helpful if some favorable events
unexpectedly take place. A favorable situation will certainly come at
some time.

2.
a.

How Can Korean Unification Be Achieved?
Internal Aspects
1.
Predominant National Strength

As explained above, national strength is the most important factor in unification. South Korean economic power must be ten to fifteen times greater than that of North Korea before South Korea can
carry out a concrete program of unification. Any kind of unification
would be possible only through the dominant national power of South
Korea. Therefore, South Korea should continue to concentrate on
economic expansion. If current economic trends continue to develop,
such a condition will be met in the late 1990s.
n.

National Unity and Support for Unification

Unfortunately, North Korea's people have a more positive attitude toward national unification than the South Korean people. Past
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administrations in South Korea could be blamed. Past administrations too often emphasized the possibility of invasion by North Korea,
partially for political purposes. It is quite true that North Korea
would invade the South if South Korea was in social turmoil and
weak. However, it is not a desirable way of persuading the people.
This policy has psychologically damaged the people's confidence in
unification. If they lose confidence in unification, it may be critical for
South Korea in time of crisis. The South Korean government should
encourage its people and instill in them some confidence in unification.
Every indicator shows that the South Korean position is far better
than that of North Korea. Accordingly, it is easy to convince South
Korea's people to have a positive attitude toward national unification.
If the South Korean people are enthusiastic toward unification, they
could easily be united for this national goal. If they are firmly united,
national development and social stability would be clearly guaranteed.
This is the clear method for unification. Without the people's general
confidence in unification, Korean unification is not feasible. This is an
important factor that can be achieved at little cost.
Several measures should be taken to consolidate national unity.
Considering its competition with the North, complaints of the poor
should be addressed. For this purpose, the social security system
should be organized. Medical insurance should be nationalized. The
term of free compulsory education should be extended to high school.
The financial burden of these programs should be managed through
various practical means. For example, to extend the free compulsory
education term, the private school system and compulsory military
service system could be utilized. Affluent people would be encouraged
to send their children to private schools while many qualified young
men would be given the choice to teach in public schools instead of
their compulsory military service. This compulsory education is particularly important in a traditional Confucian society like Korea,
where parents attach much importance to the education of their
children.
iii.

Consolidation of a Strong But Democratic
Government

The necessity of a strong but democratic government has been
explained. The intervention of the military in politics and political
demonstrations by students should simultaneously disappear. For this
purpose a strong charismatic leader is desirable. A strong charismatic
leader could consolidate national unity and lead the whole nation toward development and unification. A charismatic leader will not fall
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from heaven. If an able and virtuous person can succeed in reassuring
national confidence and be worthy of this confidence, he would be the
charismatic leader. Accordingly, a national leader should be elected
by a direct national election. Any leader imposed upon the people
would be hard-pressed to develop such national confidence, at least
within a short period. Because of this, the actual Constitution of
South Korea, which does not guarantee the direct popular election of
the president, should be amended. It has been explained that the presidential system is preferable to the parliamentary system and that a
single term of eight years or possibly two terms of six years is desirable
for the presidency. At the same time, a very strong governmental
mechanism should be installed in this consitutional amendment to
carry out efficiently the programs of unification. However, this strong
governmental system should be installed within the framework of a
democratic government which guarantees basic human rights. Ademocratic system is clearly a strong point vis-a-vis the North Korean totalitarian system.
iv.

Reorganization of the National Defense System

A national defense system should be divided into two different
objectives, the national defense against external invasion and the national defense in the context of South-North Korean relations. Until
now the two systems have been confused. However, if South Korea
wants to actively carry out a program of national unification, the two
national defense systems should be clearly distinguished and
reorganized.
First, the national defense system against external invasion
should be organized by alliance with the United States and other
friendly nations. The present national defense system would be in this
category. Second, the national defense system in the context of SouthNorth Korean relations should be independent of any Allied system.
National unification can be achieved only through self-reliance and
self-determination. National unification is a Korean national problem
and should be internationally publicized. If any one expects that some
friendly countries would achieve the unification for the Korean people,
it would be an impossible dream. Korean unification is possible only
when Korea can effectively prevent the intervention of foreign countries, because if one neighbor intervenes in the Korean question, the
other neighbors' interests would be affected.
In view of these defense considerations, a self-reliant defense system and the defense industry should be developed. The South KoreaU.S. alliance should be developed as a national defense system against
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external invasion and not in the context of South-North Korean relations. If North Korea attacks South Korea, South Korea alone should
be able to destroy the invading forces without the involvement of U.S.
forces. If the United States intervenes in Korea, other neighboring
countries will necessarily side with North Korea. The Korean peninsula would then be merely a place for combat by the major powers,
resulting in a disaster for Korea. The Korean War of the 1950s holds
many lessons for Korea. Therefore, it is unrealistic to include U.S.
supporting forces when military powers between South and North Korea are compared. South Korean forces alone must prevail against
North Korean forces. The goals of genuine self-reliant defense
strength and the defense industry must be achieved. This is not to say
that the Korea-U.S. alliance would not be helpful. This alliance is
absolutely necessary for national defense against external invasion. If
Korean unification can be achieved, the intervention of foreign countries must be prevented. Unfortunately, this is the only feasible means
of unification that history has taught us. Therefore, the two kinds of
defense systems must be distinguished and the South Korean defense
system should be reorganized.
v.

South Korea's Dominant Role in the Korean Question
and the Reduced Role of the United States

A dominant role for South Korea is the natural consequence of
the above arguments. If unification is a Korean national problem and
can be achieved only by self-reliant efforts, South Korea should take
charge of all the responsibilities in the Korean question.
Chapter One clearly proved that South Korea is the principal
party to the Korean Armistice Agreement, and Chapter Two explained that the United Nations Command in Korea was de facto dissolved. From this, the logical conclusion is that South Korea should
take charge of the implementation of the Armistice Agreement. South
and North Korea, not the United States, should operate the Military
Armistice Commission. At the same time, the commanding authority
of South Korean forces should be separated from the United States
forces, and both parties should establish a coordinating committee for
effective cooperation between the two forces. This procedure is natural for a sovereign state.
b.

External Aspects
1.

Assurance of Non-Intervention of External Powers

To carry out the program of unification, the assurance of non-
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intervention of external powers is absolutely necessary. To obtain this
assurance, South Korea must persuade all neighboring countries that a
unified Korea would be best for all. The two feasible alternatives of
the United States policy in the Korean question have been explained
here. Of these two alternatives, a unified Korea in South Korean
terms without any foreign forces should be the basic formula for persuading neighboring countries. In particular, South Korea should endeayor to persuade the Soviet Union that a unified Korea would never
be used as a base for attack against it. If this is accomplished, the four
neighboring countries should conclude an agreement that they would
never intervene militarily in Korean national affairs under any circumstances, except when one of them has already militarily intervened.
Even North Korea would not oppose it, dreaming the improbable
dream - unification on its terms.
ii.

Assurance That Neighboring Countries Will
Not Supply Nuclear Weapons on the
Korean Peninsula

The four neighboring countries should also agree not to supply
any nuclear weapons to the Korean peninsula. This agreement should
be easily reached because nuclear weapons in Korea would threaten all
countries. Of course, there is no way to prevent North Korea from
developing nuclear weapons. As South Korean economic strength
would prevail against the North, South Korea would not need to
worry about North Korean nuclear ability as long as neighboring
countries do not supply nuclear weapons to the North.
iii.

Long-term Foreign Policy for Unification: One Korea
Policy

South Korea has proposed simultaneous admission of South and
North Korea to the United Nations while North Korea has opposed
it, emphasizing that this would constitute a two-Korea policy. 452
However, North Korea might change this position within ten years in
light of the wide gap in national strength between South and North
Korea. Accordingly, South Korea should be careful in making a longterm foreign policy of unification. The East German position, which
argues for two Germanies, should be a good lesson for South Korea.
South Korea should concentrate on keeping the universal recognition
that the Korean nation is only one nation. It is true that many coun452. ROK, National Unification Board, A White Paper on South-North Dialogue in Korea, supra note 320, pp. 223-225.
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tries have double diplomatic relations with both sides of Korea. However, as the economic gap between South and North Korea rapidly
widens, South Korea should modify its long-term foreign policy and
use its economic power as leverage to assure its dominant position in
international society. In this context, South Korea should reconsider
its current foreign policy which argues for concurrent recognition of
both sides of Korea by the Communist bloc and the Western World.
One of the most important elements in a unification policy is the international recognition that Korean unification is a Korean domestic
problem and that foreign countries should not intervene. This is not a
time to fear a North Korean invasion, but a time to try to subject the
North Korean regime to South Korea's dominant position. Fortunately, North Korea still stands strongly for a one-Korea policy.
South Korea should not lose this opportunity. In the foreseeable future, North Korea will probably change its position and speak for a
two-Koreas policy. If the two-Koreas policy is firmly recognized in
international society, there is not much hope for unification by selfdetermination. The German case provides a good example of this type
of scenario.
c.

The Aspect of South-North Korean Relations
1.
Active Measures for Social Change in North Korea

To achieve Korean unification, the current society of North Korea must be changed. Until now South Korea did almost nothing to
advance a change. South Korea should quickly take the offensive and
carry out active measures to change the North Korean totalitarian collective society. Of course, it would be difficult to penetrate a thoroughly closed society like North Korea. It is also true that the more
closed a society, the more vulnerable to external cultures and systems.
Thus, South Korea should urgently study this program.
Several effective methods could be pursued to promote change in
the North Korean society. First, mass media such as television and
radio would be most effective. South Korea should launch a telecommunication satellite into the geo-stationary orbit for a direct broadcasting television system. It would take some time for the North
Korean people to be able to receive such direct-broadcast television
programs from a satellite, but modern technology would quickly
spread. At the same time, South Korea should intensify its radio
broadcasts to North Korea and carefully select the programs.
Second, to penetrate North Korean society, South Korea might
use pro-North Korea Korean residents in Japan. Since the North Korean society is a very closed society and there are not many connec-
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tions between the Korean residents in Japan and North Koreans, this
approach would be less effective. However, several hundred thousand
pro-North Korea Korean residents in Japan would be available in various ways.
Third, South Korea can send various public relations materials
through the demilitarized zone by utilizing balloons and other means.
Since the North Korean armed forces are concentrated in this area,
this would be very effective.
Fourth, South Korea should intensify its contacts with North
Korea through South-North Korean dialogues in hope of progress.
Recently, South Korea accepted the North Korean offer of relief
materials for South Korean flood victims for the benefit of the dialogue. In the foreseeable future some exchanges between the two sides
of Korea in areas such as sports and commerce are feasible.
ii.

The Desirable Direction for the South-North
Korean Dialogue

Although the initial period of South-North Korean dialogue in
the early 1970s was very active, its development was stalemated. Recently, the dialogue has shown some cautious movement, and some
progress might be expected.
The South-North Korean dialogue is very important for several
reasons. It offers an effective means to change North Korean society
and at the same time prevent foreign intervention in the Korean question, emphasizing that Korean unification is being carried out by the
Koreans themselves. Therefore, South Korea should encourage its
progress.
Several important considerations should be taken into account in
encouraging the South-North Korean dialogue. First, South Korea
should not confuse the objective of the dialogue. To hope for unification through such a dialogue with the North Korean Communists is
unrealistic. The only feasible objective of this dialogue is to open and
change the closed society of North Korea. If South Korea succeeds in
exchanges of sports or commerce with North Korea, it would be one
of the best ways to change the closed society of North Korea. The
North Korean Communists will never concede anything through dialogue unless it is forced to do so. This objective of the dialogue, to
change North Korean society, should be communicated to the South
Korean people. If not, the South Korean people would soon tire of
fruitless dialogues and lose confidence in unification.
Second, South Korea should change its attitude toward the dialogue and North Korea. It is not understandable that the North Ko-
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rean Communists arrogantly demand that South Korea repeal its
Anti-Communist Law and release certain prisoners, insulting the
South Korean Government, while South Korea is on the defensive and
tries to be gentle. 453 This attitude should be drastically changed.
South Korea should take a more dominant and confident position.
South Korea should demand that the North Korean regime recognize
the basic human rights of the Northern brethren, recognize their private ownership and freedom of religion, and return to a free market
economy. These demands will obviously not be accepted, but the psychological benefit of this behaviour to North and South Koreans
would be great. Attack is the best defense.

453. Ihid .. pp. 220-222.
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APPENDIX I
KOREAN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, 1953

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF,
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND, ON THE ONE HAND, AND
THE SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S
ARMY AND THE COMMANDER OF THE CHINESE
PEOPLE'S VOLUNTEERS, ON THE OTHER HAND,
CONCERNING A MILITARY ARMISTICE IN KOREA

PREAMBLE

The undersigned, the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations
Command, on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander· of the
Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese
People's Volunteers, on the other hand, in the interest of stopping
the Korean conflict, with its great toll of suffering and bloodshed
on both sides, and with the objective of establishing an armistice
which will insure a complete cessation of hostilities and of all
acts of armed force in Korea until a f;nai peaceful settlement
is achieved, do individually, collectively, and mutually agree to

accept and to be bound and governed by the conditions and
terms of armistice set forth in the following Articles and
Paragraphs, which said conditions and terms are intended to
be purely military in character and to pertain solely to the
belligerents in Korea.
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ARTICLE I
MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE AND
DEMILITARIZED ZONE

1. A Military Demarcation Line shall be fixed and both
sides shall withdraw two (2) kilometers from this line so as
to establish a Demilitarized Zone between the opposing forces.
A Demilitarized Zone shall be established as a buffer zone to
prevent the occurrence of incidents which might lead to a
resumption of hostilities.

2. The Military Demarcation Line is located as indicated
on the attached map (Map 1). 1'1
3. The Demilitarized Zone is defined by a northern and a
southern boundary as indicated on the attached map (Map 1)~'1
4. The Military Demarcation Line shall be plainly marked
as directed by the Military Armistice Commission hereinafter
established. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall have
_suitable markers erected along the boundary between the
Demilitarized Zone and their respective areas. The Military
Armistice Commission shall supervise the erection of all
markers placed along the Military Demarcation Line and along
the boundaries of the Demilitarized Zone.
5. The waters of the Han River Estuary shall be open to
civil shipping of both sides wherever one bank is controlled by
one side and the other bank is controlled by the other side. The
Military Armistice Commission shall prescribe rules for the
shipping in .that part of the Han River Estuary indicated on
the attached map (Map 2). 1'1 Civil shipping of each side shall
have unrestricted access to the land under the military control
of that side.
6. Neither side shall execute any hostile act within, from,
or against the Demilitarized Zone.
7. No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted
to cross the Military Demarcation Line unless specifically
authorized to do so by the Military Armistice Commission.
1 The originals of thc.~e maps, large-scale in size, are clepositecl with the signed
original Agreement io the archives of the Department. of State where they are
available for reference.
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8. No person, military or civilian, in the Demilitarized Zone
shall be permitted to enter the territory under the military
control of either side unless specifically authorized to do so by
the Commander into whose territory entry is sought.
9. No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to enter
the Demilitarized Zone except persons cancerned with the
conduct of civil administration and relief and persons
specifically authorized to enter by the Military Armistice
Commission.
10. Civil administration and relief in that part of the
Demilitarized Zone which is south of the Military Demarcation
Line shall be the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief,
United Nations Command; and civil administration and relief
in that pa1·t of the Demilitarized Zone which is north of the
Military Demarcation Line shall be the joint responsibility of
the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the
Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. The number
of persons, military or civilian, from each side who are
permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone for the conduct of
civil administration and relief shall be as determined by the
respective Commanders, but in no case shall the total numbe:'-"
authorized by either side exceed one thousand ('1,000) persons
at any one time. The number of civil police and the arms to
be carried by them shall be as prescribed by the Military
Armistice Commission. Other personnel shall not carry arms
unless specifically authorized to do so by the Military Armistice
Commission.

Nothing contained in this Article shall be construed to
prevent the complete freedom of movement to, from, and v~ithin
the Demilitarized Zone by the Military Armistice Commission, its
assistants, its Joint Observer Teams with their assistants, the
Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission hereinafter established,
its assistants, its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams 'h<ith their
assistants, and of any other persons, materials, and equipment
specifically authorized to enter the Demilitarized Zone by the
Military Armistice Commission. Convenience of movement shall
be permitted through the territory under the military control of
11.
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either side over any route necessary to move between· points
within the Demilitarized Zone where such points are not
connected by roads lying completely within the Demilitarized

Zone.

ARTICLE ll
CONCRETE ARRANGEMENTS FOR CEASE-FIRE
AND ARMISTICE
A. GENERAL
12. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall order
and enforce a complete cessation of all hostilities in Korea by
all armed forces under their control, including all units and
personnel of the ground, naval, and air forces, effective twelve
(12) hours after this Armistice Agreement is signed. (See
Paragraph 63 hereof for effective date and hour of the
remaining provisions of this Armistice Agreement.)
13. In order to insure the stability of the Milita.!·y Armistice
so as to facilitate the attainment of a peaceful settlement through
the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher
level, the-Commanders of the opposing sides shall:
a. Within seventy- two (72) hours after this
Armistice Agreement becomes effective, withdraw all of their
military forces, supplies, and equipment from the
Demilitarized Zone except as otherwise provided herein. All
demolitions, minefields, 'Alire entanglements, and other hazards
to the safe movement of personnel of the Militatr Armistice
Commission or its Joint Observer Teams, known to exist
within the Demilitarized Zone after the withdrawal of military
forces therefrom, together v.ith lanes known to be free of all
such hazards, shall be reported to the Military Armistice
Commission by the Commander of the side whose forces
emplaced such hazards. Subsequently, additional safe lanes
shall be cleared; and eventually, within forty-five (45) days
after the termination of the seventy-two (72) hour period, all
such hazards shall be removed from the Demilitarized Zone as
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directed by and under the supervision of the Military Armistice
Commission. At the termination of the seventy-two (72) hour
peri¢, except for unarmed troops authorized a forty-five (46)
day period to complete salvage operations under Military
Armistice Commission supervision, such units of a police nature
as may be specifically requested by the Military Armistice
Commission and agreed to by the Commanders of the opposing
sides, and personnel authorized under Paragraphs 10 and 11
hereof, no personnel of either side shall be permitted to enter
the De1nilitarized Zone.
b. Within ten (10) days after this Armistice Agreement
becomes effective, withdraw all of their military forces, supplies,
and equipment from the rear and the coastal islands and waters
of Korea of the other side. If such military forces are not
withdrawn within the stated time limit, and there is no mutually
agreed and valid reason for the delay, the other side shall have
the right to take any'· action which it deems necessary for the
maintenance of security and order. The term "coastal islands", as
used above, refers to those islands which, though occupied by one
side at the time when this Atmistic.e Agreement· becomes
effective, were controlled by the other side on 24 June 1950;
provided, however, that all the islands lying to the north and
west of the provincial boundary line between HWANGHAE-DO
and KYONGGI-DO shall be under the military control of the
Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and
the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, except the
island groups of PAENGYONG-DO (37°58'N, 124"40'E),
TAECHONG- DO (37"50'N, 124°42'E), SOCHONG- DO
(37"46'N, 124"46'E), YONPYONG-DO (37"38'N, 125"40'E),
and U-DO (37"36'N, 125°58'E), which shall remain under the
military control 'of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations
Command. All the islands on the west coast of Korea lying south
of the above-mentioned boundary line shall remain under the
military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations
Command. (See Map 3.) l'l
c. Cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing
military personnel; provided, however, that the 1-otation of units
and personnel, the arrival in Korea of personnel on a temporary
1

See footnote 1, a11te, p. 2.''n.
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duty basis, and th~ return to Korea of personnel after short
periods of leave or temporary duty outside of Korea shall be
permitted within the scope prescribed below. "Rotation" is
defined as the replacement of units or personnel by other units
or personnel who are commencing a tour of duty in Korea.
Rotation personnel shall be introduced into and evacuated from
·• Korea only through the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph
43 hereof. Rotation shall be conducted on a man-for-man basis;
provided, however, that no more than thirty-five thousand
(35,000) persons in the military service shall be admitted into
Korea by either side in any calendar month under the rotation
policy. No military personnel of either side shall be introduced
into Korea if the introduction of such personnel will cause the
aggregate of the military personnel of that side admitted into
Korea since the effective date of this Armistice Agreement to
exceed the cumulative total of the military personnel of that
side who have departed from Korea since. that ~ate.
Reports concerning arrivals in and departures from Korea
of military personnel shall be made daily to the Military
Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory
Commission; such reports shall include places of arrival
and departure and the number of persons arriving at
or departing from each such place. The Neutral Nations
Supervisory Commission, through its Neutral Nations Inspection
Teams, shall conduct supervision and inspection of the rotation
of units and personnel authorized above, at the ports of entry
enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof.
d. Cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing
combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition;
provided, however, that combat aircraft, armored vehicles,
weapons, and ammunition which are destroyed, damaged, worn
out, or used up during the period of the armistice may be
replaced on the basis of piece-for-piece of the same effectiveness
and the same type. Such combat aircraft, armored vehicles,
weapons, and ammunition shall be introduced into Korea only
through the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof.
In order to justify the requirement for combat aircraft, armored
vehicles, weapons, and ammunition to ·be introduced into Korea
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.for replacement purposes, 1·eports concerning every incoming
shipment of these items shall be made to the Military Armistice
·Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission;
such reports shall include statements regarding the disposition
of the items being replaced. Items to be replaced which are
removed from Korea shall be removed only through the ports of
entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof. The Neutral Nations
Supervisory Commission, through its Neutral Nations Inspection
Teams, shall conduct supervision and inspection of the
replacement of combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and
ammunition authorized above, at the ports of entry enumerated
in Paragraph 43 hereof.
e. Insure that personnel of their respective commands
who violate any of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement
are adequately punished.
f. In those cases where places of burial are a matter of
record and graves are actually found to exist, permit graves
registration personnel of the other side to enter, within a
definite time limit after this Armistice Agreement becomes
effective, the territory of Korea under their military control, for
the purpose of proceeding to such graves to recover arid evacuate
the bodies of the deceased military personnel of that side,
including deceased prisoners of war. The specific procedures
and the time limit for the performance of the above task shall
be determined by the Military Armistice Commission. The
Commanders of the opposing sides shall furnish to the other
side all available information pertaining to the places of burial
of the deceased military personnel of the other side.
g. Afford full protection and all possible assistance
and cooperation to the Military Armistice Commission, its
Joint Observer Teams, the 'Neutral Nations Supervisory
Commission, and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, in the
carrying out of their functions and responsibilities hereinafter
assigned; and accord to the Neutral Nations Supen.isory
Commission, and to its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, full
convenience of movement between the headquarters of the
Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the ports of
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entry enumerated· in Paragraph 43 hereof over main lines of
communication agreed upon by both sides (See Map 4)~'l and
between the head:Juarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory
Commission and the places where violations of this Armistice
Agreement have been reported to have occurred. In order to
prevent unnecessary delays, the use of alternate routes and
means of transportation will be permitted whenever the main
lines of communication are closed or impassable.
h. Provide such logistic support, i·ncl uding
communications and transportation facilities, as may be
required by the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral
Nations Supervisory Commission and their Teams.
i. Each construct, operate, and maintain a suitable
airfield in their respective parts of the Demilitarized Zone in
the vicinity of the headquarters of the Military Armistice
Commission, for such uses as the Commission may determine.
j. Insure that all members and other personnel of

the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and-of the Neutral
Nations Repatriation Commission hereinafter established shall
enjoy the freedom and facilities necessary for the proper exercise
of their functions, including privileges, treatment, and
immunities equivalent to those ordinarily enjoyed by accredited
diplomatic personnel under international usage.
14. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing
ground forces under the military control of either side, which
ground forces shall respect the Demilitarized Zone and the area
of Korea under the military control of the opposing side.
15. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing
naval fore~. which naval forces shall respect the waters
contiguous to the Demilitarized Zone and to the land area of
Korea under the military Lvntrol of the opposing side, and shall
not engage in blockade of any kind of Korea.
16. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing
air forces, which air forces shall respect the air space over the
Demilitarized Zone and over the area of Korea under the military
control of the opposing side, and over the waters contiguous to
both.
1

S!'e fnut nott> 1, a 11 f<:. p. 237.
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17. Responsibility for compliance with and enforcement of
the terms and provisions of this Armistice Agreement is that of
the signatories hereto and their successors in command. The
Commanders of the opposing sides shall establish within their
respective commands all measures and procedures necessary to
insure complete compliance with all of tl).e provisions hereof by
all elements of their commands. They shall actively cooperate
with one another and with the Military Armistice Commission
and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in requiring
observance of both the letter and the spirit of all of the provisions
of this Armistice Agreement.
18. The costs of the operations of the Military Armistice
Commission and of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission
and of their Teams shall be shared equally by the two opposing
sides.

B. MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION
1. COMPOSITION
19. A Military Armistice Commission is hereby established.
20. The Military Armistice Commission shall be composed of
ten (10) senior officers, five (5) of whom shall be appointed by
the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and five
(5) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme
Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander
of the Chinese People's Volunteers. Of the ten members, three
(3) from each side shall be of general or flag rank. Tht two (2)
remaining members on each side may be major generals,
brigadier generals, colonels, or their equivalents.
21. Members of the Military Armistice Commission shall be
permitted to use staff assistants as required.
22. The Military Armistice Commission shall be provided
with the necessary administra ...ive personnel to establish a
Secretariat charged with assisting the Commission by
performing record-keeping, secretarial, interpreting, and such
other functions as the Commission may assign to it. Each side
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shall appoint to the Secretariat a Secretary and an Assistant
Secretary and sucJ;t clerical and specialized personnel as required_
by the Secretariat. Records shall be kept in English, Korean,
and Chinese, all of which shall be equally authentic.
23. a. The Military Armistice Commission shall be initially
provided with and assisted by ten (10) Joint Observer Teams,
which number may be reduced by agreement of the senior
members of both sides on the Military Armistice Commission.
b. Each Joint Observer Team shall be composed of not
less than four (4) nor more than six (6) officers of field grade,
half of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in,-Chief,
United Nations Command, and half of whom shall be appointed
jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army
and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers.
Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, and interpreters
shall be furnished by each side as required for the functioning
of the Joint Observer Teams.

2. FUNCTIONS AND AUTHORITY
24. The general mission of the Military Armistice
Commission shall be to supervise the implementation of this
Armistice Agreement and to settle through negotiations any
violations of this Armistice Agreement.
25. The Military Armistice Commission shall:

a. Locate its headquarters in the vicinity of
PANMUNJOM (37°57'29"N, 126°40'00"E). The Military
Armistice Commission may re-locate its headquarters at another
point within the Demilitarized Zone by agreement of the senior
members of both sides on the Commission.
b. Operate as a joint organization witpout a chairman.
c. Adopt such rules of procedure as it may, from time

to time, deem necessary.
d. Supervise the carrying out of the provisions of this
Armistice Agreement pertaining to the Demilitarized Zone and
to the Han River Estuary.
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e. Direct the operations of t.'lle JoL'lt Observer Teams.
f. Settle through negotiations any violations of this
Armistice Agreemeni;.
g. Transmit immediately to the Commanders of the
opposing sides all reports of investigations of violations of this
Armistice Agreement and all other reports and records of
proceedings received from the Neutral Nations Supervisory
Commission.
h. Give general supervision and direction to the
activities of the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of
War and the Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced
Civili&ns, hereinafter established.
i. Act as an intermediary in transmitting
communications between the Commanders of the opposing sides;
provided, however, that the foregoing shall not be construed to
preclude the Commanders of both sides from communicating
with each other by any other means which they may desire to
employ.
Provide credentials and distinctive insignia for its
staff and its Joint. Observer Teams, and a distinctive marking for
all vehicles, aircraft, and vessels,· used in the performance of its
mission.
j.

26. The mission of the Joint Observer Teams shall be to
assist the Military Armistice Commission in supervising the
carrying out of the provisions of this Armistice· Agreement
pertaining to the Demilitarized Zone and to the Han River
Estuary.
27. The Military Armistice Commission, or the senior
member of either side thereof, is authorized to dispatch Joint
Observer Teams to investigate violations of this Armistice
Agreement reported to have occurred in the Demilitarized Zone
or in the Han River Estuary; provided, however, that not more
than one half of the Joint Observer Teams which have not been
dispatched by the Military Armistice Commission may be
dispatched at any one time by the senior member of either side
on the Commission.
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28. The Military Armistice Commission, or the senior
member of either side . thereof, is authorized to request the
Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to conduct special
observations and inspections at places outside the Demilitarized
Zone where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been
reported to have occurred.

29. When the Military Armistice Commission determines
that a violation of this Armistice Agreement has occurred, it·shall
immediately report such violation to the Commanders of the
opposing sides.
80. When the Military Armistice Commission determines that
a violation of this Armistice Agreement has been corrected to its
satisfaction, it shall so report to the Commanders of the opposing
sides.

3. GENERAL
31. The Military Armistice Commission shall ~eet daily.
Recesses of not to exceed seven (7) days may be agreed upon by
the senior members of both sides; provided, that such recesses
may be terminated on twenty-four (24) hour notice by the
senior member of either side.
32. Copies of the record of the proceedings of all meetings of
the Military Armistice Commission shall be forwarded to the
Commanders of the opposing sides as soon as possible after each
meeting.
33. The Joint Observer Teams shall make periodic reports
to the Military Armistice Commission as required . by the
Commission and, in addition, shall make such special reports as
may be deemed necessary by them, or as may be required by
the Commission.
34. The Military Armistice Commission shall maintain
duplicate files of the reports and records of proceedings required
by this Armistice Agreement. The Commission is authorized to
maintain duplicate files of such other report~. records, etc., as
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may be necessary in the conduct of its business. Upon eventual
dissolution of the Commission, one set of the above files shall
be turned over to each side.
35. The Military Armistice Commission may make
recommendations to the Commanders of the opposing sides with
respect to amendments or additions to this Armistice Agreement.
Such recommended changes should generally be those designed
to insure a more effective armistice.

C. NEUTRAL NATIONS SUPERVISORY COMMISSION
1. COMPOSITION
36. A Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission is hereby
established.
37. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be
composed of four ( 4) senior officers, two (2) of whom shall be
appointed by neutral nations nominated by the Commander-inChief, United Nations Command, namely, SWEDEN and
SWITZERLAND, and two (2) of whom shall be appointed by
neutral nations nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander
of the Korean People's Army. and the Commander of the
Chinese People's Volunteers, namely, POLAND and
CZECHOSLOVAKIA. The term "neutral nations" as herein
used is defined as those nations whose combatant forces have
not participated in the hostilities in Korea. Members appointed to
the Commission may be from the armed forces of the appointing
nations. Each member shall designate an alternate member to
attend those meetings which for any reason the principal
member is unable to attend. Such alternate members shall be
of the same nationality as their principals. The Neutral Nations
Supervisory Commission may take action whenever the number
of members present from the neutral nations nominated by one
side is equal to the number of members present from the neutral
nations nominated by the other side.
38. Members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory
Commission shall be permitted to use staff assistants furnished
by the neutral nations as required. These staff assistants may
be appointed as alternate members of the Commission.
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39. The neutral nations shall be requested to furnish the
Neutral Nations Superv}sory Commission with the necessary
administrative personnel to establish a Secretariat charged with
assistilig the Commission by performing necessary recordkeeping, secretarial, interpreting, and such other functions as
the Commission may assign to it.
40. a. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall
be initially provided with, and assisted by, twenty (20) Neutral
Nations Inspection· Teams, which number may be reduced by
agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military
Armistice Commission. The Neutral Nations Inspection Teams
shall be responsible to, shall report to, and shall be subject to the
direction of, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission only.
b. Each Neutral Nations Inspection Team shall be
composed of not less than four ( 4) officers, preferably of field
grade, half of whom shall be from the neutral nations nominated
by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and
half of whom shall be from the neutral nations nominated
jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army
and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers.
Members appointed to the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams
may be from the armed forces of the appointing nations. In
order tO facilitate the functioning of the Teams, sub-teams
composed of not less than two (2) members, one of whom shall
ba from a neutral nation nominated by the Commander-in-Chief,
United Nations Command, and one of whom shall be from
a neutral nation nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander
of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of
the Chinese People's Volunteers, may be formed as
circumstances require. Additional personnel such as drivers,
clerks, interpreters, and communications personnel, and such
equipment as may be required by the Teams to peJiorm their
missions, shall be furnished by the Commander of each side, as
required, in the Demilitarized Zone and in the territory under
his military control. The Neutral Nations Supervisory
Commission may provide itself and the Neutral Nations
lnspeetion Teams with such of the above personnel and

PEACE AND UNIFICATION IN KOREA AND INT'L LAW

equipment of its own as it may desire; provided, however, that
such personnel shall be personnel of the same neutral nations
of which the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission is
composed.
2. FUNCTIONS AND AUTHORITY
41. The mission of the Neutral Nations Supervisory
Commission shall be to carry out the functions of supervision,
observation, inspection, and investigation, as stipulated in
Sub-paragraphs 13c and 13d and Paragraph 28 hereof, and to
report the results of such supervision, observation, inspection,
and investigation to the Military Armistice Commission.
42. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall:
a. Locate its headquarters in proximity to the
headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission.
b. Adopt sucli rules of procedure as it may, from time
to time, deem necessary.
Conduct, through its members and its Neutral
Nations Inspection Teams, the supervision and inspection
provided for in Sub-paragraphs 13c and 13d of this Armistice
Agreement at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43
hereof, and the special observations and inspections provided
for in Paragraph 28 hereof at those places where violations of
this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred.
The inspection of combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons,
and ammunition by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall
be such as to enable them to properly insure that reinforcing
combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition
are not being introduced into Korea; but this shall not be
construed as authorizing inspections or examinations of any
secret designs or characteristics of any combat aircraft,
armored vehicle, weapon, or ammunition.
c.

d. Direct and supernse the operations of the Neutral
Nations Inspection Teams.
e. Station five (5) Neutral Nations Inspection
Teams at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 4S
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hereof located in the territory under the military control of the
Commander-in-Chief, Uni.ted Nations Command; and five (5)
Neutral Nations Inspection Teams. at the ports of entry
enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof located in the territory
under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the
Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese
People's Volunteers; and establish initially ten (10) mobile
Neutral Nations Inspection Teams in reserve, stationed in the
general vicinity of the headquarters of the Neutral Nations
Supervisory Commission, which number may be reduced by
agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military
Armistice Commission. Not more than half of the mobile
Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be dispatched at any
one time in accordance with requests of the senior member of
either side on the Military Armistice Commission.
f. Subject to the provisions of the preceding Subparagraph, conduct without delay investigations of reported
violations of this Armistice Agreement, . including s u c h
investigations of reported violations of this Armistice
Agreement as may be requested by the Military Annistice
Commission or by tlie senior member of either side on the
Commission.
g. Provide credentials and distinctive insignia for its
staff aJ?.d its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, and a distinctive
marking for all vehicles, aircraft, and vessels, used in the
performance of its mission.
43. Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be stationed at
the following ports of entry:
Territory under the military control
of the United Nations Conunand

Territory under the military control
of the Korean People's Army and
the Chinese People's Volunteers

INCHON

(37'28'N, 126'38'E)

SINUIJU

(40'06'N, 124'24'E)

TAEGU

(35'52'N, 128'36'E)

CHO::-<"GJIN

(41'46'N, 129'49'E)

PUSAN

(35'06'N, 129'02'E)

HUNGNAM

(39'50'N, 127'37'E)

KANGNUNG (37'45'N, 128'54'E)

MANPO

(41'09'N, 126'18'E)

KUNSAN

SINANJU

(39'36'N, 125'36'E)

(35'59'N, 126'43'E)

These Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be accorded full
convenience of movement within the areas and over the routes of
communication set forth on the attached map (Map 5).·1'1
'See footnote 1, ante, p. 23i.
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3.

GENERAL

44. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall
meet daily. Recesses of not to exceed seven (7) days may be
agreed upon by the members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory
Commission; provided, that such recesses may be terminated on
twenty-four (24) hour notice by any member.
45. Copies of the record of the proceedings of all meetings of
the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be forwarded
to the Military Armistice Commission as soon as possible after
each meeting. Records dhall be kept in English, Korean, and
Chinese.
46. The Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall make
periodic reports concerning the results of their supervision,
observations, inspections, and investigations to the Neutral
Nations Supervisory Commission as required by the Commission
and, in addition, shall make such special reports as may be
deemed necessary by them, or as may be required by the
Commission.. Reports sha_ll be submitted by a Team as a whole,
but may also be submitted by one or more individual members
thereof; provided, that the reports submitted by one or more
individual members thereof shall be considered as informational
only.
47. Copies of the reports made by the Neutral Nations
Inspection Teams shall be forwarded to the Military Armistice
Commission by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission
without delay and in the language in which received. They shall
not be delayed by the process of translation or evaluation. The_.
Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall evaluate such .
reports at the earliest practicable time and shall forward their
findings to the Military Armistice Commission as a matter of
priority. The Military Armistice Commission shall not take
final action with regard to any such report until the evaluatioa
thereof has been received from the Neutral Nations Supervis6lJ
Commission. Members of the Neutral Nations Supervisol')'
Commission and of its Teams shall be subject to appearance
before the Military Armistice Commission, at the request of the
senior member of either side on the Military Armistice
Commission, for clarification of any report submitted.
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48. The Neutral. Nations Supervisory Commission shall
maintain duplicate files of the reports and records of proceedings
required by this Armistice Agreement. The Commission is
authorized to maintain duplicate files of such other reports,
.records, etc., as may be nece&~ary in the conduct of its business.
Upon eventual dissolution of the Commission, one set of the
above files shall be turned over to each side.
49. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may
make recommendations to the Military Armistice Commission
with respect to amendments or additions to this Armistice
Agreement. Such recommended changes should generally be those
designed to insure a more effective armistice.
\

60. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission., or any
member thereof, shall be authorized to communicate with any
member of the Military Armistice Commission.
ARTICLE ill
ARRANGEMENTS RELATING TO PRISONERS OF WAR

61. The release and repatriation of all prisoners of war
held in the custody of each side at the time this Armistice
Agreement becomes effective shall be effected in conformity
with the following provisions agreed upon by both sides prior
to the signing of this Armistice Agreement.
a. Within sixty (60) days after this Armistice Agreement
becomes effective, each side shall, without offering any hindrance,
directly repatriate and hand over in groups all those prisoners of
war in its custody who insist on repatriation to the side to
which they belonged at the time of capture. Repatriation shall
be accotnplished in accordance with the related provisions of this
Article. In order to expedite the repatriation process of such
personnel, each side shall, prior to the signing of the Armistice
Agreement, exchange the total numbers, by nationalities, of
personnel to_ be directly repatriated. Each group of prisoners
of war delivered to the other side shall be accompanied by
rosters, prepared by nationality, to include name, rank (if any)
and internment or military serial number.
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b. Each side shall release all those remaining priscmers
of war, who are not directly repatria~ from its military control
and from its custody and hand them over to the Neutral Nations
Repatriation Commission for disposition in accordance with the
provisions in the Annex hereto: "Terms of Reference for Neutral
Nations Repatriation Commission."
So that there may be no misunderstanding owing to
the equal use of three languages, the act of delivery of a prisoner
of war by one side to the other side shall, for the purposes of this
Armistice Agreement, be called "repatriation" in English,
•• • • " (SONG HWAN) in Korean, and " iii& "
(CH'IEN FAN) in Chinese, notwithstanding the nationality or
place of residence of such prisoner of war.
c.

52. Each side insures that it will not employ in acta of war
in the Korean conflict any prisoner of war released and
repatriated incident to the coming into effect of this Armistice
Agreement.
53. All the __ sick and injured prisoners of war who insist
upon repatriation shall be repatriated with priority. Insofar as
possible, there shall be captured medical personnel repatriated
concurrently with the sick and injured prisoners of war, so as to
provide medical care and attendance en route.
54. The repatriation of all of the prisoners of war required by
Sub-paragraph 51a hereof shall be completed within a time limit
of sixty (60) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes
effective. Within this time limit each side undertakes to
complete the repatriation of the above-mentioned prisoners of
war in its custody at the earliest practicable time.
55. PANMUNJOM is designated as the place where
prisoners of war will be delivered and received by both sides.
Additional p~ace(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of
war in the Demilitarized Zone may be designated, .if necessary,
by the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War.
56. a. A Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War
is hereby established. It shall be composed of six (6) officers of
field grade, three (3) of whom shall be appointed by the
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Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and three (3)
of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of
the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese
People's Volunteers. This Committee shall, under the general
supervision and direction of the Military Armistice Commission,
be responsible for coordinating the specific plans of both sides for
-the repatriation of prisoners of war and for supervising the
execution by both sides of all of the provisions of this Armistice
Agreement relating to the repatriation of prisoners of war. It
shall be the duty of this Committee to coordinate the timing of the
arrival of prisoners of war at the place(s) of delivery and
reception of prisoners of war from the prisoner of war camps of
both sides; to make, when necessary, such special arrangements
as may be required with regard to the transportation and welfare
of sick and injured prisoners of war; to coordinate the work of
the joint Red Cross teams, established in Paragraph 67 hereof,
in assisting in the repatriation of prisoners of war; to supervise
the implementation of the arrangements for the actual
repatriation of prisoners of war stipulated in Paragraphs 53
and 54 hereof; to select, when necessary, additional place(s)
of delivery and reception of prisoners of war; to arrange
for security at the place(s) of delivery and reception of
prisoners of war; and to carry out such other related functions
as are required for the repatriation of prisoners of war.
b. When unable to reach agreement on any matter
relating to its responsibilities, the Committee for Repatriation
of Prisoners of War shall immediately refer such matter to the
Military Armistice Commission for decision. The Committee
for Repatriation of Prisoners of War shall maintain its
headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the Military
Annistice Commission.
c. The Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War
shall be dissolved by the Military Armistice Commission upon
completion of the program of repatriation of prisoners of war.

57. a. Immediately after this Armistice Agreement
becomes effective, joint· Red Cross teams com.posed of
representatives of the national Red Cross Societies of the
countries contributing forces to the United Nations Command
on the one hand, and representatives of the Red Cross Society
of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and represtmtatives
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of the Red Cross Society of the People's Republic of China on the
other hand, shall be established. The joint Red Cross teams shall
assist in the execution by bo~ sides of those provisions of this
Annistice Agreement relating to the repatriation of all the
prisoners of war specified in Sub-paragraph 51a hereof, who
insist upon repatriation, by the perfonnance of such
humanitarian services as are necessary and desirable for the
welfare of the prisoners of war. To accomplish this task, the
joint Red Cross teams shall provide assistance in the delivering
and receiving of prisoners of war by both sides at the place(s)
of delivery and reception of prisoners of war, and shall visit the
prisoner of war camps of both sides to comfort the prisoners of
war and to bring in and distribute gift articles for the comfort
and welfare of the prisoners of war. The joint Red Cross teams
may provide services to prisoners of war while en route from
prisoner of war camps to the place(s) of delivery and reception
of prisoners of war.
b. The joint Red Cross teams shall be organized as set
forth below:
(1) One team shall be composed of twenty (20)
members, namely, ten (10) representatives from the national Red
Cross Societies of each side, to ~ssist in the delivering and
receiving of prisoners of war by both sides at the place(s) of
delivery and reception of prisoners of war. The chairmanship of
this team shall alternate daily between representatives from the
Red Cross Societies of the two sides. The work and services of
this team shall be coordinated by the Committee for Repatriation
of Prisoners of War.
(2) One team shall be composed of sixty (60)
members, namely, thirty (30) representatives from the national
Red Cross Societies of each side, to visit the prisoner of war
camps under the administration of the Korean People's Anny
and the Chinese People's Volunteers. This team may provide
services to prisoners of war while en route from the prisoner
of war camps to the place(s) of delivery and reception of
prisoners of war. A representative of the Red Cross Society
of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or of tbe Red Cross
Society of the People's Republic of China shall serve as chainnan
of this team.
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(3) One team shall be composed- of sixty (60)
members, namely, thirty (30) representatives from the naiional
Red Cross Socii!ties of each side, to visit the prisoner of war
camps under the administration of the United Nations Command.
This team 11,1ay provide Services to prisoners of war while
en route from the prisoner of war camps to the place(s) of
delivery and reception of prisoners of war. A representative of a
Red Cross Society of a nation contributing forces to the United
Nations Command shall serve as chairman of this team.

(4) In order to facilitate the functioning of each
joint Red Cross team, sub-teams composed of not less than two (2)
members from the team, with an equal number of representatives
from each side, may be formed as circumstances require.
(5) Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks,
and interpreters, and such equipment as may be required by the
joint Red Cross teams to perform their missions, shall be
furnished by the Commander of each side to the team operating
in the territory under his military controL
(6) Whenever jointly agreed u.pon by the
representatives of both sides on any joint Red Cross team;- the
size of such team may be increased or decreased, subject to
confirmation by the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners
of War.
c. .The Commander of each side shall cooperate fully
with the joint Red Cross teams in the performance of their
functions, and undertakes to insure the security of the personnel
of the joint Red Cross team in the area under his military
control. The Commander of each side shall provide such
logistic, administrative, and communications facilities as may be
required by the team operating in the territory under his ·
military control.
d. The joint Red Cross teams shall be dissolved upon
completion of the program of repatriation of all the prisoners of
war specified in Sub-paragraph 51a hereof, who insist upon
repatriation.
58. a. The Commander of each side shall furnish to the
Commander of the other side as soon as practicable, but not later
than ten (10) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes

60h02 0 -
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effective, the following information concerning prisoners
of war:
{1) Complete data pertaining to the prisoners of
war who escaped since the effective date of the data Jut
exchanged.
{2) Insofar as practicable, information regarding
name, nationality, rank, and other identification data, date aDd
cause of death, and place of burial, of those prisoners of war wbo
died while in his custody.
b. If any prisoners of war escape or die after the
effective date of the supplementary information specified above,
the detaining side shall furnish to the other side, through the
Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War, the data
pertaining thereto in accordance with the provisions of
Sub-paragraph 58a hereof. Such data shall be furnished at ten-da7
intervals until the completion of the program of delivery and
reception of prisoners of war.
c. Any escaped prisoner of war who returns to the
custody of the detaining side after the completion of the
program of delivery and reception of prisoners of war shall be
delivered to the Military Armistice Commission for disposition.

59. a. All civilians who, at the time this Armistice
Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military
control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command,
arid who, on 24 June 1950, resided north of the Military
Demarcation Line established in this Armistice Agreement shall,
if they desire to return home, be permitted and assisted by the
Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command,· to return to
the area north of the Military Demarcation Line; and all
civilians who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes
effective, are in territory under the military control of the
Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the
Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, and who, on
24 June 1950, resided south of the Military Demarcation Line
established in this Armistice Agreement shall, if they desire to
return home, be permitted and assisted by the Supreme
Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander
of the Chinese People's Volunteers to return to the area south
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of the Military Demarcation Line. The Commander of each
side shall be responsible. for publicizing widely throughout
territory under his military control the contents of the provisions
of this Sub-paragraph, and for calling upon the appropriate
civil authorities to give necessary guidance and assistance to all
such civilians who desire to return home.
b. All civilians of foreign nationality who, at the time this
Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the
military control o:f the Supreme Commander of the Korean
People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's
Volunteers shall, if they desire to proceed to territory under the
military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations
Command, be permitted and assisted to do so; all civilians of .
fo~ign nationality who, at the time this Armistice Agreement
becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of
the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, shall, if
they desire to proceed to territory under the military control of
the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the
Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, be pertl_litted
and assisted to do so. The Commander of each· side shall be
responsible for publicizing widely throughout the territory under
his military control the contents of the provisions of this
Sub-paragraph, and for calling upon the appropriate civil
authorities to give necessary guidance and assistance to all such
civilians of foreign nationality who desire to proceed to territory
under the military control of the Commander of the other side.
Measures to assist in the return of civilians provided
for in Sub-paragraph 59a hereof and the movement of civilians
provided for in Sub-paragraph 59b hereof shall be commenced by
both sides as soon as possible after this Armistice Agreement
becomes effective.
c.

d. (t)· A Committee for Assisting the R~turn of
Displaced Civilians is hereby established. It shall be composed
of four (4) officers of field grade, two (2) of whom shall be
appointed by the Commander- in- Chief, United Nations
Command, and two (2) of whom shall be appointed jointly by
the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and
the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. This
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Committee shall, under the general supervision and direction of
the Military Armistice Commission, be responsible for
coordinating the specific plans of both sides for assistance to the
return of the above-mentioned civilians, and for supervising the
execution by both sides of all of the provisions of thia
Armistice Agreement relating to the ret urn of the
above - mentioned civilians. It shall be the duty of thia
Committee to make necessary arrangements, including those of
transportation, for expediting and coordinating the movement
of the above-mentioned civilians; to select the crossing point(s)
through which the above-mentioned civilians will cross the
Military Demarcation Line; to arrange for security at the
crossing point(s); and to carry out such other functions as are
required to accomplish the return of the above-mentioned
civilians.
(2) When unable to reach agreement on any
matter relating to its responsibilities, the Committee for
Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians shall immediately
refer such matter to the Military Armistice Commission for
decision. The Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced
Civilians shall maintain its headquarters in proximity to the
headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission.
(3) The Committee for Assisting the Return of
Displaced Civilians shall be dissolved by the Military Armistice
Commission upon fulfillment of its mission.

ARTICLE IV
RECOMMENDATION TO THE GOVERNMENTS
CONCERNED ON BOTH SIDES

60. In order to insure the peaceful settlement of the Korean
question, the military Commanders of both sides hereby
recommend to the _governments of the countries concerned on
both sides that, within three (3) months after the Armistice
Agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference
of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives
appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions
of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful
settlement of the Korean question, etc.
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ARTICLEV
MISCELLANEOUS
61. Amendments and additions to this Armistice Agreement
must be mutually agreed to by the Commanders of the opposing

sides.
62. The Articles and Paragraphs of this Armistice
Agreement shall remain in effect until expressly superseded
either by mutually acceptable amendments and additions or by
provision in an appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement
at a political level between both sides.

63. All of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement, other
than Paragraph 12, shall become effective at 1:- 2.. 0 0
hours
on 2, 7 JULY
1953.
hours on the
Done at Panmunjom, Korea, at I 0 0 0
Z 714 day of JULy , 1953, in English, Korean, and
Chinese, all texts being equally authentic.

KIMILSUNG

Marshal, Democratic:
People's Republic
of Korea
Supreme Commander,
Korean People's Army

PENG TEH-HUAI MARK W. CLARK

Commander,
Chinese People's
Vt~lunteers

General, United States
Army
Commander-in-Chief,
United Nations
Command

PRESENT

1

NAMIL

PI~/

~·\<-,~
WILLIAM K. HARRISON, JR.

Lieutenant General, United States
General. Korean People's Army
Senior Delegate,
Army
Delegation of the Korean People's Senior Delegate,
Army and the Chinese People's United Nations Command Delegation
Volunteers
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APPENDIX II
JULY 4, 1972, SOUTH-NORTH JOINT COMMUNIQUE
Recently there were talks held both in Pyongyang and Seoul to
discuss problems of improving the south-north relations and
unifying the dividedfatherland.
Director Hu Rak Lee of the Central Intelligence Agency of
Seoul visited Pyongyang from 2 to 5 May 1972 to hold talks with
Director Young Joo Kim of the Organization and Guidance
Department of Pyongyang. Second Vice Premier Sung Chul Park,
acting on behalf of Director Young J oo Kim, also visited Seoul
from 19 May to I June 1972 to hold further talks with Director
Hu Rak Lee.
With the common desire to achieve peaceful unification of the
Fatherland as early as possible, the two sides in these talks had
frank and openhearted exchanges of views, and made great progress in promoting mutual understanding.
In the course of the talks, the two sides, in an effort to remove
the misunderstandings and mistrust and mitigate increased tensions that have arisen between the south and north as a result
of long separation, and further to expedite unification of the
fatherland, have reached full agreement on the following points:
I) The two sides have agreed to the following principles for

unification of the fatherland:
First, unification shall be achieved through independent Korean

190

CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES

efforts without being subject to external imposition or interference.
Second, unification shall be achieved through peaceful means,
and not through the use of force against each other.
Third, as a homogeneous people, a great national unity shall
first be sought, transcending differences in ideas, ideologies, and
systems.
2) In order to ease tensions and foster an atmosphere of mutual
trust between the south and north, the two sides have agreed
not to slander or defame each other, not to undertake armed
provocations whether on a large or small scale, and to take positive measures to prevent ina.dvertent military incidents.
3) The two sides, in order to restore severed national ties, promote mutual understanding and to expedite independent peaceful
unification, have agreed to carry out various exchanges in many
fields.
4) The two sides have agreed to cooperate positively with each
other to seek early success of the south-north Red Cross talks,
which are under way with the fervent expectations of the entire
people.
5) The two sides, in order to prevent the outbreak of unexpected
military incidents and to deal directly, promptly and accurately
with problems arising between the south and north, have agreed
to install a direct telephone line between Seoul and Pyongyang.
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6) The two sides, in order to implement the aforementioned
agreed items, solve various problems existing between the south
and north, and to settle the unification problem on the basis
of the agreed principles for unification of the Fatherland, have
agreed to establish and operate a South-North Coordinating Committee co-chaired by director Hu Rak Lee and director Young
JooKim.
7) The two sides, firmly convinced that the aforementioned
agreed items correspond with the common aspirations of the
entire people, who are anxious to see an early unification of the
fatherland, hereby solemnly pledge before the entire Korean
people that they will faithfully carry out these agreed items.
4 July, 1972,
UPHOLDING THE DESIRES OF THEIR RESPECTIVE
SUPERIORS
HU RAK LEE
YOUNG JOO KIM
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APPENDIX III
SPECIAL STATEMENT REGARDING FOREIGN POLICY
FOR PEACE AND UNIFICATION BY PRESIDENT PARK:
CHUNG.HEE, JUNE 23, 1973

Dear Fifty-million Fellow Countrymen!
Today, I wish to announce the guide lines of our foreign policy
for peace and unification to improve substantially conditions for
the attainment of our long-cherished national aspiration to the unification of our fatherland. I make this announcement, taking into
account our experiences in the south-north dialogue and the recent
developments in international situation.
At the conclusion of World War II, Korea was liberated, but
our land was divided and our people were separated against their
will.
The 38th parallel, originally known as a millitary demarcation
line for disarming Japanese forces, turned later into an Iron Curtain. As a result, the south and north were cut off from each
other in political, economic, social, cultural and all other fields.
In the meantime, negotiations were conducted at the meetings
of the US-USSR Joint Commission to remove the barrier of
the 38th parallel and to establish a unified democratic govern-
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ment. Yet, these negotiations ended in failure due to basic
differences in the positions of the two parties. The Korean question was, then, submitted to the United Nations.
At the Second Session of the United Nations General Assembly
convened in 1947, a resolution was adopted calling for free general
elections throughout the whole of Korea. The United Nations
Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) was then dispatched to Korea to facilitate this objective.
However, the general elections were held only in the southern
part of Korea because of the negative attitude on the part of
north Korea. Thus. the government of the Republic of Korea
was established on 15 August 1948 and was subsequently recognized by the United Nations as the only lawful government in
Korea.
On 25 June 1950, the north Korean Communist forces launched
an unprovoked aggression against the Republic of Korea. During
the Korean War thus caused, an innumerable number of our
brethren lost their lives and the whole country was subjected to
destruction by warfare. An armistice was put into effect after
three years of war, but the country still remained divided and
the prospect of unification of the country became even dimmer.
In my Commemorative Address delivered on the occasion of
the 25th anniversary of national liberation on 15 August 1970,
I called for a relaxation of tension between the south and
north with a view to alleviating the sufferings of our compatriots
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arising from the division of the country and also to building the
foundations for a peaceful unification of the fatherland. On 12
August of the following year, our side proposed the south-north
Red Cross talks, and, on 4 July last year, the South-North Joint
Communique was issued.
The south-north dialogue was thus started. Yet, the results of
these dialogues lasting for almost two years since their beginning
have been far from our expectations.
In our talks with the north, we have taken the position that
both sides should endeavor to gradually remove the artificial
barriers between the south and north by solving easier and more
practical problems first and to phase out feelings of mutual distrust and replace them with those of mutual confidence through
concrete results. We further pointed out that such an approach
would best serve to make the talks productive and would also
serve as a short-cut to the eventual unification of the country by
peaceful means.
The north Korean side, in disregard of the existence of deeprooted feelings of distrust between the south and north, insisted
that military and political problems, which might endanger the
security of the Republic of Korea, must first be dealt with, as a
package, in the talks. While the very problem of reunification
. #
was being discussed at the talks, the north Korean side was continuously engaged in such external activities as would practically
perpetuate the division of the country.
In view of the current status of the south-north relationship, it
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is anticipated that not only many difficulties lie in the way of the
dialogue, but a considerable length of time will also be required
before the results of the dialogue originally expected can be attained.
Moreover, if the present state of affairs were to be left as it is,
the existing feelings of distrust might be deepened and even the
tension between the south and north might be aggravated.
Now, as for the recent developments in the international situation, it may be said that the era of Cold War after World Warn
came to an end. We have embarked upon a new era of peaceful
coexistence, based on the status quo, through the balance of
power among the major powers.
Judging also from a series of events witnessed in this part of the
world, it seems unlikely that the unification of our fatherland
can be attained within a short period of time.
These international trends give riseto a most serious problem
in the history of our nation. The problem is how to pursue the
national unification-the supreme aspiration and objective of the
whole Korean people-in the face of the stark realities of international situation.
My dear Fifty-million Fellow Countrymen!
We must tackle these realities in an active and positive way. We
must formulate wise and firm policies for attaining the goal of
national unification in the face of internal and external realities.
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Then, we must assiduously implement such policies.
We should have peace rooted firmly in this land and should
achieve, without fail, the ultimate goal of peaceful unification by
our own self-reliant efforts.
With these considerations in mind, I now declare the following
policies:
1) The peaceful unification of the fatherland is the supreme task
of the Korean people. We will continue to exert every effort to
accomplish this task.
2) Peace must be maintained in the Korean peninsula by all
means. The south and north should neither interfere with each
other's internal affairs· nor commit aggression against each other.
3) We will continue to make efforts with sincerity and patience
to secure concrete results from the south-north dialogue based on
the spirit of the South-North Joint Communique dated July 4,
1972.

4) We shall not oppose north Korea's participation with us in
intereational organizations, if it is conducive to the easing of
tensions and the furtherance of international cooperation.
5) We shall not object to our admittance into the United Nations together with north Korea, if the majority of the memberstates of the United Nations so wish, provided that it does not
cause hindrance to our national unification.
Even before our admittance into the United Nations as a member, we shall not be opposed to north Korea also being invited
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at the time of the U.N. General Assembly's deliberation of "the
Korean question" in which the representative of the Republic of
Korea is invited to participate.
6) The Republic of Korea will open its doors to all the nations
of the world on the basis of the principles of reciprocity and equality. At the same time, we urge those countries whose ideologies
and social institutions are different from ours to open their doors
likewise to us.
7) Peace and good-neighborliness are the firm bases of the foreign policy of the Republic of Korea. It is reaffirmed that we will
continue to further strengthen the ties of friendship existing betweel?- our friendly nations and our country.
I wish to make it clear that matters concerning north Korea in
the policies enumerated above are interim measures during' the
transition period pending the achievenment of our national unification and that the taking of these measures does not signify our
recognition of north Korea as a state.
My dear Compatriots in the South and North!
Upon an objective and realistic appraisal of the internal and
external situations surrounding our fatherland, I have a firm conviction that these policies are the only short-cut to the achievement of peaceful unification by our own self-reliant efforts amidst
international currents of relaxation of tension without impairing
the dignity and pride of our nation.
There can be no despair or frustration for a wise and courageous people.
Let us march together, with hope, courage and wisdom, toward
the attainment of peace in the Korean peninsula, prosperity of
~he nation and unification of our fatherland.
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